



JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

19980113 226

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

JPRS-NEA-92-046

CONTENTS

14 April 1992

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ze'ev Schiff Examines Relations With U.S. [HA'ARETZ 28 Feb]	1
---	---

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Haredim Facing Financial Difficulties [HA'ARETZ 19 Feb]	2
Path to Islamic State, Justice in Palestine [HA'ARETZ 21 Feb]	3
Palestinian Approach to Settlement Issue [HA'ARETZ 28 Feb]	6
Security Changes Following Jaffa Attack [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 18 Mar]	7
Overview of YESHA 1992, Settler Statements [HA'ARETZ 5 Mar]	7
Analysis of Autonomy, Jewish Settlement [HA'ARETZ 1 Mar]	9
Plan for Unified Metropolitan Jerusalem [HA'ARETZ 21 Feb]	11
Three-Fold Increase in Bedouin Recruitment [BAMAHANE 12 Feb]	12
Storm Over Ze'evi's Remarks on Gil'ad Murderers [HA'ARETZ 28 Feb]	13
Assessment of Levi's Standing in Likud [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 6 Mar]	13
Likud Tactics To Garner Immigrant Support [HA'ARETZ 14 Feb]	15
Analysis of HABAD, Likud Electoral Relations [HA'ARETZ 28 Feb]	16
Call To Establish Jewish Underground [NEQUDA Jan]	18
MK Sarid Defies Lubavitcher's Authority [BAMAHANE 12 Feb]	21
Profile of Lubavitch Center Kfar Habad [HA'ARETZ 14 Feb]	22
YESHA Council Leader Criticizes Security Gaps [NEQUDA Jan]	26
Details of Rabbi Shach's Attack on Habad [HA'ARETZ 2 Mar]	29
Paper Urges Stricter Gun License Measures [HA'ARETZ 22 Mar]	31
Factional Tensions at Qetziyot Prison [DAVAR 11 Mar]	31

ECONOMICS

Civad Administrator on Economics in Territories [BAMAHANE 5 Feb]	32
Deepening Recession, Gloomy Economic Forecast [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 27 Mar]	33

MILITARY

Photo Satellites, Collection Methods for IDF [BAMAHANE 5 Feb]	34
New 'Merkava' Tank Excludes U.S. Components [AL HAMISHMAR 25 Mar]	38
Analysis of 'Gray Areas' in Arms Trade [HADASHOT 15 Mar]	38
IDF Budgetary Planning, Constraints [BAMAHANE 5 Feb]	39
IDF, 'Black Panthers' Contend for Power [HA'ARETZ 3 Mar]	45
IDF Plans To Establish New Brigade in Gaza [BAMAHANE 25 Mar]	46
IDF Addresses Increased Hamas, Fatah Tensions [HA'ARETZ 23 Mar]	47
Analysis of Defense Industry Sales [BAMAHANE 12 Feb]	47
Tadiran Develops Antimissile Simulator [HA'ARETZ 2 Apr]	50

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ze'ev Schiff Examines Relations With U.S.

92AE0253B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Feb 92
p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Strategic Warmth, Political Freeze"]

[Text] The complex relations between Israel and the United States are often subject to opposed tendencies. On the one hand Israel seems to be stepping toward an unavoidable confrontation with Washington regarding the guarantees and the settlements. On the other hand, precisely at this time defense sources are saying that the strategic cooperation between the two countries has improved and that recently it showed gains for Israel. As usual, the truth lies somewhere in the middle and it is better not to view those relations in black and white.

Regarding the settlements, from talks with various personalities in Washington it became clear to me that this issue has become more emotion-laden than ever in the past. This has recently been expressed by President Bush, too, whose relations with Israel, rife with ups and especially downs, date back years ago, when he was vice president, and even before that. Secretary of State Baker viewed the settlements issue from a pragmatic angle, but ever since Israel challenged him by establishing a new settlement every time he came to Jerusalem, it became an emotional issue with him, too. Sources close to him say that was the reason that their influence regarding the settlements was curtailed, especially since the feeling in Washington is that Israel gave false reports on construction in the territories and violated its promises concerning the guarantees for the \$400 million in loans.

On the other hand, the administration already has a quiet solution to the issue of the guarantees. When Ambassador Shoval raised the question of whether Jerusalem was included in the agreement, Baker refrained from answering. Washington is willing to offer Shamir a very convenient ladder to climb down from his high tree and receive the guarantees; and if not all of them, at least some, and for a shorter period of time. Shamir does not need to give up the right of the Jews to settle in the territories, only to freeze this right for a certain period of time, for which he stands to receive a lot of money, provided he does not try to deceive Washington. The Administration is even willing to provide him with a good explanation for his voters by way of construction starts that may be completed.

The trouble is that the negotiation is being conducted almost publicly and that there are other sides to it, namely the Palestinians and other Arabs. Any U.S. concession to Israel in the matter of settlements is perceived by them as a net loss. It is also important to note that some of the high-ranking Administration functionaries claim that confrontation with Israel need not be avoided, on the contrary, it should be pursued. This current must not be ignored. According to them, a clash

with Israel is to be expected anyway, because Shamir will not be able to keep his promises regarding the settlements, and especially because there is no chance of arriving at a regional peace agreement as long as he is the leader of Israel. And if there is a clash with Israel, it is better that it be about the settlements, a matter on which the president enjoys broad support. This is also a good topic on which the U.S. Jewry will have to choose, between the extremists in Israel and the United States, which is offering guarantees in exchange for conditions with which one can live.

While these signs of deterioration are exposed for everyone to see, there has been a nice improvement in the defense relations between the two countries, in spite of the fact in the post-cold war era, many people in Washington are wondering about the significance of strategic cooperation with Israel. Among the many signs of this improvement are the increased number of visits by officials and high-ranking officers to Israel and extended calls by U.S. ships in our ports, up to 100 days a year. The intelligence cooperation between the two countries, the details of which cannot be revealed, is currently described as good. IDF [Israel Defense Forces] branches are benefited by joint study of the lessons of the Gulf War. Similarly, the area of joint exercises is also satisfactory to both sides. A significant gain was achieved when Washington listed 70 research and development topics on which America is interested in cooperating with Israel. Israel produced a much longer list. The 70 selected for joint study are an important compliment paid to Israel.

If there is one cloud hovering over the defense relations, it is the Dotan affair. The Dotan affair is far from being over and its fallout is dangerous. Aside from the two internal Pentagon and state comptroller inquiries, the U.S. Justice Department is also investigating it. Israel is closely cooperating with those bodies. The difficulties lie with the Congressional commission led by Congressman John Dingle, which is scheduled to open a public investigation in March. The impression is that Dingle is seeking a confrontation with Israel. Every detail, including a letter sent to Defense Minister Moshe Arens, is immediately leaked out. Through the Pentagon he is requesting and receiving many documents from the defense delegation. On the other hand, Israel continues to refuse—on grounds of the autonomy principle—to allow him and others to directly question Israeli witnesses. Most probably Dingle is trying to prove that \$50 million were stolen in Israel out of American aid money, not \$13 million as Dotan admitted, and that Dotan had additional partners among high-ranking officers and officials. The danger is that Dingle will bring about a worsening in military aid conditions to Israel.

How do we explain the improvement on the one side and the deterioration in relations on the other? Most probably the Administration is taking care not to weaken Israel in the defense area and wants it to feel secure. This is the background for the latest improvements. On the other hand, we must not go too far in our conclusions.

This is an Administration whose approach to Israel is an almost businesslike approach. Among the people close to the president there are some, like his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who believe that too much closeness to Israel may hurt the United States. The conclusion is that in this delicate system of relations we had better avoid confrontations with Washington and unnecessarily putting our relations with it to the test.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Haredim Facing Financial Difficulties

92AE0264A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Feb 92 p B3

[Article by Shahar Ilan: "The Emissary Was Received With Scorn"]

[Text] A stubborn rumor has it that the economic crisis in the Haredi community in the United States is so severe that Haredi institutions there are considering the dispatch of emissaries to Israel to obtain donations. A Haredi source asserted this week that one emissary from the United States had already arrived in Israel, but that he was received with great scorn.

But in Israel, too, the situation is getting worse; the American Haredis, who are incapable of funding their own institutions, have, of course, reduced their contributions to Israel to the minimum. The main sufferers are the institutions of the Haredi community, who do not accept money from the Zionist Government. In many yeshivas, salaries are being cut in order to avoid the dismissal of employees.

There are those who assert that these difficulties began three years ago, following the split in Agudat Yisrael. Many American donors, who could not understand why the Haredis in Israel are incapable of living in peace with each other, cut back their donations as a means of pressure.

But the great crisis began following the Gulf War, which increased the balance of payments deficit of the United States and caused a severe recession there. It is very difficult to find an important Haredi donor in the United States who was not hurt. The situation of the donors in Europe also is not good, but it is much better than in the United States. Among the Haredis, it is said that there is a growing community of Haredi business persons, who have fled from their creditors.

Many of the wealthy Haredis had invested in real estate, explains the Haredi newspaper THE SIXTH DAY, but the value of their assets declined, and they found themselves with mortgages that were larger than asset values and with murderous interest and tax payments. The Reichman family, for example, the richest Jewish family in the world, had assisted many Haredi couples in Israel with an interest- and linkage-free loan of US\$10,000. But

today, the family finds it difficult to pay its own mortgages. Due to the recession, its luxurious office buildings in New York are half-empty, and it has cut its donations to Israel to the minimum. Fund-raisers who visited the home of a major Canadian donor by the name of Tannenbaum, whose donations had been similar in size to those of the Reichman family, said that he had given \$18 dollars to everyone who approached him and invited him to come again in three years.

Some Haredi textile firms in New York supply goods to the giant Macy's department store chain. If that chain shuts down, those firms will go down with it. There were also cutbacks in the firms of the members of the Brin family, who are important donors to Gur Hassidism, and who manufacture military equipment for the American army, and the donations were cut back accordingly. The diamond industry also was hit hard by the recession.

But the hardest blow was the bankruptcy of the Photo 47 electrical appliance chain of the biggest benefactor of Satmar Hassidism, Hayyim Goldstein. It is said that Goldstein formerly would have reception hours on Sundays and Wednesdays, when he would sit with piles of dollars on the table before him and give them out to those who approached. Goldstein's electrical appliance chain itself did not suffer much from the recession, but he got entangled in poor real estate investments. If the stores close, the blow will be very severe; most of Goldstein's employees were Satmar Hassids.

The first important Haredi institution in the United States that was shut down due to economic difficulties was identified with Satmar. The reference is to the first Haredi school for special education in the United States, called "Hahush." Like many Haredi institutions in the United States, the school operated solely on the basis of donations and tuition payments. Lately, the Haredi newspaper FAMILY reports, it suffered from a deficit and, due to the lack of funds for paying salaries, its 120 pupils, all of them autistic or retarded, were sent home.

Given this situation, it is no wonder that almost every meshulah (a fund-raising emissary) who goes from Israel to the United States returns empty-handed and depressed. "They all come back crying," said one of Rabbi Shach's associates. "There are cases in which they also are insulted," relates another source. The Haredi newspaper THE SIXTH DAY writes that the month of Tevet formerly was characterized by many melave malka fund-raising parties in the United States, but this year there were hardly any such events during Tevet. Many professional "schnorrers" preferred to stay home.

As was mentioned, the hardest hit institutions in Israel were those of the Haredi community, which do not accept money from the Ministry of Education. These institutions receive allocations from an entity called the Fund for Salvation, which is financed by Satmar Hassidism in the United States. But when Satmar finds it difficult to maintain its own institutions in Brooklyn, it is forced to abandon institutions in Israel.

Thus, institutions close to the Haredi community, such as the "Mea She'arim" and "Hayye 'Olam" talmud torahs, began to accept allocations from the Jerusalem municipality. For some reason, the "Hayye 'Olam" talmud torah was chosen as the symbol of this breach, and the Haredi community began a struggle against it that included demonstrations, blows, and scurrilous leaflets. But these changed nothing, because the directors of the talmud torah had no other source of funds.

According to a member of the religious court of the Haredi community, Rabbi Yisrael Moshe Dushinsky, there is nothing left for the members of the community to do except to pray; at an event of the Dushinsky institutions in Israel, the rabbi interrupted his speech and instructed those present to pray "for the sake of our brothers, the Jews in the United States and in Europe, whose livelihood and economy have suffered most terribly."

Very severe problems have arisen also for Vischnitz Hassidism, which is led by the president of the Council of the Great Torah Scholars of Agudat Yisrael, the Admor of Vischnitz, Rabbi Moshe Yehoshu'a Hagar. The business situation of Yitzhaq Cassirer of Antwerp, a significant donor to Vischnitz, is excellent; Cassirer purchased a large building in Brooklyn recently, in which Vischnitz institutions in the United States will be housed, and next week the Admor will fly over to dedicate the building. But Cassirer, says a Hassidic source, donates only for buildings and not for activities. Consequently, the Vischnitz institutions in Israel were compelled to take large loans at high interest from banks and in the grey market. The increase in the budgets that the state allocates to the yeshivas helps, but Hassidism is finding it difficult to meet the murderous interest payments. A source within Hassidism says that all the buildings of Vischnitz in Israel have been foreclosed, as well as the Vischnitz hotel and the private apartments of the directors of the institutions. They say further that the Admor himself will attempt to raise money during his coming trip to the United States.

Important Lithuanian yeshivas, such as the Ponovitz Yeshiva of the leader of Degel Hatorah, Rabbi Eli'ezer Menahem Schach, are struggling with great difficulties. Only the institutions of Gur Hassidism are in relatively good shape: the chairman of the [Knesset] Finance Committee, Rabbi Moshe-Ze'ev Feldman, succeeded in directing to them special allocations of many millions of shekels, which raised his status and prestige considerably in Hassidism. Nevertheless, even in Gur Hassidism there is very slow progress in development activities such as the construction of the world center of this Hassidism, a giant structure of more than 20,000 square meters in the area of the Schneller Compound in Jerusalem. In the other yeshivas, such works are almost completely frozen.

Despite all this, there is still no news of the collapse of any Haredi institutions in Israel nor of any layoffs, perhaps because the Haredis prefer to cut the salaries of all the employees rather than to dismiss some of them.

Many families, who live on the already low salary of a yeshiva teacher, must consequently lower their standard of living even further. The level of the food in the yeshivas is going down, as well.

As the Haredi fund-raising system also serves private individuals, it is not only institutions that suffer from the situation. It is customary among the Haredis that in the framework of the betrothal the young couple receives an "arrangement," which means an apartment and equipment. Parents who are about to marry their children and do not have the money, travel to the United States to seek donations or dispatch emissaries for this purpose. So this area also has been hurt by the recession, and, with no alternative, the Haredi fund-raisers are compelled to seek other donation markets.

Consequently, a Haredi source relates, many meshulachim go today to Mexico and to Brazil, where many wealthy Jews of Sephardi origin are living. Another man says that the fund-raisers suddenly discovered the wealthy individuals in Israel, and they are conducting fund-raising trips to Tel Aviv and the Ramat Aharon neighborhood in B'nei B'rak. "The head of one kollel told me that he made 10,000 shekels in one evening in Israel," he said. "Who makes 4,000 dollars in one night abroad?"

A researcher on the Haredi population, Professor Menahem Friedman, foresees in his book *Haredi Society* a difficult economic crisis in the Torah institutions, which will no longer be able to obtain sufficient budgets from the state. Friedman says that the crisis in the United States is exacerbating the financial difficulties and bringing the crisis nearer. "It is a question of time," he says. In Friedman's opinion, when the crisis comes, Haredi society will have to select students and send some of them to work and to the army.

Path to Islamic State, Justice in Palestine

92AE0244A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Feb 92
p B4

[Article by Yosef Algazi]

[Text] The rainwater blocked the main entrances to Gaza from the north and south. We [finally] drove straight into the city center after making a big detour and coming in from the east, finally succeeding in crossing the main highway after a long time. The taxi had had to go around big puddles of water, pits, and potholes; to find its way in the tangle of cars moving in all directions with nobody there to direct traffic; to be sure not to bump into one of the wagons or stands scattered haphazardly; and above all, to take care not to run down anyone in the crowd of peddlers, shoppers, and other pedestrians making their way shouting through the mud and tumult. The roads are in ruin. The sidewalks are cracking to pieces. Piles of stinking trash and garbage are strewn everywhere.

"We live on another planet," someone from Gaza said to me many years ago. This crowded planet has a ruler, but it has no boss and no landlord. "There will be no elections to the Gaza city council until real progress has been made at the bilateral peace talks. All the words about elections coming soon are just balloons that the authorities and the people who want to be mayor are letting loose into the air. It is no accident the city is neglected—the authorities want us to stew in our own juice. If the pressure cooker that is called Gaza blows up, not only we will be hurt. Israel will suffer too," one of the Gazan community leaders said to me. I heard similar things from others.

"The world has forgotten us. Our Arab brothers have deserted us. Only God still remembers us," the cab driver summed up, after pouring out his problems to me and apologizing for going on so long. In Gaza, where the great majority of the people are Muslims, God has many messengers.

In the first 10 days of February, residents of Gaza counted 17 people who had been liquidated in the Strip by unidentified assailants. In every case, the victims had been accused of "collaboration," and the women—of "licentiousness"—as well. Nobody in Gaza will admit he knows who is committing these murders, who decides it should be done and how. A thick fog covers all with secrecy and dread.

From bits of conversation I picked up, it appears that the process of identifying the victims to be liquidated includes informing, painting threatening graffiti including people's names, spreading rumors, and interrogations that include ruthless torture. "What we are talking about is suspicion. To find out whether there is a basis for the suspicion, they put the suspects through the tortures of hell: stabbings, extinguishing cigarette butts on the suspect's body, scalding with white hot iron, pouring molten plastic over him. Under torture like this, the suspect will confess that he is Yitzhak Shamir—and also implicate others. Some of the interrogations are carried out within prison walls—so that sometimes the judgment that a victim should be liquidated is made while they are still in prison, but to avoid jeopardizing the prisoners, it is carried out after his release."

The liquidation is presented as a "patriotic act." Only in one of one conversations will you hear words of criticism or condemnation. One of the central figures in the city, who tried to downplay the seriousness of the phenomenon, said to me, "We know that Israel exploits the liquidations to make us look rotten within its borders and before the world. As long as the occupation lasts, we cannot prevent the phenomenon. To fight against it and against those taking part in it also means uncovering them and turning them over to the authorities, and no one would dare to do that. We live in a kind of vicious circle."

The manifesto published not long ago by one of the three factions of the Palestinian Communist Party criticized

the use of liquidations as an answer. The manifesto called for "judging anew all the means used against collaborators, and a halt to the physical liquidation of suspects, except in cases of overwhelming necessity and only after trying all nonviolent methods of deterrence, to avoid giving the occupying power and its agents a chance to exploit this phenomenon."

Gaza is the most important center of the Hamas organization, the Islamic opposition movement, in the territories. Until the party's existence was announced, in December 1987, they had been known as the "Islamic Union," founded by the Muslim Brotherhood 10 years before. Its members worked through mosques and educational institutions, and distributed money lavishly to those taking on a strictly religious way of life: for instance, men who openly and publicly kept all the tenets of the Muslim faith; and women who exchanged their modern clothing for a veil and traditional clothing. They had at their disposal large sums of money collected from donors in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, and sent by way of Egypt and Jordan. Sometimes the members of the "Union" took upon themselves the role of an armed militia acting as the guardians of morality. "The Israeli authorities did not oppose the Muslim Brotherhood; they saw them as a balance to the other organizations," I was told more than once.

Throughout their various incarnations, the Muslim Brethren have been known as religious zealots accustomed to using force in their relations with their rivals. Years ago, the Gaza offices of the Red Crescent, which is run by Dr. Heydar Avar A-Shafi, was the target of a pogrom-like attacks investigated by them. Only a few of the bloody encounters between Hamas activists and Fatah have reached the press. The conciliation agreement signed by the two organizations a year ago, with Yassar Arafat's blessing, is in danger because of Hamas's opposition to Palestinian participation in the talks in Madrid and Washington. At the end of last October, Hamas activists in Gaza tried to use violence to prevent the organization of the demonstrations supporting the peace process. Merchants who sell Israeli products, including surpluses of foods in short supply in the city, that they sell at reduced prices, like low-quality bananas and avocado, are in danger of being beaten and even of having their businesses set on fire by Hamas activists.

Outlawing the Hamas and arresting part of its leadership has not weakened its activity. Hamas has a wide social base, while the social base of the competing organization, the more radical Islamic Jihad, is narrower.

In its statement of principles, the Hamas declares itself part of the World Muslim Brotherhood movement. Like the [Muslim Brotherhood], it considers Palestine part of the "Muslim consecrated property (the Wakf) that belongs solely and forever to the entire world Muslim congregation." Like the [Brotherhood, Hamas] works for the return of Muslim rule in all the territories over which it ruled hundreds of years ago, from the Indian Ocean in the East to Spain in the west. "We believe that that day

is near." The Mujahedin in Afghanistan defeated a great power like the Soviet Union. Islam will soon rule again in the Islamic republics of the crumbling Soviet Union. The tanks will not prevent the Islamic victory in Algeria," Dr. Mahmoud H'ald A-Z'har, known to be one of the Hamas's leaders in Gaza, said to me.

Dr. A-Z'har arranged to meet with me in the city's Muslim University, which serves as the Muslim Brotherhood's stronghold. Since he was delayed, Dr. Abd Al-'Aziz A-Renatissi and Isma'il Renim greeted me in the meantime. The two, who presented themselves as "graduates" of Israeli jails, endeavored, citing passages from the Koran selectively, to convince me they do not hate Jews just because they are Jews. At the same time, they repeatedly said in all-encompassing language: "You Jews are responsible for all our injustices and all our misfortunes."

Isma'il Renim, a pharmacist, described the conditions of the interrogation when he was arrested. "The minute I was brought before my interrogators, they said to me 'We are going to take you right to the Masalaha (the slaughterhouse), and there you will talk.' The Masalaha is a nickname the interrogators themselves gave to the torture chambers in the prison at Gaza. They sat me on a low couch with my hands and feet shackled. After hours without sleep and with blows coming down on my head, I was asked by the interrogator to confess membership in a forbidden organization (Hamas) and admit to being a courier for the organization. Because I did not sign a confession, they sentenced me to prison based on somebody else's testimony against me. To the day I die, I will remember that interrogation, and their tortures."

Dr. Renatissi, a pediatrician, studied medicine in Alexandria, Egypt. He was freed from prison not long ago. "I spent the last three months in solitary confinement, because I refused to rise before the prison commander, Colonel Sh'alti'el. As a strict Muslim, I am not required to rise before any man, not even a commander, and not even God's messenger. I am required to rise only before God."

Dr. Renatissi is convinced that nothing good will come to the Palestinians as a result of the talks with Israel. They will bring only disaster. In his opinion there is only one solution: "to establish an Islamic state, in which Muslims, Christians and Jews will be equal, the way they lived once under the Muslim state founded by the successors of the prophet Muhammad. In order to ensure a Muslim majority in Palestine, all Jewish immigration will be stopped, and the three million Muslim Palestinians who were expelled will be returned. In the Muslim state, democracy will reign," he maintained.

Dr. Mahmoud A-Z'har, 46 years old, married and the father of seven children, studied medicine at the 'Eyn Shamas University in Cairo. He is a surgeon and today also lectures on the faculty for paramedical studies at the Islamic University in Gaza. In the elections to the Gazan Physician's Union, held at the end of January, he was not

chosen. "A prophet is not accepted in his own city," he claimed, "if there had been elections in the time of Moses the Prophet, he would not have succeeded in being elected either; if he were not elected, it would not have been Moses who should be ashamed, but the society he lived in." He does not admit to being a member of Hamas. "That is a forbidden, secret organization," he explained. In Gaza, it is accepted that he is the spokesman for the organization. A smile comes over his face when you mention this to him.

"There are two aspects to the Palestinian problem," as he explains the main points of his approach: "the political and the religious. Political—the State of Israel was created on a basis of injustice. Religious—it is forbidden for any believing Muslim to live under non-Muslim rule. The Israeli conquest is what ruined the relations between Muslims and Jews. Under Islamic rule, the Jews enjoyed complete freedom. The Jews suffered only under secular Arab regimes, like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq."

Dr. A-Z'har's vision of peace does not include the State of Israel's continued existence, and also not the creation of a Palestinian state. "Back in March of 1988, when I met with the then foreign minister, Shimon Peres, I already put before him a starting plan with four facets: Israeli withdrawal from the territories conquered in June 1967; the territories returned by Israel to be turned over to the UN or to some mutually accepted international body, which would manage the daily life there; the people living in these territories would choose their representatives; the chosen representatives would handle the negotiation with Israel."

Will the negotiations be directed toward setting up a Palestinian state in the territories that are vacated as a neighbor to the Israeli state? "No!" he responded, "in the next stage, the subject of the future of all Palestinian territory will be turned over to the international arbitration body, and it will decide, following the example of Taba."

[Algazi] What will happen if this arbitration body decides to divide Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish?

[A-Z'har] We will not agree to a thing like that under any circumstance. If that was to happen, we would turn to a body of Muslim religious judges and they would decide. We will never accept a non-Muslim state, or a secular Muslim state. We will accept only an Islamic state.

[Algazi] Why are you so certain that you will achieve that goal?

[A-Z'har] Time is part of the remedy. We have plenty of time. To found a great Islamic state will take less time than it would take to set up a tiny, secular Palestinian state. It depends on the will of the Arab peoples and of all the Muslims in the world. Every young Muslim knows the borders that exist today in the Arab world are artificial and that they were the creation of British, French, and Italian imperialists.

[Algazi] Do you support violence and the liquidation of suspected collaborators?

[A-Zh'ar] I act only according to the tenets of the religion of the Koran.

[Algazi] Many people believe you are responsible for the liquidation of suspected collaborators. Is this true?

[A-Zh'ar] Islam allows capital punishment in only three cases: a killer, whose punishment is to be killed; a married man and a married woman who commit adultery, and to whose adultery there are four eyewitnesses; anyone who was a Muslim and left Islam.

[Algazi] Personally, do you approve of liquidating collaborators?

[A-Zh'ar] I do not take a stand for or against. If I speak against it, that will be taken as meaning that I am an instigator against those carrying out the liquidations. There are organizations that take on themselves the responsibility for these actions. I am not responsible for them. So I declare that I am subject only to the tenets of Islam. I support every Muslim because he is a Muslim.

Dr. Heidar 'Abd A-Sh'afi, commenting on Dr. A-Zahr's declaration, said to me, "His opinions are not representative of Islam, and they do not reflect the opinions of most Muslims in Gaza. Many religious Muslims in the Strip have given me their blessing, for the peace mission that has been entrusted to me and my companions."

Palestinian Approach to Settlement Issue

92AE0253C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Feb 92
p B1

[Article by Danny Rubinstein: "Gains Means Individual Rights"]

[Text] In spite of the growing tension in Washington, the Palestinians most probably do not intend to break up the negotiations because of the settlements. It is true that in this week's QOL AL-ARAV the Israeli physician from East Jerusalem, Ahmad Tibi, urged the Palestinian delegation to suspend the talks in order to make it clear to the Israelis that the price they will have to pay for the settlements was rising with every passing hour and may even break the peace process, but the top Palestinian leadership is weighing its steps most carefully. Why do they need to give an ultimatum when the Americans are doing their work for them in the matter of the settlements?

"We must now alleviate the situation for the American Administration and not make difficulties for it," said one of the delegation advisers who stayed behind in Jerusalem. His colleagues in Washington can now certainly present the heavy price that will be exacted from Israel for the settlements: This price includes forfeit of the guarantees, great difficulties with the immigration absorption, and probably a stop to the immigration. The price that Israel will have to pay for the settlements will

include a sharp confrontation with the American Administration that may even involve Palestinian-U.S. coordination.

As unbearable as the economic and political price is, the Israeli society is already paying and will continue to pay in the future a far higher price for the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This is a price to which many have already adjusted: The creation of a warped apartheid-like society on the other side of the Green Line, built on two systems of laws and customs; a society of rulers and ruled; a democracy in which the Israelis, masters of their fate, live next to people deprived of the most elementary individual rights.

This is the reason that, before beginning to talk about other topics, simultaneously with their demand to freeze the settlements, the Palestinian delegates in Washington raised the issue of the human rights restrictions in the territories. In this manner they hope to make clear to everyone the meaning of continued Israeli rule in the territories and of the construction of settlements there. Even more than the settlements, gains in the area of human rights is what interests and concerns the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Those rights include putting a stop to the arrests, deportations, house demolitions, land seizures, school closings, movement restrictions, bans on political activities, press and literary censorship, and the other articles of the harsh security legislation. In fact, the Israeli proposals do not feature anything in that respect.

The Israeli delegation arrived in Washington with a string of ideas for discussion in the areas of jurisdiction of an autonomous Palestinian government. Israel proposed establishing teams to discuss Palestinian participation in transferring the authority to them in the areas of education, health care, transportation, welfare, municipal administration, and various economic fields.

These appear to be essential and important areas, but to a great extent the Palestinians have long since been in charge of them. The Israeli Government almost did not interfere, or more precisely, it bothered the Palestinians very little in matters like establishing school curricula, opening schools, or developing the health care system. Had they wanted to, the inhabitants of the territories could have built more plants, initiated more economic projects, improved the municipal networks, and developed the relief and welfare system.

Faysal al-Husayni and his people cannot go back to the territories and tell the people that they were successful at the negotiations and that, from now on, the mayor of Nabulus will not have to get the Israeli governor's approval for the municipal budget, or that their major gain was that an Arab physician will replace the Israeli staff officer for health care. They would be stoned to death. Thousands of Palestinian families are expecting that the peace talks with Israel will release their sons from jail and stop the daily roadblock harassment, not

bring them some trifling appointment of an Arab director general of the welfare services in the territories.

This kind of proposals for self-government in the territories were made by Moshe Dayan 20 years ago or more, when he forced the Palestinians to hold municipal elections in the West Bank and to manage some of their internal affairs. Almost no one in Hebron and Gaza now cares about that. What they are concerned about is the fate of the administrative detention orders and boarding up houses, what will happen in 'Alon Moreh, Bayt Hadassa, and Qedumim, and by how much they can raise the heavy price that Israel is paying for them.

Security Changes Following Jaffa Attack

TA1803165492 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 18 Mar 92 p 4

[Text] In the wake of the attack in Jaffa—the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], the police, and the General Security Services [GSS] will intensify their supervision and control of Arab residents of the territories who enter Israeli territory.

The intensification of the inspection will be accomplished in several ways: Checkpoints will be posted, including "surprise" ones; a license check will be conducted in work places within Israel; and supervision will be heightened in the granting of work permits and of permits to remain in Israel.

In addition, the inspection of vehicles belonging to residents of the territories—who receive permits to bring their vehicles into Israel—will be intensified. The inspection will be conducted via control and checkpoints on both sides of the Green Line: In the territories, the inspections will be conducted by the IDF and the Border Police and, within Israel, it will be done by the Israel Police and the Border Police. Checkpoints on roads into Israel will be posted not only during the morning—when the laborers leave for work—but also throughout the day.

The Civil Administration in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza has granted work permits and permits to remain in Israel to about 110,000 Palestinians. Sources within the defense establishment said yesterday that there is no intention to close Green Line areas to residents of the territories. They noted that the closing of the territories would bring about an exacerbation of the tension within the territories and, in its wake, an escalation of violence in the territories is liable to occur. Defense sources noted that there is concern about a rising wave of terror, especially because of the encouragement they received in the territories following the murder near Kibbutz Gal'ed; the freeze in the political negotiations; and because of the month of Ramadan—ending in two weeks—which influences the religious youths to fulfill religious commandments with greater enthusiasm.

Overview of YESHA 1992, Settler Statements

92AE0260C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Mar 92
p B3

[Article by N. Shegay: "Propaganda is Only the First Step"]

[Text] "How will you act if your struggle fails, and autonomy nevertheless prevails?" Elyaqim Ha'etzni, Shlomo Baum, and other members of the Right were asked when they presented the media with "YESHA [Judea, Samaria, and Gaza] '92—the headquarters for the Struggle Against Autonomy," which they set up in recent months. A clear answer to this was not given. But, whoever peruses the writings of the new headquarters, not necessarily today's, can find at least one clear clue in that direction.

A few years ago, not a long time after the evacuation of the Yamit District, Elyaqim Ha'etzni quoted, in the booklet "The Impact of Retreat From the Land of Israel," words from which we may, perhaps, learn of "the second route" that the new headquarters is preparing in the event that autonomy is achieved. The words were taken from Professor Yosef Klausner's article, "The First Pogrom and the Image in the Temple." There is no doubt that this is how Ha'etzni would like to see the opposition to autonomy, or the opposition to the evacuation of settlements.

And these are the words that were quoted there: "From the Roman emperor Caligula a decree was issued to erect his image in the great temple in Jerusalem, so that the eyes of all the Jews would be cast upon him. The decree was to be implemented by Petronius.... The matter was known in the land of Israel and agitated the heart of the Jews.... With the speed of lightning, the terrible rumor spread in Judea and the entire nation trembled.... At the start of the harvest they flowed from all corners of the land of Israel, from the cities and from the Jewish villages, by the thousands and tens of thousands, to the valley of 'Akko, and a great multitude stood before Petronius and his astounded army....

"Quickly, one terrible wail broke out from the entire camp, terrifying even the mighty Roman, Petronius. The multitude fell to their faces and pleaded for mercy for their temple.... The heart of the Roman was moved. Tens of thousands of swords were in his hands, and in their hands there was nothing. But, nevertheless, he felt in his soul that he was powerless against the great force that revealed itself in this multitude.... Great was the moment in time that Petronius, one of the better Romans, sprang back with his powerful legions in the face of the people who shamed his soul...."

"YESHA '92" is operating under more comfortable conditions: 110,000 Jews live in the territories, and the government is sympathetic. But, in spite of this, its people are seized with fear. "The people are asleep," Rafi 'Atiya of Beyt-El said yesterday. "Many know nothing

about what is written in the Camp David accords and what autonomy means to each and every one of them."

The YESHA council already published "A Possible Negative Scenario of Autonomy in Action," a few months ago and, in their words: "We will not be able to travel anymore on the roads that cut across Arab cities and villages, because, in the event that we would be attacked, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] could no longer rush to our aid.... According to the autonomy agreement, the IDF means to evacuate its forces and bases from the concentrations of Arab population in the region.... Armed Arab policemen will detain us for inspection between Elqana and Ari'el.... In the event of the least failure in the electricity network, water and telephones will be totally dependent on the grace of Arab clerks in the autonomy bureaus.... Hundreds of thousands of Arabs from Jordan and Lebanon mean to 'return' to the autonomous region."

The headquarters for the Struggle Against Autonomy was established on the background of the YESHA council's feeling of inaction; its rainbow of views range from the moderates of the Likud to the extremists of Moledet. Ha'etzni, Shlomo Baum, veterans of unit 101, attorney David Rotem, Ariyeh Stav, editor of NATIV, Me'ir Gross from Beyt-El, and many others were drawn into action. They have already held 60 evenings of propaganda in the territories. Among the lecturers have been Knesset members from the Tehiya, Moledet, and MAFDAL parties, Professor Hillel Weiss from Elqana, Professor Yosef Ben Shlomo from Qedumim, Dr. Mordekhai Nisan and Rafi Yisra'eli, Brigadier (Reserves) Moshe Bar Kokhba' and rabbis.

The association has begun its journey with the distribution of the propaganda booklet entitled, "Autonomy—Gateway to a Palestinian Terrorist State." In its opening, the "eight degradations" are described. The first degradation, for example, touches on the transfer of government. "In the Camp David accords, it is written that Israel and Egypt agreed to..., in order to ensure an orderly transfer...the solution...also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just needs...." The compilers bring supporting quotations. Shamir: "Autonomy is a true, independent government...except for matters of security and foreign policy"; 'Ezer Weizmann: "Begin has shut himself in because he perceived...that in Camp David he placed the land of Israel...on a doubtful enterprise"; and, also, James Baker: "The goal of the UN...is to lead to the transition of agreements from Israel to the Palestinians, a new situation in which the Palestinians administer the West Bank and Gaza."

Also detailed are "golden opportunities" to terminate the agreement...which Israel "missed," "with great sorrow," and also, "five pieces of practical advice for the struggle against autonomy."

"1. Propaganda—...to explain to all Knesset voters: The autonomy plan is not 'good for the Jews.' This is a

wretched plan, which will not prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. It will be there forever. The pretty mask must be removed from the ugly face of autonomy, to explain to the nation that it means an independent Palestinian state in the heart of the land of Israel."

"2. Movement in the region—To return to the territory that we, too, abandoned. We were busy with fattening up the existing settlements, with the struggle for our security on the main highways. We banished ourselves from the entire territory, apart from our settlements and the main roads that lead to them. If the other roads—among them, those which pass through Arab villages—are blocked, they must be opened now. Why are we waiting? When will we do this? When the Palestinian police control them."

"3. Settlement—Every Jewish dunam [a land measure], every house, every settlement releases more and more land from Palestinian autonomy...the battlefield, therefore, is on every mountain and every valley in YESHA, in the Golan, and in Jerusalem. And the time is now, because the Sinai has fallen...because they waited for the end of negotiations, among other things. This is the time to remember how the 'settlers' captured their place and position—an influencing and, at times, decisive, factor in Israeli politics—in Sebastia."

Further on, the question is asked: "If not autonomy—then what?" According to the struggle's organization, there is no cause for haste. "For how many years do many nations throughout the world endure such struggles: Ireland—for 800 years the British have ruled there, and they still have not found a 'solution.' They endure without too much agitation, without a 'peace process.' The land of the Basques—in northern Spain (and southern France) the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] has been fighting underground for years, and its 'achievements' are impressive, but, nevertheless, Spain has not yielded. The cost to the economy is great, the number of lives given is great, but, nevertheless—the Leftist claim that 'there is no chance of withstanding a popular uprising,' does not come under consideration there...in none of these conflicts there is no one pushing for a 'solution'...it is said from now on: the term 'solution' is taken from mathematics." The term "process," according to the booklet, is taken from chemistry. "Both terms were planted in our heads as part of hostile psychological warfare...."

Nearing the elections, the "YESHA '92" propagandists will come to the settlements that are within the green line. They will try to convince the voting public to vote for the parties opposing autonomy. Yitzhaq Rabin promised that he will begin autonomy within six to nine months, if he is chosen as prime minister, and the Right is afraid of him.

Yitzhaq Shamir has promised the settlers that he will try to crush autonomy. But they are afraid that he has already immersed himself too deeply in the political

process. Therefore, they say, there is no way out except to arrange to foil autonomy. Propaganda, according to them, is only the first step.

Analysis of Autonomy, Jewish Settlement

92AE0264B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
1 Mar 92 p B2

[Article by Yossi Torpstein: "Pockets of Autonomy in a Sea of Security"]

[Text] How will the General Security Service [GSS] carry out arrests of suspects within the boundaries of the future Palestinian autonomy? With the aid of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] or with the aid of a Palestinian police force, which will be given responsibility for order and security throughout the autonomy, and perhaps with the aid of a joint Israeli-Palestinian security police? Today, chemotherapy is being given in Israeli hospitals to about 1,500 patients a year from the territories through the Civil Administration. Who will determine this when the Palestinian autonomy is established? Who will adjudicate in cases of a civil dispute between an Israeli and a Palestinian? Will a VAT [value added tax] be established under the autonomy like there is in Israel? Who will supervise the archaeological sites in the territories? What role will Jordan have in the arrangements? Will it participate, as Israel wants, in the committees that supervise the autonomy?

Several bodies are today working out the technical answers and the possible ways of acting on these questions and many others, which are related to the transfer of authority in various areas of life in the territories from the Civil Administration to the bodies of the independent Palestinian government that will be established. In the offices for coordination of activities in the territories, the officers of Brig. Gen. Dani Rothschild, the coordinator of activities in the territories, are preparing the technical specifications. Rothschild himself, it should be noted, accompanied the Israeli delegation to the peace talks. His men are combing thoroughly sphere after sphere in the present system of the Civil Administration in the territories and noting the problems and the difficulties in every area. But in the absence of a clear overall conception, their documents contain several ways of acting in various areas, and revisions are even being made in them according to directives from the political level, which change from time to time. In the area of the economy and taxation, a very important and problematical area, conception papers were crystallized through cooperation between the coordination of activities and two committees that were established a year ago for this purpose in the Ministry of Finance and in the Bank of Israel.

These documents pass afterwards to several factors, such as Solly Meridor, the advisor to the minister of defense, and Elyakim Rubinstein, the chief of the Israeli delegation to the negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Rubinstein presents them to Shamir, and he

confers with associates such as Moshe Arens, Dan Meridor, and Benyamin Netanyahu.

Therefore, the experts devoted considerable thought to possible ways of acting in many areas: taxation, ecology, academic curricula, hospitalization in Israel. Still lacking is the unifying thing that would allow the creation of an overall framework, called "the desired model of the autonomy." Not even one of the persons that are involved in the work knows if the reference is to personal autonomy for the residents in all of the territories, or to autonomy in defined geographical regions, or, perhaps, another model. An unequivocal answer to these central questions would bring about significant changes in the technical details that are now being worked out.

What does official Israel think, at the level of the definition of the strategic goal? Two terms from the Camp David accords are central for an understanding of the totality of approaches to autonomy: "full autonomy for the residents" and the withdrawal of IDF forces to "security areas that are to be defined." The traditional Israeli interpretation regarded the first expression as "personal autonomy" for all of the Palestinians in the territories, who would be under Israeli sovereignty and without any signs of Palestinian sovereignty. The second statement was understood as the withdrawal of the IDF from the large cities and its deployment according to Israel's needs.

"We are not obligated by every letter of the Camp David accords," Israel Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir declared recently, without further comment. The significance of his words is that the basis of the Israeli position in the present negotiations is anchored in the accords that were signed in 1979 and in the discussions on autonomy in the territories that Israeli and Egyptian delegations conducted and which were discontinued in March '82. But his words also imply a tendency to revise the agreements.

"From that time until this very day," says assistant minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who was appointed by the prime minister's office to follow the process, "not one Israeli Government held an orderly discussion about the strategic framework towards which we must strive on the subject of the autonomy. Therefore, there was no decision on the matter. There is also no team that is working to crystallize a defined Israeli conception on the subject."

Thus, it was not for nothing that the Israeli delegation to the talks in Washington was given only tactical directives for dealing with three defined subjects: the determination of an agreed agenda of subjects for discussion, which itself is viewed by Israel as an essential matter; the location of the next round of the talks; the date of the talks. However, the Israeli delegation is seeking to discuss with the Palestinians in Washington also the transfer of areas of responsibilities at the level of daily life.

Such a discussion—without prior determinations on essential matters, in which it would be necessary to reveal the model of autonomy that is intended by the Israeli Government and the latter's approach to a central Palestinian authority—may promote an old Israeli intention that seeks to maintain the status quo with nonessential changes, in the manner of "Arabization of the existing Civil Administration." As evidence, so to speak, for demonstrating "flexibility" in the negotiations, the Israeli delegation this time was joined by Dr. Yitzhaq Savar, the staff officer for health affairs in the Civil Administration in Gaza and Professor 'Ezra Sadan, who headed the team that examined the relationship between the Israeli economy and the economy of the territories. But all this is already recognized and known, say the Palestinians and the Americans, pointing to the autonomy talks and the establishment of the Israeli Civil Administration at the beginning of the '80's. And, indeed, it was on the issue of the model of the autonomy not being presented that the talks entered a crisis last week.

Halil Tewfkag'i, a Palestinian geographer from the "Center for Arab Researches," which is headed by Feysal al-Huseyni, concluded after conducting field studies, that the Israeli Government has been acting for years in a planned manner to create several Arab enclaves in the territories: Nabulus, Janin, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, and two enclaves in the Gaza Strip. These enclaves, in effect, already exist, according to him, and they are surrounded by settlements, state lands, and closed military areas. "Out of 144 settlements in the West Bank, only 11 are located in these enclaves, where most of the Arab population lives," says Tewfkag'i, "but this is only the basic plan. The settlement drive is also eating into the enclaves. At the beginning of the 2000's, even these enclaves will not remain in the Palestinians' hands. At the same time, Israel can exert pressure for Palestinian emmigration from the territories, due to economic distress or for other reasons."

Tewfkag'i apparently has showered empty praise on the extent of the planning and the sophistication of the government in this matter, but the idea of autonomous enclaves, or Palestinian cantons, was heard recently around the prime minister and was received in other circles, such as in the NRP [National Religious Party], where there is sharp opposition to the personal autonomy of Camp David.

Netanyahu opposes the "Beginist principle of personal autonomy throughout the territories." In his eyes, this is too broad. His opinion is that it will create "a sea of Arab autonomy with Israeli security pockets." In the cantons plan, which was brought before members of the Likud central committee and before the activists of the NRP, he drew "a sea of Israeli security with pockets of Arab autonomy." As does Arik Sharon, Netanyahu views Jordan as the de facto Palestinian state. The Palestinians will be granted cultural, municipal, and internal political autonomy within defined geographical areas, in which the majority of the Palestinian population are crowded.

These areas will be cut off from one another, without a central authority that would connect them, and would be surrounded by IDF installations and roadblocks and by settlements. If they wished, the residents could be Jordanian citizens.

Dr. Yitzhaq Bailey, a lecturer in Oriental studies at Tel Aviv University, who submitted a plan in '84, according to which several Arab enclaves in the territories would be autonomous districts of Jordan, believes that there is no intention to grant cantons in the real sense: equality of the systems of central government in Jewish and Arab cantons, such as in Switzerland. Bailey presented his plan in '89 before senior political levels in the Likud and in Labor, and they did not accept it. Some told him that if any committee, military or civilian, were tasked to examine such an option, which involves relinquishing territories, the government would fall apart.

But today, precisely the reintroduction of "the personal autonomy" a la Camp David has driven the supporters of the parties of the extreme right and the settlers crazy. Different Likud activists believe that such an autonomy holds the danger of a future Palestinian takeover of all the territories, with the assistance of international pressures. The advantages of "cantons" under Israeli sovereignty now appear to them in a different light: preserving the entire Land of Israel and the security of the state from an "Arab eastern front" and from terrorist attacks, on the one hand, and giving an answer to the central Palestinian demand, the removal of the regime of the direct conquest and the nearby Jewish presence, by granting limited self-rule on the other hand.

The government led by the Likud is still not ready to present the model of the autonomy that it has in mind. If Shamir has a certain conception on the matter, he is not exposing his secrets in public. It may be implied from the positions of the Israeli delegation that the technical transfer of the civil administration to the Palestinians is, in its view, a preferable option and a plan of "a first line option." In any event, there are several areas, such as education, law, and health, in which the systems are already operated by Arab officials, excepting the chiefs of the systems, the staff officers, who are Israelis. Even a certain Jordanian presence is acceptable to Israel, and its delegation to the talks expresses itself in this spirit. But the present diplomatic conditions are not suitable for that.

Consequently, there is now crystallizing around Shamir also an idea of "a second line option," based on limited and isolated Arab districts with a measure of territorial administrative autonomy over about one-third or less of the area. This option, which is reminiscent of South African arrangements, would allow the free expansion of the scope of the settlements, and that is, perhaps, the "goal line option": Israeli control over all of Eretz Yisrael and a massive Jewish presence in the territories. In any event, an orderly process of strategic decision-making in this central sector of Israeli policy, if it indeed exists, is not apparent.

Plan for Unified Metropolitan Jerusalem

92AE0244B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Feb 92
p B2

[Article by Dani Rubinstein]

[Text] A few days ago, the Jerusalem city limits were extended by 15,000 dunams, all within the green line, and mainly within the area formerly known as the Jerusalem corridor. After the legal arrangements for the expansion are completed, the Jerusalem city limits will include Emek Arazim, at the foot of the isolated village of Lifta, which can be seen north of the highway leading into the city; the little settlement Motza; a section of the stone quarry range of the Kastel, up to the Sataf ridge, toward Kibbutz Tzova; and also an area in the south, at the foot of the mountain where Yad Kennedy stands. This expansion does not add population to Jerusalem, except for the residents of Motza. It does create two enclaves within the city limits: Kibbutz Ramat Rahel, whose lands have been annexed to the city; and Moshav Beyt Zayit, with its agricultural lands, to the agricultural school south of the Eyn Kerem dam.

The expansion was needed because of the shortage of land reserves in the largest city, in terms of territory, in Israel. There was no choice but to expand Jerusalem within the confines of the green line, because in the other directions, the Jerusalem is seen as the same as the official border of the State of Israel, and any change in it would have legal repercussions.

Thus the eastern borders of the city remain in their present location and the registration of the Arab residents of Jerusalem also remains as it was 25 years ago—both of them the fruit of hasty decisions made by the Israeli government in 1967. In the years that have passed since, neither municipal borders, nor the definition of the legal status of the city's Arabs, have stood the test of the reality created in the field. Sometimes, this has reached the point of being nothing but a joke.

South of the city, for example there is an expanse of Beduin villages spread over a large territory, going down from the fringes of the villages of Um Tuv'a and Jebel Mukhabar (Armon Hanatziv), and the R'as 'Al 'Amud neighborhood, toward where the Kidron stream runs through, to the village of Abu Dis. Spread over this territory are the Arabs of western and eastern Sev'ahara, who make up one big social unit. Once it was possible to distinguish, more or less, between the two branches of the Sev'ahara tribe, and so the border was set between them. Western Sev'ahara was included within the bounds of Jerusalem and the State of Israel, and eastern Sev'ahara within the bounds of the military rule on the West Bank. In several ways, luck favored the Beduin of western Sev'ahara. They were given Israeli identity cards, as well as the opportunity to benefit from national insurance, and from freedom of movement within Jerusalem and all over the State of Israel. Members of the families from eastern Sev'ahara are limited. They need permits from the military government at Bethlehem

before they can enter Jerusalem, and other permits, required by military decree in the territories, for countless everyday activities.

This is the way it supposedly is. Actually, the two Sev'ahara groups have mingled over the years. They have built houses all over the wide expanse. Unlike the Israeli construction in the eastern city, which created defined neighborhoods in crowded and clearly distinguished blocks, the members of the Sev'ahara tribe went to live in a large territory on the two sides of that border which in reality does not exist. Nobody knows how many of the residents of eastern Sev'ahara live in the west and vice versa. You never hear anymore of one of them asking for a permit, as required by law, to cross the dirt path from a house considered within the bounds of the West Bank to a house considered within the territory of Jerusalem.

The picture is the same for the slopes of the Mount of Olives, in the El Shiyah neighborhood bordering the large village of El-Azariah. Here the city limit passes between the Arab houses, divides streets, and [even] the courtyard of a church. This border is meaningless, except as the fruit of chance decisions made in another time. So that Israelis will be able to reach Ma'alei Adumim and the Dead Sea without passing between the houses of 'Al-'Azaria, they paved the broad highway that descends north of French Hill and skirts the crowded Arab region. But in the meantime, an eastern extension has been added to the A-Tor village. It crosses the new highway and the city border in the direction of a new Arab village named A-Za'im, which is actually the continuation of Arab construction on the slope of the Mount of Olives. In other words, the new highway, "Intifidah Pass," no longer really fulfills its purpose, with Arab construction swiftly closing in where it passes at the foot of the A-tur neighborhood.

Minister Ari'el Sharon, and others who relate to this problem as they would to a war, recently issued directives for extending the judicial boundaries of the municipality of Ma'alei Adumim, the first Jewish settlement in the territories to be declared a city. The boundaries of the new city, according to these directives, will come to within several hundred meters of the Jerusalem border. But, just as Ma'alei Adumim is constantly expanding in the direction of Jerusalem, so are a long chain of nearby Arab villages. The houses of 'An'ata and Hizm'a, for instance, and the houses of neighborhoods and villages north of Jerusalem are also spreading toward the big city and becoming part of it.

A rather astonishing phenomenon, that Israelis are practically unaware of, took place on the border dividing the Beyt Hanina neighborhood in Jerusalem and the village of Al-Bira to the north. In 1967, there were, east of the Ramallah-Jerusalem highway, a small village called A-R'am, and Dihiyat Al-Barid, a neighborhood of postal workers. Since then, the village and neighborhood, which are right on the municipal border of Jerusalem, have combined and become a veritable city, with a

population of about 30,000. Many of them carry identity cards (Israeli) for East Jerusalem, but did not succeed in finding a place to live in their city, and so moved to the suburbs. Land in this area was relatively cheap. At one time there was a land arrangement, and since the village authorities did not make it hard to get building permits, it was possible to build quickly there.

Together with Bir Nab'alla and Al-Jib in the west, and Kafr Ekev and Mahane Kalanadiya in the north, they are all outside the boundary of Jerusalem. In this region, we are speaking of a new and crowded Arab urban area about half the size of the Jewish neighborhoods built in East Jerusalem since Israeli rule began. Many businesses belonging to Jerusalem Arabs have been established in the postal neighborhood and in Ba R'am. There are hundreds of stores and dozens of workshops for which conducting business is much easier in the suburbs than it would be within the city limits. Here, they do not have to pay Israeli taxes, Jerusalem property tax or the rest of the Israeli regulations, and they are connected to the Arab centers, schools, and colleges of the Ramallah region.

Yisra'el Kimhi of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research, who published a series of studies about the greater metropolitan area of Jerusalem, says that had it not been for political constraints, an organization, similar to Eged Gush Dan in the Tel Aviv area, would have been set up for the whole region, from Bet El in the north to Gush Etzion in the south. From the functional point of view, the municipal bodies in the entire region should be cooperating where it comes to transportation, water, education, trash removal, health, and other services. This region should function as a single urban unit, but the borders of political entities divide it, each one with its own system of laws and regulations.

To complicate the matter further, the division is not just geographic, but also human. Tens of thousands of Israelis are living not only in East Jerusalem but also in neighborhoods and settlements surrounding the eastern city, and great numbers of Arabs without Israeli papers live within the borders of Israel. If there are 450,000 inhabitants, a third of them Arabs, within the actual territory of the city of Jerusalem, then in the greater metropolitan area of the city, together with Bethlehem and the area surrounding it, and together with Ramallah and Al-Bira, and also with Ma'ale Adumim, and Giv'at Z'ev, and dozens more villages and settlements—we are dealing with a metropolis of 750,000 souls—half of them Jewish, the other half Arab, mixed together without rhyme or reason, living in separate social groups and bound by separate administrative orders and directives. Faced with facts like these, it takes a lot of imagination even to dream of any kind of settlement at all.

Three-Fold Increase in Bedouin Recruitment

92AE0239C Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
12 Feb 92 p 10

[Text] From the windows of the bus that passed by a caravan of jeeps, little hands waved. "Right on, IDF

[Israel Defense Forces]," cried the thin noisy voices that tore napkins from the little throats that were in the bus. The soldiers of the bedouin patrol unit, riding on the jeeps, contained their smiles, but it was obvious that they approved of the encouragement.

About 80,000 bedouin are scattered in the south of Israel, and about 40,000 more are in the north. The bedouin are citizens of the State, but, in contrast to the Druze community, which is subject to the regular draft requirement and where the draft percentages are identical to the Jewish sector, the number of bedouin drafted is still relatively low. Nevertheless, last year an IDF campaign was mounted in the southern command to encourage volunteering for IDF service among the bedouin. The results: in 1991 more than three times the multiyear average of preceding years were drafted. This means a huge swing in bedouin sign-up for the IDF. Until the November cycle, which from their point of view was the top cycle, the southern area, which is where most of the bedouin population is concentrated, produced eight to 10 draftees per cycle. In the November cycle that area alone produced more than 30 draftees—an increase of 300 percent. These peak data were accomplished after intensive public relations work was done over the last few months among the bedouin population and its VIP's.

Captain 'Ali Halaf, you are in charge of the bedouin draft; what are your people doing to bring the bedouin population into the IDF?

"The essence of our work was done among the bedouin. The first plane on which we operate is to bring together the community's leaders and VIP's. Today we have gotten to a situation where most of the representatives of the bedouin community support the IDF draft. A further channel in which we operate is PR among the youth. Teachers from the territories and even from the Triangle have taught in many of the bedouin settlements in the south and infused some nationalist brainwashing into their pupils. We are trying to correct the distorted impression created among them and are sending youth leaders, who are Gadna' soldiers, to the schools to give lessons to grades 10, 11, and 12 and try to arouse in the bedouin youth a desire to serve in the IDF."

What are the factors that cause the bedouin youth not to join the IDF?

"The first reason is that a lot of clergy, who oppose the draft, are active in the settlements. Part of the population listens to those clergymen, another part hesitates, and the third part joins the IDF. The arguments with the clergy, by the way, are generally verbal and we cannot remember a situation in which things degenerated into violence. Another reason is a lack of awareness. Many of the bedouin settlements, especially those in the south of Israel, are far from the Jewish population centers, so that the Israeli lifestyle is foreign to them. The lack of contact between the populations also is a factor in the youths' lack of motivation to serve in the army.

Captain 'Ali, why do you think the bedouin have to serve in the army?: "We live in the State of Israel, and, like all other citizens, we have to fulfill our obligations in order to be worthy of our rights. Today the community is granted only some of its rights, and that may be because we have only started down the road. Apart from that, the IDF is part of the Israeli experience. There were bedouin who were drafted into the Palmah and helped establish the Jewish settlements in the southern part of the country. A number of bedouin even fell in Israeli campaigns. It is important to us for our youth to be drafted and for the uniforms to be seen in the villages because that will also strengthen the bond between the bedouin sector and the State of Israel."

Storm Over Ze'evi's Remarks on Gil'ad Murderers

92AE0253A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Feb 92
p 5

[Article by Gid'on Alon, Moshe Reinfeld, and Eytan Rabin: "The Storm Around MK Ze'evi's Statement"]

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir yesterday sharply condemned the statement made by Knesset Member [MK] Rehav'am Ze'evi (Moledet), who day before yesterday claimed in the Knesset plenum that the murderers of the three soldiers at the boot camp near Kibbutz Gil'ad had been caught by the defense forces.

"There is no doubt that Ze'evi's statement hurt the inquiry and that he overstepped every limit. I do not understand what could motivate Ze'evi to take advantage of his parliamentary immunity in order to reveal details of a sensitive security inquiry that was under embargo," Shamir said at a meeting of the Likud Central Committee in Tel Aviv.

The prime minister added that in his view, the time had come to change the immunity law for MK's. "The immunity law was designed to preempt government attacks on MK's from the opposition, but recently we have seen it being abused, as for example in the Ze'evi case."

Attorney General Yosef Harish said that as of yesterday no one had asked him for an opinion regarding MK Rehav'am Ze'evi's statement in the plenum. Harish believes that Ze'evi's immunity cannot be lifted for the purpose of a court action.

According to him, the reason is that in this instance, Ze'evi enjoys "substantive immunity," which the law does not allow to be lifted. This kind of immunity is protected by the law of MK immunity—their rights and obligations—according to which an MK will not bear criminal or civil liability and will be immune to any court action for any deed carried out in the exercise of his duties as a member of Knesset.

The Knesset Commission will discuss this topic next week at the initiative of Chairman MK Hayim Qorfu

(Likud). Qorfu said that Ze'evi's statement makes it necessary to pass an amendment and to set restrictions on the issue of MK's immunity in disclosing security information in the Knesset plenum. According to him, the Knesset Commission must find a formula to stop this loophole and any abuse of immunity.

MK Yosi Sarid (Citizens Rights List) yesterday filed a complaint with the Knesset Ethics Commission about Ze'evi's action. Sarid told the Ethics Commission that it was undoubtedly a violation of national security, which is a serious criminal offense for which any citizen would have stood trial. "Unfortunately, Ze'evi is not subject to the criminal law, but he is subject to the Knesset law. It will be only right that at least the Ethics Commission should censure him for his harmful, wrong act." After hearing MK Ze'evi's version, the Ethics Commission is entitled to pass sentence on him, as for example, admonition, warning, reprimand, or serious reprimand.

MK Arye Gamli'el (SHAS) proposed an urgent point for the agenda on this matter, in which he defended Ze'evi and attacked his critics. "This is pure persecution from Ze'evi's political opponents, who have their own account to settle with him. They are exploiting the incident in order to attack him in terms such as were never heard against other politicians who disclosed 'secrets' and even facts regarding other inquiries of the security forces in a bid to influence and disrupt an investigation."

Appearing yesterday before high school students, Rehav'am Ze'evi himself said that he stands on his position. According to him, all those who today are attacking him for what he said will tomorrow have to apologize to him because "it will become clear exactly who told the truth and who did not, who was right and who was not."

Ze'evi added that his statement in the Knesset plenum was not a slip of the tongue. "Like most of my speeches, this one, too, was written, thought out, and planned. I did not blurt out any word I did not want to say. Anyone listening to the denials will realize that they are trying to find out who leaked the information to me. If it is not true, who cares who leaked to me? And how did it confuse the investigation?" he said. He stressed that he did not repent having said it.

Assessment of Levi's Standing in Likud

92AE0264C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 6 Mar 92 p 8

[Article by Yeshayahu Porat: "Levi Is Liable To Give a Surprise"]

[Text] Almost everything has already been said and written about David Levi's situation after his camp was defeated decisively in the Likud central committee: that he is the big loser, that he is wounded and humiliated, that he has shut himself up in his home and is licking his wounds.

The focus of the commentators on David Levi's mental condition after the great defeat is not an accident and does not prove definitely an evil and prying inclination on their part. It is a real problem that Levi, with his exaggerated sensitivity for his personal honor and his ego, had already brought upon himself. In a certain sense, he is now paying the price of his glory, which he never regarded as a negligible factor.

But the shining of the spotlights solely on the personal fate of "the man who came from Beyt She'an" distorts and misrepresents the picture. In a more inclusive picture, with all due respect for David Levi's honor, this approach becomes completely unimportant. After all, the point is not whether David Levi may still view himself as the intended heir when Yitzhaq Shamir steps down or whether his having been placed behind Arens and Sharon in the Likud top leadership finally blocks his way to the leadership of the party and of the government. The real implications of the results of the panel and of the rounds of voting focus on the sociopolitical level and on the defense aspect, even though these, at the present time, do not fascinate public opinion and are not getting headlines like the foreign minister's degradation and state of mind.

Entirely unrelated to the blow that his status received in the panel and in the first round of voting, David Levi, incomparably more than Arens and even more than Shamir, was and remains a living symbol and a shining example worthy of imitation for a broad, vital, and lively stratum in our population. An authentic example of what was once called the Second Israel.

The resounding slap that was directed at him in order to cut him down, in the words of one of his rivals, to his "real size," some distance from the "glory" of being Number 2 after Shamir, injured, in effect, an entire public. And not just a public, but a center of electoral strength without whose votes the Likud would never have come to power. The result was immediate and instinctive, and testified to this public's threshold of sensitivity. The Ashkenazim are screwing the Sephardim, that is what was uttered and shouted openly there. The call "Rabin, Rabin," which Shamir, Arens, and Sharon would seriously err in taking lightly, also must be understood on this background.

Sociologists will say that the germ of communal feeling has revived and is raising its head. Politologists [as published] are already saying that the occasion of Levi's degradation is liable to mark a turn in the opposite direction from what happened in '77. On June 23, the Orientals, at least a part of them, are capable of taking their revenge and returning to Labor, which is headed by Rabin. All the more so, as here and there an original slogan has already spread, which raises a bitter smile in the Likud: "Enough of the Likud. Enough of Labor. This time, Rabin."

The result on the diplomatic level is much more serious. In Europe and in the United State, no one is weeping

over Levi's fall from Number 2 to Number 4 in the Likud nomenklatura. But foreign observers, who are much less concerned than we are over the place of Ephrayim Gur or Moshe Barash in the list of candidates of the ruling party, interpret the rebuff to the foreign minister as an expression of no confidence in his policy.

A former constrainer, and a one-time Sharon ally, David Levi, while no less an entire Land of Israel loyalist than his opponents, has a different outlook and has carefully weighed his diplomatic steps since he has been sitting in the place where Moshe Sharett and Abba Eban formerly sat.

With a naivete that occasionally arouses pity, with a direct and good fellow style that raises eyebrows, but with sincerity, honesty, and a deep inner faith, he has succeeded in creating a balanced dialogue with senior statesmen in the United States and Europe. His openness and his moderation, and his ability to listen and to learn, became famous in Paris, Brussels, and Washington. He was liked by his interlocutors there. He sent them rational messages that rehabilitated and improved the image of the Shamir government, which was thought of as the government of the eternal "nyet."

More realistic than his colleagues, Levi understood what it was possible to obtain and get out of a given international situation and what was a fantasy that it was impossible to achieve. He regarded himself as personally responsible for the peace process. And had it depended solely on him, a compromise formula would have been found for receiving the guarantees from the United States. In short, Levi would have avoided a confrontation with the United States, without relinquishing the entire Land of Israel, but also without going back on the autonomy plan.

And what emerges now, on the background of the elections in the Likud central committee? The complete opposite of this. A Likud more hawkish than ever, Shamir and Arens linked up with Sharon, a running "amok" towards confrontation with the United States, a peace process out of fuel, a complete going back on the autonomy, and an accelerated loss of the hope of preventing a renewed outbreak in the Middle East.

In these conditions, David Levi's frustration stems not only from the injury to his personal status. Together with his reference group in the development towns and among the Orientals, he must ask himself what is the meaning of the obvious sociopolitical change that is taking place in his party. As foreign minister, he must ask what the top leadership of his party is striving for, what are its diplomatic plans, and what remains of his dream of moving Israel towards a peace agreement with its neighbors.

Closed up in his home in Beyt She'an, David Levi is pondering the new situation. And it is my gut feeling that David Levi is liable to surprise his party and the public.

Likud Tactics To Garner Immigrant Support

92AE0233A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Feb 92
p B1

[Article by Ran Kislev]

[Text] The Likud has begun taking its campaign into the field, and will likely be aiming its first salvo at the immigrants.

One can easily understand the worry of the ruling party's election experts when it comes to this sector of voters. The approximately 400,000 immigrants increase Israel's population by about 10 percent. When we consider the age composition of this group and the relatively few families with many children (the average family has 3.1 members), we can assume that the additional qualified voters among the immigrants will really come to more than 10 percent.

Considering that several earlier elections ended in a tie between left and right, the Likud Government can stand or fall on the vote of these added percentages, and therefore, the architects of the Likud's election campaign have good cause to worry.

The latest surveys show that support for the Likud among the immigrants from Russia is dwindling, and today is at about half the level of their support for the Labor Party. But even without surveys, the process seems clear. The immigrants who arrived from what was once the USSR were not usually Zionists, but they instinctively shied away from everything in politics that came close to the color red. Even the pink Labor Party was too socialist. This is the source of their support for the right—and especially the Likud.

But time has blurred the traumas of the past (all the more so, now that the past itself has collapsed in their old homeland), and made the problems of the present first on the agenda. And the present of the immigrants is convincingly described by the statistics the Employment Service published this week: out of approximately 144,000 unemployed in January of this year, about 43,000 are immigrants. Like every other employed person, they face the stark reality every day: for every position offered, there are 4.4 unemployed competing. If we add to this the fact that half of the unemployed immigrants are academics whose chance of finding work in fields close to their professions is almost nil, and that, among those happy immigrants who are not registered as unemployed, are those thousands of immigrants who are doing cleaning, working in gas stations, or filling other menial jobs, the picture facing the fashioners of the Likud's election campaign is not at all bright. Nor is time on their side. Five months is not enough time to create jobs out of nowhere, even if they put election economics into action on a mass scale. And furthermore, every month that brings us closer to the polls will pour more and more immigrants into the job market, as their "sal haklita" (absorption basket—aid given to new arrivals) period comes to an end.

Not having a proper answer for the worsening situation (at least at this stage of the campaign), the Likud has decided to attack on another front. This very week—so we were told—a giant operation to take 100,000 immigrants on tours of the territories will begin. The operation will be called "Mivtza Haim" (Operation Life), and an association by that name has even been formed to organize it, which is not formally connected to the Likud, at least not from the standpoint of compliance with the Law of Political Party Funding. We can assume that we are speaking here of quite large funding, judging from the dimensions of the operation and the hundreds of buses that have already been ordered for the next five months.

We can imagine that this will be something like the tour operation that Ari'el Sharon organized about ten years ago, then too, as part of the Likud's election campaign. Today it will not be Sharon personally heading "Mivtza Hayim," but his former aide, Yisra'el Katz. Unlike "Sharon Tours" [previous words in English] 10 years ago, which was aimed at the entire Israeli population, only immigrants will enjoy the trip and the hospitality this time.

The organizers will be presenting to the immigrants from Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa the rocky expanses of Samaria and the deserts of Judah, meant to kindle in their hearts the holy fire of love for the whole Land of Israel. They will point out the rate at which the settlements are developing, the trailers at the top of every hill and the single-family houses in Karnei Shomron and Ari'el, to demonstrate to them what the true Zionism of our day is. For the older immigrants, this is likely to awaken a certain nostalgia: perhaps they will remember the "Fiatilyetkot" (five-year plans) of Stalin, and how the great enterprises of Socialism were built at the expense of bread and shoes. Younger ones, especially those with an education in Economics, will certainly put two and two together and figure out how much all this is costing and how many jobs could have been created with the money.

According to reports published by Shalom Ahshav (Peace Now), about 2.5 billion shekels were invested in settlements in the territories last year, mainly for building and infrastructure. This figure is based on the estimate that about 13.5 thousand units of housing are in various stages of completion in the territories, about 10,000 as permanent construction, and the rest as temporary dwellings and trailers. Because of this, the members of "Shalom Ahshav" were dubbed "informers." Today, in the debate over the loan guarantees, it is the settlers and the right who are pointing to those numbers.

These tremendous investments on the one hand, and complete paralysis of any action toward creating jobs for hundreds of thousands of immigrants and proper use of the professional potential hidden in them, on the other, illustrate the two opposing approaches to Zionism in our day: that which sees the Zionist mission and the future of the State in the absorption of hundreds of thousands of

Jews, and that which sees the mission in settlements to establish sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel. All the talking about how there is no contradiction between these two approaches breaks up against the rock of the facts. And one of them is that the success of the settlements has paralleled a total failure of the absorption of the immigration—until it has almost completely come to a stop. If we can judge by the way the debate on the guarantees has evolved, this is how it is going to continue.

The Likud has the right to believe that settlements have preference over any other version of Zionism. But to bring the immigrants, the victims of this scale of preferences, to see with their own eyes where the money is being poured, and further to hope that they will rejoice at what they see—borders on cruelty.

Analysis of HABAD, Likud Electoral Relations

92AE0253D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Feb 92
p B2

[Article by Shlomo Shamir: "Shamir in the Sights"]

[Text] The Court of the Lubawitsch Rabbi in Brooklyn is in the embarrassing process of sobering up from the sensation of being drunk on power that had been governing its actions since what sources close to the Rabbi's proudly describe as the success of his endeavors to thwart the establishment of a coalition under Shim'on Peres and to award the premiership to Yitzhaq Shamir. At the peak of those endeavors about one and a half years ago Shamir was honored by being repeatedly described by the Rabbi and his associates as the only Israeli leader that could be trusted to withstand pressures and not to let himself be dragged into peace talks.

The forecast that Shamir will agree to discuss the autonomy was estimated at the Rabbi's Court as out of the question and was one of the main hostile claims made about Shim'on Peres. The explanation that the head of the Punivej Yeshiva, Rabbi Shakh, was supporting Shamir precisely because he and none other could be expected to make concessions, elicited sneers from the Rabbi's associates, who do not hide their contempt for the elderly yeshiva principal, to whom they refer as the great enemy of the HABAD movement. But after all that, not only did Shamir agree to participate in those peace talks, complain the Brooklyn HABAD members, but the prime minister is adding insult to injury by daring to talk about autonomy. And all that, they seethe, while failing to show any gratitude to the Rabbi who presented him with the 61st Knesset member who defected from the Agudat Yisra'el Party in order to ensure a majority for the coalition led by Shamir.

When Transportation Minister Moshe Qatzav tried to reassure the Rabbi that autonomy did not mean giving up the territories, the Rabbi stated categorically: "Alone the fact of talking about an autonomy plan is blasphemy and desecration." Currently, any mention of Shamir's

name among the Hassidim is accompanied by expressions of scorn and contempt regarding his truthfulness.

This sobering up is also painful because it confronts the Hassidim with their belief that their Rabbi is incapable of erring, an unacceptable possibility for the Lubawitsch Hassidim, whose reverence for the elderly Admor [Leader and Teacher] knows no bounds. The fact that in the final analysis Rabbi Shakh, the great enemy from Bene Beraq, was right and that the reason he gave for supporting Shamir turned out to have been correct, is a nightmare to the Brooklyn Court.

Outwardly, the Rabbi's associates are displaying a sense of serenity and confidence, but what comes through in off the record discussions is discomfort about the compulsion to demonstrate that the Rabbi's political positions are right. Because when it comes to the Rabbi's involvement in Israeli or any other affairs, the word failure does not exist in the HABAD lexicon. "Shamir has not yet seen the beginning of the campaign that the Rabbi will inspire against him if indeed he continues to promote the autonomy plan," one of the Rabbi's close associates told me. "I do not doubt that the Rabbi will be the winner in this campaign." Informed sources from the Rabbi's inner circle say that the Admor has already instructed his trusted friend, the Australian millionaire Yosef Yitzhaq Gutnik, who serves as the liaison man between the Rabbi and the prime minister, not to spare any money in financing the propaganda campaign against Shamir and the autonomy plan.

Hints dropped by coalition circles for the benefit of the Brooklyn Court about willingness to allocate funds for HABAD institutions in Israel were immediately rejected in Brooklyn. Shlomo Meidanchik, one of the movement's activists in Israel, was charged with the special mission of explaining to Shamir and to Likud activists that the Lubawitsch Court will not be bought with allocations. "Shamir has become accustomed to making deals with the orthodox parties," said Brooklyn Hassidim, "and he cannot grasp that the Rabbi is not a politician with whom one can come to a compromise in exchange for advantages." They point out that recently, every time that he has expounded his opposition to autonomy and criticized its supporters, the Rabbi has made a point of reinforcing his statement with the words "most strongly." In HABAD terminology, that is an unequivocal order to war to the death.

The Lubawitsch Court in Brooklyn, the most exposed among all the contemporary orthodox courts, is at the same time the most closed off and introverted. Its activists' zeal in spreading the Rabbi's word and all the movement's actions suddenly dissolve when confronted with any attempt to elucidate the relationship between the Rabbi and those identified as being close to him. As was the case during the efforts to help Shamir form a government, now, too, it is difficult to find out to what extent, if at all, the Rabbi is influenced by the reports he receives every day from his secretaries and aides.

Questions to that effect are met with derision. "The Rabbi is not influenced, he influences. He needs no prompting from those close to him to shape his political ideas," said a young scholar from the Court propaganda team. He gets reports not only from his secretaries, but also from other sources, the young scholar added. In addition, he reads various newspapers and publications every day and learns what he needs to know. Thus, visitors who talk to him are amazed by the scope of his knowledge of what goes on in Israel. Nevertheless, it is difficult to shake the feeling that some of the information the Rabbi gets is tendentious and matches the ideas of some of his close associates, who are identified as extreme right wing.

The Rabbi has in his office four secretaries, who are the only ones to see him and talk to him daily ever since the decision to receive visitors singly. Yehuda Krinsky, particular about observing the manners of a man of the world, is viewed as the most sophisticated among them. Krinsky, a native of Boston, has no difficulty expressing himself well in English and he is in charge of relations with the American media and of handling important nonreligious visitors who come to the Court for the Rabbi's advice and blessing. Krinsky accompanies the Rabbi on his weekly visits to the grave of his father-in-law, the former Admor. The Hassidim say that the Rabbi values Krinsky's daily reports.

Leib Groner and Binyamin Klein work in offices next to the Rabbi's office and are on hand whenever he needs them. The two handle the Rabbi's mail and bring him appeals from Hassidim. Groner is viewed as the dominant figure among those close to the Rabbi; he is the one who one and a half years ago did the lobbying among the Agudat Yisra'el admors to withdraw their support from Shim'on Peres. That campaign brought about the break between the Lubawitsch Court in Brooklyn and the Agudat Yisra'el's Council of Torah Sages. Some people believe that the troubled relations with Agudat Yisra'el were to a large extent caused by Groner, who is not particular about the means used when he is convinced that he is fulfilling the wishes of the Rabbi, and even more so when they agree with his political leanings.

The person who takes care to show up every morning in the secretarial offices is the Rabbi's oldest secretary, Rabbi Hayim Mordekhay Hadakov, 91 years old. Hadakov, a native of Riga, who worked as a public activist in Russia, was at the time close to the former Admor, something that won him a special position at the Court as the Rabbi's loyal confidant. Hadakov enjoys the kind of special reverence from the Lubawitsch devotees reserved for elderly Hassidim. At public assemblies his seat is first among the notables behind the Rabbi. He does not get involved in political matters and his frequent talks with the Rabbi are limited to matters of the spirit.

The most predictable thing about the Rabbi, say his close associates, is his unpredictability. That is how they explain his silence on the issue of Jewish identity, which

surprised many of those who remembered the struggle he waged about it for 25 years. In the past, there was not one assembly at which he did not preach for amending the law of return and warn against the serious implications for the future and purity of the Jewish people of not amending the law and of conversions done not according to the Halakha [religious law]. But for over two years now the Rabbi stopped referring to the issue.

"Only the Rabbi himself can explain the meaning of his silence on this subject," said Yehuda Krinsky. He strongly denied the reports and rumors circulating in New York that the Rabbi was refraining from commenting on the issue of Jewish identity because wealthy contributors to the Lubawitsch institutions in the United States from among the reform and conservative movements, warned that they would stop their donations if he continued to preach for changing the law of return. Jewish activists in New York, including some who are orthodox, believe that the Rabbi's campaign on the issue of Jewish identity produced a stinging failure. His associates did not foresee the intensity of the opposition to changing the law of return among the Jewish public in the United States and Israel.

Orthodox activists are worried about the founded view that the protracted struggle that the Rabbi waged on the issue of Jewish identity contributed to uniting and strengthening the reform camp. Another widespread version in New York is that the Rabbi chose to stop his struggle to amend the law of return in order to not hurt Yitzhaq Shamir; since he was first elected to lead the government, eight moves to amend the law fell through in the Knesset. According to Yehuda Krinsky, the mass immigration from Russia, which brought to Israel non-Jews and half-Jews, proved how right the Rabbi was when he requested the law to be changed.

The sobering up process at the Brooklyn Rabbi's Court was also prompted by postfactum doubts about any gains and advantages derived from the movement's intensive involvement in the last Knesset elections, when its activists mobilized in support of Agudat Yisra'el's list. That involvement, the Lubawitsch Hassidim are willing to admit now, seriously eroded the all-Jewish and non-party image that the HABAD movement had been boasting. The Lubawitsch Court was never a part of Agudat Yisra'el and its relations with the Aguda admors and its political leaders had always been distant and even hostile.

The main motive for HABAD's support for Agudat Yisra'el at the last Knesset elections was mostly a forced reaction to Rabbi Shakh's challenge toward the Admor and the serious denunciations, almost abuses, he expressed publicly against the Rabbi and the spiritual leaders of the Lubawitsch Hassidim. "We view Agudat Yisra'el as a Hassidic movement. We wanted to thwart the efforts of Rabbi Shakh and his Lithuanian flunkies to destroy it," explained one of the Rabbi's close associates. In spite of the view that the involvement in the elections harmed the image of the movement, the Lubawitsch

Court in Brooklyn does not rule out a declaration of support for the extreme right parties in the next election, on the assumption that they will foil the autonomy plan. Harmony between Agudat Yisra'el and the Lithuanian Degel Hatora Party will mark another painful disappointment regarding HABAD's interference in the internal Israeli arena.

The Rabbi's associates attribute the wave of reports about the Messianic tendencies recently displayed by the Rabbi's Court in Brooklyn to the ignorance of the Israeli media. The aspiration to hasten the coming of the Messiah is one of the basic concepts of the Hassidic movement and one of the identifying traits of the greatest admors of all generations, they explain. Hassidim always claimed that the admors had qualities which the sources attributed to the Messiah. At the same time, there is a feeling that in their fervent aspiration for revelation, the HABAD devotees have overstepped the boundaries of good taste in awarding their Rabbi the title of Messiah.

[boxed item]

World Birth Anniversary

Intensive preparations are under way at the Rabbi's Court in Brooklyn for the Rabbi's 90th birth anniversary on 11 Nisan [2 April]. On that date every year there is a special public assembly, but this year a string of festive events are being prepared in Brooklyn and throughout the world. Thousands of Hassidim are expected to come to Brooklyn to attend the special assembly in honor of the Rabbi's 90th birthday.

The nature of the events is still a closely kept secret. Special teams of young scholars and yeshiva students have been formed to handle the programs and events marking the anniversary. Among other things, delegates were dispatched to various countries to produce television interviews with heads of state and international public figures. The interviews are intended as segments of a long film about the Rabbi's life and works.

International leaders who were already interviewed expressed gratitude and appreciation for the Rabbi's leadership. Margaret Thatcher, who was recently interviewed in London, expressed great admiration for the Rabbi and praised his initiatives and works in the area of education. Thatcher, who in the past served as minister of education, was acquainted with HABAD's schools in Britain and, according to one of the organizers of the festivities, she expressed admiration for the educational methods used in those institutions and attributed their success to the personality of the Rabbi.

Envoys of the Rabbi also intend to interview the presidents of the United States and France and heads of European governments. No one among the organizers of the festivities was willing to disclose whether Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir will or has already been invited to participate in the movie.

Call To Establish Jewish Underground

92AE0236A 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew
Jan 92 pp 13-15, 41

[Article by Moshe Shapira: "Under the Rule of the Mandate"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the title of this article is shocking, but this is, most unfortunately, the reality. So it is worthwhile, already from the start, to explain that what follows is not the wish of the writer. More than that: I hope very much that things will not develop in the direction described here. I, too, when I gathered the data, was frightened by the conclusion that we, the residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, are returning to the Mandate era. However, the title represents an inescapable conclusion, which stems from an analysis of the facts in the past and the presentation of a possible scenario of the future.

The Six Day War dealt a decisive blow to all those who believed that the UN partition plan, or any partition of Eretz Israel, could be a viable political plan. Those who initiated that war intended to move the front line from the Green Line to a burning Tel Aviv, and by the response it was moved to the Jordan, to the Red Sea, and to the Golan. The events of that war proved that in 1967 the idea of the entire Land of Israel was not at all a practical idea for the ruling forces in Israel, and no one thought of it; certainly not as an operational plan. In contrast, the idea of reaching Tel Aviv was accepted by the entire Arab nation, which intended to realize it in June '67. We must admit, even though it is not so pleasant, that it was the Arab nation that forced the idea of the entire Land of Israel on the Jewish nation. More than that: before the Six Days War, we were among those who thought that the vision of the entire Land of Israel was not realistic. The decisive majority of national-religious Jewry also had adapted to the status quo, without any real thought of changing it (even the words of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda, a righteous man of blessed memory, on the Independence Day before the Six Days War, about Nabulus and Hebron, did not constitute a real operational demand for the conquest of all of western Eretz Israel, though the wonderful visionary and prophetic quality of the words should not be underrated).

The Six Days War undermined in one fell swoop this entire political (mis) conception. We learned during the three weeks of waiting that our lives were insufferable within the framework of the narrow borders of the Green Line, and that we were exposed to a real existential danger. It was our enemies who did not leave us any choice to think otherwise, and they compelled us to begin a defensive war in order to remove the threat to our existence; this necessity was what brought about the beginning of the mandatory period for the areas of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Look and see, that persons were forced to conduct that war in contradiction to their total political world view,

and therefore, it was for them an unbearable historical caprice. A gray and pragmatic man such as Levy Eshkol, a classic Mapainik, who had beseeched Huseyn on the morning of 6 June, in front of everyone, not to begin a war, was the person who was forced to expand [to] the borders that he did not want. Thus, we find that war to have been a practical necessity without any connection to the political conception of those who participated in it. Both Yossi Sarid and Major General Matti Peled—who was a fervent proponent of going into that war (and ended up later at the left end of the political map and served as an MK [Knesset Member] for Muhammed Mi'ari's Progressive List)—were forced to accept the same decision, if concern for the existence of the State of Israel indeed guided them.

The contrast between the political weltanschauung of those who made the decisions to go to war and the events that took place is the decisive examination point for understanding the nature of the attitude of the rulers of Israel at that time towards the new territories that fell into their hands. Most unfortunately, they related to them as territories subjected to foreign rule and as someone who had received a temporary mandate to hold them. Just as the British rule was a foreign rule in the country, whose authority stemmed from the mandate that was granted by the League of Nations, and it was essentially a temporary government, thus did the government of Israel at the time, and the present opposition, understand the nature of Israeli rule over the new territories—they would be, as was customary in international accords, like a temporary deposit until their owners returned upon the achievement of peace.

The state of affairs on the seventh day of the war was such that those who ran the government actually controlled the entire Land of Israel, but their political conception refused to break away from the idea of the divided Land of Israel. And the idea of partition was still the cornerstone of their political thinking. This historical delusion occurred during the 10 years in which the men with this conception ruled territories that they did not succeed in getting rid of, and they reluctantly controlled parts of a country that they did not want. Consequently, they were in the pincers of the paradox in which, on the one hand, they advocated the partition of Eretz Israel, but in practice they controlled all of it and implemented the policy that they called, derogatorily, "not one inch."

Thus, we find that the moment this imposed conquest began, the mandatory regime returned to these territories. Not long afterwards, the syndrome of this rule was already visible in the field. In the manner of tricking the mandatory regime, a group of persons came to Hebron and began illegal settlement, that went through the seven departments of Hell until it received de facto recognition.

'Ofra was founded in the same crafty manner. In other ways, of a more rebellious nature, the groups went up to Sebastiya, and the rebelliousness concluded with the founding of Kedumim and Alon Moreh. All of these

settlements are expressions of a revolt against the official policy of the government, which stuck to the policy of partition and saw it as the only desirable solution, given the circumstances, for our existence.

But the basic status of the settlements did not change with the upset, when the Likud rose to power. Even though "many Alon Morehs" arose, as Menahem Begin promised at Kedumim, from the viewpoint of the basic conception, the partition plan is firm and abiding even now, 10 years afterwards. The Likud's autonomy plan is not essentially different from the Alignment's approach of "a temporary deposit," as it, too, recognizes the difference of the areas of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza from the viewpoint of their basic status and it, too, perpetuates the partition. Even if it becomes a permanent political solution, as its initiators hope, and no Palestinian state grows out of the autonomy, the Green Line will continue to separate two kinds of status of territories both from the legal and from the political viewpoints. The Likud is in the pincers of the opposite paradox: it advocates the Entire Land of Israel, it opposes its partition, but in practice it continues the policy in which is etched the mark of partition.

Both the Likud, and the Alignment before it, are consistent in their approach. Within the framework of the thinking that autonomy should be granted to the Arabs, 'Ezer Weizman, the minister of defense at the time, provided passive assistance, if not more than that, for the development of an independent leadership in the territories in the form of the Committee for National Direction (of the mayors of the cities). Here was revealed the syndrome of the mandatory regime, when, following the undermining of the security situation, the first underground was formed, in which residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza were the main members and initiators, and we returned to the days of the underground. Even if we denounce that phenomenon and take exception to it, there is no doubt that it showed us and our situation in a true and correct light. For we, too, are in the pincers of the paradox: on the one hand, we want to be loyal to the authority in the state, but on the other hand, we want to ensure our security. And when these two things are inconsistent, we are confronted with the very difficult choice, where one of the possibilities to which it leads is the establishing of an underground. Only someone who understands that we, Jewish residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, are still in the mandatory period, will properly and fully understand the phenomenon.

The intifadah exposed much more strikingly and dramatically the mandatory situation in which we live. History has gone back 52 years, and the same characteristics of the Arab Revolt at that time, the strikes, the burning of fields, the murder of Jews, and the attacks on the roads, are repeated. For the Arabs, Israeli rule is indeed a foreign rule, no less, and perhaps even more, than the British rule. For the Arab residents, the struggle is the same even if the circumstances are different.

So it becomes clear to us that the intifadah is indeed the revival of the partition plan, and the best man is none other than the minister of defense, Yitzhaq Rabin, who stood at the cradle of its birth. The development of the intifadah when he served as minister of defense is not an accident, and it is, in effect, his pet. He endeavored many times to explain its popular nature and its roots. He said, and reiterated, that the solution for this form of violence is political and not military, and he even said that it had engendered a positive factor—the new leadership, as it were, in the territories. With the help of this new leadership, Mr. Rabin—who is the father of the idea of a Palestinian delegation to talks with Israel that is cut off, as it were, from the PLO—sought to revive the plan for the partition of Eretz Israel. The lack of success of Rabin—and of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]—in eradicating the intifadah, is an intentional and conscious lack of success; it is a failure that served him as a political level for realizing the partition policy, from which the old Mapai political thinking refuses to part. Mr. Rabin may take pride in the crafty political exploitation of the intifadah. Under the auspices of the unity government, and in partnership with the Likud, he succeeded in bringing about a political move that the Likud did not want, and he may take pride in the establishing of a political fact that, for the moment, appears to be gaining momentum. The Madrid conference and its continuation in Washington mark the beginning of a new period, whose characteristic is the growing recognition of the Palestinian entity, not only in the international arena but also in Israel.

This recognition is what has brought us to the second stage of the intifadah, the stage of growing use of firearms. The pride that the Palestinian entity has won encourages it to take more daring actions, in order to escalate the conflict and to exert greater pressure on Israel. This entity now operates through two wonderfully coordinated arms—one is political, in the talks that are being conducted between it and Israel, and which put it in the position of a political entity equal to the State of Israel, and the other is military, which is engaged in killing on the roads with the intention of cutting off from the state, practically and psychologically, the settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, undermining the security of their residents, causing the flight of the residents from the settlements, and in that way to achieve the dream of partition, which is shared by Yitzhaq Rabin and his clique.

The Israeli regime is incapable of carrying out a drastic operation for maintaining the security of the roads in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, as such an action, if it were indeed possible, would make it into the saboteur of the political process. Thus, it stands helpless, and the coordinated attack eats away at the strength to rule on both fronts. We are now confronted by the question of the practical implications that are liable to stem from the policy of restraint that is imposed on it. We have here before us a game of simulation, which would present us with a forecast regarding what is going to happen. We are

not sure that this is the only scenario, but it is definitely reasonable and should be taken into account, even if it is not pleasant, and even if we do not like it.

According to this scenario, the terror activities involving firearms will increase. The success will encourage the Arabs to widen their activities, and they will acquire a clear military tendency whose goal is to cut off the access to the settlements and to undermine the security of the residents when they travel on the roads, which would result in the strangling of their development, avoidance by new settlers, and abandonment by the residents already living there. Not many successes are necessary for the ring of fear to begin to tighten around the settlements. It is sufficient for a cumulative process of several additional murders at a higher frequency in order to undermine the security of the ordinary citizen in his ability to travel peacefully to and from his home, and in that way to make his life unbearable.

If that is the case, it would appear that we are liable to arrive at a new stage of the vision, "With blood and sword we will free Falastin"; [quotation marks as published] it may be that we are on the verge of a Palestinian military achievement such as they never had before—a real military achievement, which is liable to result in the paralysis of the entire settlement system in Eretz Israel.

In truth, it appears that the picture that is described here does not constitute a novelty for the decision makers. There is every evidence to show that they see it clearly, in all of its terrors. When the delegation of the heads of the settlers in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza appeared before the prime minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, and wanted to present to him the hard facts about the shooting and the attacks with firearms that were collected by the "Uvda" institute, he said that he was aware of the situation, without bothering to look at the document. The director of his office, Yossi Ahime'ir, said on another occasion that the situation will get worse. The minister of defense said to a delegation of women from Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza that he knows that we are in a war situation, and the chief of staff, who is defeated by the terror, outdid them when he declared at a meeting with settlers from 'Ofra (after the murder of Tzvi Klein), that additional difficult events await us: "It is necessary to be ready to stand on blood and to stand on corpses," declared Lt. Gen. Barak in his rough language.

There is one significance for messages from bodies that are supposed to be the highest authority for the maintenance of our security: an admission of bankruptcy of the system and a disavowal of responsibility for the bloody events that are liable to occur. The brutal declaration of Lt. Gen. Barak, which by its language and spirit abandons the Jewish settlers and treads on their corpses, surpassed everything. It shows not only a forecast of things to come, but also a cynical and hostile emotional attitude towards the blood of Jews that is shed, which beyond all doubt made concrete the foreignness and alienation towards the settlement in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. It struck like lightning every Jew who expects

to see the most senior officer of the IDF as a person who treats the life of a Jewish person with respect. Even during the days of the British mandate there was no such expression by representatives of the government.

But these things have a much more far-reaching and even frightening practical implication. The chief of staff's disavowal of responsibility for Jewish blood that will be spilled says, in effect, that someone else must assume this responsibility. Such a situation of vacuum of authority is liable to reawaken extreme elements among us to take into their hands such responsibility and to carry out rash deeds. Could he be seeking by his words to hint at an invitation for a new underground or a new movement of revolt? Is that really what he, the chief of staff, needs in these crazy days, to mobilize IDF forces to repress a Jewish intifadah? His words are liable to have a boomerang effect. If the killing has, indeed, only begun, the revolt is liable to be proportional, and the decision-making levels must take this terrible possibility into account.

The comparison with the period of the mandate seems, as it were, as if someone is presenting a gloomy forecast for our future in Eretz Israel, and that is not the case. Even if gloomy clouds now cover the skies of our lives here in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—and the severity of the era in which we live and the dangerous possibilities that it holds should not be minimized—the very comparison with the rule of the British mandate is actually encouraging. The first mandate period ended with the establishment of an independent state in part of Eretz Israel—the second edition of the mandate period, which, after all, is much easier for us, also will end with the independence of Israel over Eretz Israel in its entirety. Whoever went through the black days and the red nights during the period of the British mandate knows and is full of faith that even in the twilight days in which light and darkness are confused, in the end the dawn of our redemption will arise.

MK Sarid Defies Lubavitcher's Authority

92AE0239A Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
12 Feb 92 p 27

[Article by Gadi Munseh: "The Script Writer From Brooklyn"]

[Text] At the time of the presentation of the autonomy program to the Palestinian negotiating committee, Minister Moshe Qatzav arrived at the court of the Lubavitcher Rabbi in Brooklyn and, apparently, got the cold shoulder. By Qatzav's account, the Rabbi is convinced that turning over the territories is treason against the Torah and the Land of Israel. Qatzav did not forget to stress that the rabbi "grasped my hands during the entire conversation, kidded around, and joked with me." The kidding and joking apparently did not convince MK [Knesset Member] Yosi Sarid (Ratz), who went on a

frontal attack against the Lubavitcher Rabbi and characterized his actions as "crude interference in the making and breaking of governments."

The Rabbi's current opposition to autonomy is nothing new. The Rabbi has a long history of pronouncements on the topic of the "whole Land of Israel" which, apparently, have not sat well with the Israeli left. Immediately after the Six Day War he announced that settlement was necessary throughout the territories. During the War of Attrition he opposed the Israeli-Egyptian separation of forces agreement. During the Yom Kippur War he opposed the cessation of hostilities, and in the Lebanon War, he announced that he did not understand how you can start a war and then finish it without achieving your objectives. Rabbi Menahem Barukh, a spokesman for Habad, says that the Rabbi's instruction to vote for 'Agudat Israel in the previous elections was a one-time phenomenon. It will not happen in the upcoming elections.

[Munseh] Yosi Sarid, what do you want from the Rabbi?

[Sarid] A man lives in Brooklyn and he lives there not because it is better but because of a very interesting philosophy: the State of Israel comes and goes, but the Jewish people lives forever, and you have to help it live. Apparently it is more correct and more worthwhile to do this from Brooklyn, and from there he fights his battles to the last drop of our blood. Israel's interests are totally foreign to him, but he nevertheless intervenes in the goings-on here in a crude and blatant fashion.

[Munseh] So why is that our business?

[Sarid] I wish that I could say "So what," but because of the strange relations between the Rabbi and his followers, everything that escapes his mouth is considered law, so that he makes and breaks governments at will. We must not forget that the government I had to be a member of did not arise because of the Lubavitcher Rabbi or because of his spokesman, a certain 'Eli'ezer Mizrahi. Every time I see Mizrahi in the Knesset I stand in amazement at how that is possible and wonder if he is not responsible for the destruction of the State of Israel.

[Munseh] Would you say the same things if he were to say that he favored the exchange of territories for peace?

[Sarid] You cannot say I spoiled Rabbi Shakh, despite the fact that he is considered a dove. When he deserved harsh words, he got them. The fact that the Rabbi says things not to my liking does not make him more likable, and the fact that he is leading us into war makes things even worse. This phenomenon is not unique to 'Agudat Israel. Every religious party bends to the will of one rabbi or another, but at least those rabbis live in Israel and kill themselves in the tent of the Torah, though I have heard that they do not die so much there. The fact that the rabbis determine the fate of the country horrifies me, and the case of the Lubavitcher Rabbi is special because of the fact that he does not live in Israel.

MK 'Eli'ezer Mizrahi (formerly of 'Agudat Israel): "Who can compare to this great leader who rightfully intervenes everywhere there are Jews, arouses the Jewish soul hidden inside of them and preserves that burning ember in every corner of the world? Places that are unreachable and where no one would dare to go, in the most forsaken communities, even in the Islamic world—that is where you will find the Rabbi's emissaries working, trying, raising morale, and awakening Judaism."

[Munseh] And why does he permit himself to support a political camp in Israel?

[Mizrahi] And who does Yosi Sarid encourage? The murderers and those who make names for themselves in Judaism. I just read that the Peace Now lobby in Washington is trying to persuade the government not to give us the guarantees. That helped Israel absorb the immigration? Sarid is a smart-aleck going up against a great leader, and that is precisely what is meant when we speak of a fly with clipped wings before the great eagle in heaven.

[Munseh] But the Rabbi does not live in Israel and may not understand our problems.

[Mizrahi] I have not seen where he does not understand. He understands very well.

Profile of Lubavitch Center Kfar Habad

92AE0233B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Feb 92
pp 11-12, 14

[Interview with Menahem Brod, spokesman for Kfar Habad, by Avi Katzman; place and date not given]

[Text] The road to Kfar Habad is a road from the Land of Israel of times past, a path of orange peels and Sabra cactus hedges and muddy earth, a narrow lane off the Tel Aviv-Ramla highway that once led to Jerusalem. Life there seems frozen in the fifties: one-story houses, not carefully kept up. There are also henhouses, hothouses, and orchards. There is no Sabbath barrier in the entrance, and no chain, only a tiny sign asking one to refrain from driving on Sabbaths and holidays. Men in black, with yarmulkes and beards, wave down rides in the entrance and at the exit, and the girls who wander about, always behind carriages, in groups of three or four, laugh and turn their heads away from the camera. In Kfar Habad, they do not jump with joy today at the thought of talking with strangers. At the convention held there last Wednesday, it was decided that only one man, Menahem Brod, the editor of the T'zirei Habad (Habad Youth) publications, would be authorized to speak.

"A small village with quiet people, who live their lives and do not bother anyone," is Menahem Brod's description. Kfar Habad, not really so small, was founded in 1949 at the direction of the previous Rebbe, Yosef Yitzhak Schneersohn, and with the help of Ahdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labor Party). The Habad Hassidim, immigrants from the Soviet Union, gathered together

there, and worked as farmers. As years passed, most of the residents gave up farming and took office jobs in the city, or they work in the four educational institutions run by Habad on the site, including two trade schools, a seminar for female teachers, and an institution for children from disadvantaged families. There are also two yeshivas (religious academies) on the site.

Kfar Habad has no "kolel" (ongoing religious academy for married men). People live only from the work of their hands. A few of the residents still work in the orchards, henhouses, and hothouses, alongside the light industry that has developed on the edge of the village, not far from the railroad tracks: a small textile plant, a radiator plant, a few printing presses. Habad believes in spreading out, not in concentrating in one place. From Menahem Brod's graduating class, not one is still there: they have gone to live in Naharia and Tiv'on, Tirat Hakarmel and Ofaqim. "We can not contribute as much here," explains Brod, who moved to Bat-Yam. The head of Kfar Habad is Menahem Lehrer, and the head of the Agudat Hasidei Habad (Union, Association of Habad Hasidim) is Shlomo Midenchik, a train engineer who makes the Lod-Dimona run three nights a week.

Six hundred families, each with about seven family members. Four synagogues (one Moroccan), dusty streets, asphalt paths, broad branched trees, almost-hidden television antennas. "There are no televisions here," says Brod, who will correct his statement after a while. Not far from the entrance to the village, standing out in its reddish foreignness, rises an exact replica, made in Israel, of the Habad study house in Brooklyn. Facing the new neighborhood going up, facing the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv Highway No 1, facing the smoky hills of Hiria. Here, opposite the Tel Aviv municipal dump, next to the reddish replica, Zushe Rivkin, a resident of the village, owner of the "Yeshurun" restaurant on Meza'ah Road in Tel Aviv, intends to erect the "Armon shel Mashiah" (Palace of the Messiah), with the Rebbe's blessing. Not far from here, the planes begin to come down on their way to land in Lod. Perhaps one of them will bring the Rebbe from Brooklyn. Very soon, they believe.

The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menahem Mendel Schneersohn, studied philosophy at the University of Berlin, and later, physics and nautical engineering at the Sorbonne. Probably no Rebbe in the history of Hasidism has ever been so surrounded by ceremony: it is doubtful that this ceremony can pass from the world without leaving a feeling of disappointment and emptiness, leaving the congregation of Hassidim with a sense of letdown and painful emptiness. The present Admor (Our Master and Teacher: title of Hasidic Rebbes) has no children, and is not grooming an heir. Completely in private, he told some of those close to him that he will come to the Land of Israel very soon, and with him—the Messiah. Kabbalists point to very clear hints by the Rebbe on the subject of the Messiah's identity.

They are convinced that he is the Messiah. They repeatedly say, "Tekef umiyad mamash." "Mamash" is made up of the initials of 'Menahem Mendel Schneersohn'; Miyad is the initials of the names of the last three Lubavitcher Admors: Menahem, Yosef Yitzhak and Dov. Not that the Rebbe ever actually said this, but he has also never bothered to deny it, and that is enough for them. Every word the Rebbe says is important, so is every silence of the Rebbe. Not to speak of the hints of the Rebbe.

The fever is at its height: important people come and go, including Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliahu, IDF (Israel Defence Force) generals, Minister Nisim, Minister Katzav and others. Politicians and generals have always come to his court, and not just Israelis. But now, reports and events are piling up. From the story of General Yosi Ben Hanan, to the fire there two weeks ago, to the mysterious murder last Thursday of Phyllis Lapin, the Lubavitch Hasid and mother of four.

They are already past the stage of "We want Mashiah now!" Like a new candy advertisement, they came out a few months ago with gigantic pale yellow signs: "Prepare for the coming of the Messiah." Except that before the Messiah showed up, the money ran out, and the sign that had been set up in Tel Aviv by the northern bound train station was taken down. Until the Messiah comes, soon, of course, they are making do with smaller signs; seven periodicals and publications; 180 centers in Israel; Rabbi Sholom Dov Wolpe's book, "Yehi Hamelekh" ("Long Live the King"); the convention of Lubavitch women in New York City, which called for him to reveal himself; and the Rebbe's "Likutei Sihot" (Lecture Notes) with commentaries, which can be received by the "Fax-a-Siha" ("Fax-a-Lecture") from Brooklyn.

Where will you find another newspaper like "Kfar Habad," with announcements like "Those ready to give the name 'Hana' in return for a substantial payment, please call..." or "I found, in the synagogue in Brussels airport, a prayerbook in the Habad liturgy, with several dollars from audiences with the Rebbe, shlita (Shlita-May he live long and happily, amen). There is no name in the prayerbook. To recover it, you can contact me with identifying signs." Besides the announcements, there are "D'var Malkhut" (The Word of the Kingdom), the Rebbe's last lecture, color photos of the Rebbe, and a description of the events in his court, hour by hour. The editor, Aharon Dov, signs his article with "Rejoice, be happy in the gladness of the redemption, for the Messiah is coming!" Rabbi Yoel Cohen writes about Messiah and redemption—"The only thing left is to open our eyes," and Rabbi Menahem Brod writes an article titled "Faith in the Torah's authenticity makes belief in the Messiah imperative."

Rabbi Menahem Mendel Brod, 32, father of five, spectacted and smiling, editor of "Sihat Hashavua" (Weekly Lecture): "Hagilayon Hashavua Lekhol Yehudi" (The Weekly Paper for Every Jew). On the front page is an editorial: "The Holy One, blessed be he, is always

revealing himself to us: we need only open our eyes." Next to it is a news column and letters to the editor: a new, free, national computerized dating network has opened. Also in the paper, one of the Rebbe's lectures, sayings, the column "Torat Hage'ula" (Teaching of the Redemption): "Kah Mitgale Hamashiah" (Thus the Messiah is Revealed). Including that Hasidic miracle story, which is always somehow about a poor person who becomes rich through the intervention of a Tzadik (Saint; here, Hasidic Rebbe).

Alongside the official publications are newspapers about miracles, like "Hage'ula" (The Redemption), just 60 agorot, with a headline in red shouting, "Our generation is the generation of the King, the Messiah," or "Soon all the People of Israel will declare—'Long Live the King!'" there are announcements of a 40 percent discount from Habad's publishing house, Kahat, "from today until the Messiah comes," bekarov mamash (soon, m.m.sh.: initials of 'Menahem Mendel Schneersohn': see above) with a column on the medicine of the future, "very soon," including limbs growing back, reports on a widening phenomenon of "dreams with the Rebbe," an exclusive story that "in New York, too, they are preparing for the practical stage of the priests' service in the Temple," a fund-raising campaign, "Lottery for the Redemption," with "a plane ticket to the Rebbe, shlita," and also, "Readers Write:" "after reading your newspaper and the bulletin, 'Sihat Hashavua,' (Weekly Lecture) regularly," writes one woman, S.K., from Jerusalem, "it is becoming clearer and clearer to me that the individual who will redeem the people of Israel is living among us, and that he is the Lubavitcher Rebbe himself, may he live long...you know, better than I do, the work he has done all over the world, to unite the Jewish people, to awaken and fan the Jewish spark. Therefore, in my opinion, the Rebbe is the man. I would appreciate it if you would agree to clarify your position."

"What is all this about the Messiah?" I ask Brod. "The last time the Messiah wandered around here with the support of the Rabbis and the multitudes of the House of Israel, 300 years ago, things turned out very badly."

"What happened with Shabatai Zvi is exactly the [kind of] Messianism that does not fit the Halakha (Jewish Law) and does not derive from it," answered Brod. "That was mystic Messianism. The Taz (Rabbi David ben Shmu'el Halevi, author of Turei Zahav) went to check him out, and found that he was mocking the ruling in the Shulkhan Arukh (See Table—Codification of Jewish Law), that forbids lying on one's back." As Brod says this, he is careful to correct the mistake our photographer made, when he laid a [religious] book on the table with its cover facing down. Brod turns the book over. A mitzva not of obvious importance must be kept just as much as the most clearly important mitzvah.

"Where is the problem here?" Brod says, choosing his words carefully, "the problem is that the general public, including the Orthodox public, including the ultra-Orthodox public, including us until not so long ago,

relate to the subject of the Messiah on a mystical level. On a kindergarten level: a man on a donkey with a shofar (ram's horn). If you look at the sources a little, you will see that actually they are expressing themselves through images. You see that the Messiah can come with the clouds of the sky or can come as a poor man riding on a donkey. What is the Messiah? Let us make it easy on ourselves and open Maimonides (Rabbi Moses ben Maimon)."

We opened Maimonides, chapter 11 of the Laws of Kings and Wars. Someone who does not believe in the Messiah and does not wait for his coming, not only denies the prophets, but also the Torah and our teacher, Moses, writes Maimonides. "Nu," I said to Brod, "Maimonides rules that the Messiah is going to come, and that we must wait for him. So, whoever says that the Messiah has already come is committing a sin and rejecting a basic religious truth. Ah," said Brod, "That is Lubavitch!" "No," I said, "That is Maimonides." "Judaism is meaningless if it is not a concrete process," said Brod. "There are clear promises," he said. "But there is no 'dead-line' [previous word in English]," I said.

"Forty-two years ago, when the Rebbe took over the leadership of Habad," said Brod, "he defined the goals in his first Hasidic statement: our generation is the last generation of the Diaspora and the first generation of the redemption. The redemption is now. It is real. It is for us, and our function is to bring the redemption. Since then, the Rebbe has built up speed. Step by step, but steadily. And so this grew stronger and stronger, until in the last year or two, the Rebbe is already speaking of the redemption as a fact [previous word in English]."

He hesitated a moment before he said, "Fact,"—said this in a lower voice. "Yes," he admitted, "I thought the Messiah would arrive earlier. There are ups and downs [previous phrase in English] in this matter. But because the Messiah has never come before, we cannot know what processes will bring him."

In Habad, they were sure that the Messiah would come right after last Pesah. Instead, they received the collapse of the Soviet Union. "And if the Messiah does not come?" I asked. "There will be a difficult crisis," answered Brod. "But he will come. The Rebbe said he is arriving in Israel with the Messiah."

"The Rebbe can change his mind," I said. "You can always interpret his words differently."

"There are statements by the Rebbe that go beyond the point of no return," said Brod. I asked, "Who needs the Messiah, anyway?" Brod was amazed: "The Messiah is the fulfillment of the ideal," he said. "Today, it is impossible to keep the 613 mitzvot," he answered, "only 'Or Mitzvot' (Light of the Commandments)—207 mitzvot. Because the other $\frac{2}{3}$ pertain to the King, the Sanhedrin, the Temple, Shmita (Biblical law that the land must rest every seven years) and Yovel (Jubilee every 50 years, when land was returned to its original owners) include all kinds of mitzvot that we do not come

close to doing. And the Judaism of our day is a Judaism of the individual, not a Judaism of the collective. The Torah's approach to life is the approach of the collective."

"Yes," Brod acknowledged, "there are some in Habad who see in the Ayatolla's rule in Iran a sign of the coming of the Messiah. There are also more sympathetic signs—the Women's Movement, for example, that is also an indication of the coming of the Messiah, for it is well known that when the Messiah comes, the status of men and women will be reversed. The women will be above the men."

[Katzman] And is the Rebbe the Messiah?

[Brod] As an official Habad policy—no. For individuals in Habad—yes.

[Katzman] Then the majority of members of Habad see him as the Messiah?

[Brod] You will have to ask the majority.

[Katzman] Then, is the editor of the Habad publications unacquainted with the opinion of the majority?

[Brod] I would say that the majority sees in him someone worthy of being the Messiah.

[Katzman] They do not believe that he is actually the Messiah?

[Brod] Not with certainty—no.

[Katzman] But it would not surprise them?

[Brod] It would surprise no one.

[Katzman] Then why do they not recognize it officially?

[Brod] Because of what we said earlier—this is a very serious subject, that requires a responsible approach. And one does not file an indictment before it is complete. Suspicion is not enough.

But the suspicions grow and grow. Peace in the world, return to faith (including in Iran), the collapse of Communism, the ingathering of the exiles of Israel, etc. We have still not entered the time of redemption, but we have come to the edge of it; it must be on the way.

And what are the signs that the Rebbe is the Messiah? "The Messiah must be from the House of David. And it is tradition accepted by the people of Israel, that the Maharal of Prague was from the House of David," said Brod, "There are books that record his lineage—Menahem Mendel Schneersohn is descended from the Maharal. [And] the Rebbe has made it clear that he is about to come.

"The question is not whether the Rebbe is the Messiah," said Brod. "But if the Messiah does not come, it will be very hard. I start from the assumption that the Rebbe is a responsible person, and he is the last person who wants

to endanger what he has built in his lifetime. And he is saying things that can not be taken back, so I believe him."

[Katzman] What would be proof to you that he is not coming?

[Brod] I am not ready to think about a possibility like that.

Rabbi Shmu'el Hefer is the dignified principal of the Beyt Rivka boarding school: a thousand pupils, junior high through teachers' college, 250 girls from Chernobyl. The girls, ages eight to 22, hold him in awe. "In every generation, there is one person worthy of being the Messiah," explains Principal Hefer. "These are exceptional times in every aspect, the materialization of the words of the Sages and the Prophets. I believe that the Lubavitcher Rebbe is the candidate worthy of being the Messiah in our generation."

The walls of Beyt Rivka's impressive campus are very reserved about matters of the Messiah. Not that anyone here questions the complete redemption taking place before our eyes. They write to the Rebbe, shlita (shlita: may he live long and happily, amen), and he sends notes back in answer. They learn to be good women, trained to serve their husbands. The best of them will become teachers and train others to be good women. They have a computer room with sophisticated equipment, alongside sewing lessons; they learn history, according to Habad, as well as citizenship. The citizenship teacher says that, in this framework, they learn of the close tie to the Land, that there were always Jews living in it; of the connection between Jews of the Diaspora and the Land of Israel; about the immigrations to the Land from the days of the Ba'al Shem Tov on. They learn about the renewal of the Jewish settlements in Hebron, Safed, Tiberias, and Jerusalem, and about those Jewish laws that can be carried out only in the Land. Yes, the Teacher says, in the framework of the citizenship lessons the existence of secular Zionism is mentioned as a fact; they teach about the Balfour Declaration; they explain that it was a case of nationalism at the expense of Torah and Mitzvot.

Habad is a movement of ideological anti-Zionism. Practical Zionism—definitely. But to see Zionism as the movement of national renewal and to believe in it as such—are absolutely unacceptable in their eyes. In Kfar Habad, they mark Memorial Day and Independence Day not as a holiday but as a fact.

They teach science there: they do not even blot out the name of Darwin, says Rabbi Hefer. They just point out that they do not accept this. They teach science in the spirit of the Talmud: this is the way things were created—including the impression that they have existed for millions of years.

The Habad movement absorbed, at its own expense, 520 of the children from Chernobyl (although now they have presented a legal claim against the Jewish Agency,

because it is not sharing the costs). It absorbs Jews from Russia, absorbs the Ba'alei Teshuva (newly Orthodox). All easy-going and gentle, in an on-going dialogue, without confrontation. Almost. They did not chide the Russian children about breaking Sabbath and Yom Kippur. A little at a time. Forty of the girls studying at Beyt Rivka come from nonobservant homes. All with their parent's agreement, including the Chernobyl children, of course. They also allowed 40 Chernobyl children, whose parents changed their minds, to return to Russia at Habad's expense. Long before people began trying to make media points out of the matter, as they put it. They introduced me to Ana, nine years old, speaking Hebrew with no accent, eight months in Israel. In a few hours, she will fly to the United States, "to go back to my parents," she says. Ana, with her angelic blue eyes, still does not know that her mother died a few days ago, another victim of the radiation leak at Chernobyl.

There are no Ethiopians at Kfar Habad, but "if they convert, we will be happy to absorb them too," says Brod. Everything has something to do with education. Even the location: the Beyt Rivka seminar's location across from the village, across the tracks of the Jerusalem railroad, is partly because of morality and modesty. They are very strict about morality and modesty. Secular newspapers are not sold in the village, secular books are not sold in the village, what does get through passes through censorship. There are meetings with secular Jews, arranged beforehand and carefully supervised. In the boys' boarding school, there was one child with a ring in his ear—then they talked to him and he took off the earring. With the girls, they will talk it over with them first—following the Rebbe's teaching, they see the girls as the direct continuation of Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah. They will not expel a girl from the boarding school until they have exhausted all possibilities. If they find out that a girl from the seminary has a boyfriend, they encourage her to get married. There is no sex education, but if a problem comes up, they will have a talk with the girl, or perhaps with both her and her boyfriend.

The radio in Brod's office is playing Reshet 'B (Station B, the second Israeli radio station), and there are also all kinds of secular books on a shelf in the library. The kinds include, among others, "The Jewish Wars" by Josephus Flavius. There is no sign in the library of the works of the Rebbe's cousin, the poetess Zelda. It all passes through the filter of the Rebbe, shlita's, careful eye: they all listen to his lectures, get his advice, ask his blessing. His portrait smiles from every office, room, and hall, except in the educational institutions, where only his sayings are on the walls, and only one little portrait, warranted by his role as president of the educational institutions, is placed in the middle of the graduating class pictures.

"What is your opinion of the personality cult they create around the Rebbe?" I asked Menahem Brod.

"This is not a personality cult," says Brod. "People express their love for the Rebbe." Anyway, "Why does

the subject of the Messiah disturb Rav Schach (Rav: non-Hasidic Orthodox Rabbi) and his students so much? What do they mean, 'idol worship,' 'personality cult'—do they not give honor to Rav Schach? Is honoring Jewish leaders idol worship?" "Come, let us break this down into details," Brod suggested. What exactly are they opposing? The fact that there are Jews who believe that a Zadik living among us is a man of God, a man whose every word is holy—is this what they are disagreeing with? Did they not relate the same way to the Hazon Ish? What is the argument here? You see portraits of the Hazon Ish and Rav Schach in every one of their homes. I say that their punishment is that what they fought against, they have accepted.

[Katzman] And at what point would it turn into a personality cult?

[Brod] When it got into the synagogue. As long as you relate to the Rebbe as a figure worthy of admiration and respect as an authority, as a man who serves as our eyes, for me this is legitimate.

[Katzman] Does the Halakha allow this?

[Brod] It not only allows it—take the original source itself: "And they believed in the Lord and in Moses his servant. And this is the Torah that Moses the man of God blessed."

[Katzman] There is no sliding into more here? Is the synagogue the limit?

[Brod] The limit is how strongly it is based. To take any man who is rabbi of a congregation and turn him into a holy man of God is an exaggeration. It is baseless. But in my eyes, when I look at the Rebbe and examine him according to the proper tools, I think that this man does not fit the scale of the men of our generation nor that of those of the last couple of generations. He fits the scale of the personalities of the Bible. In my opinion. I see that this person is head and shoulders above the others in every way, in the realms of philosophy and ideas, in the realm of Torah-Halakhic knowledge, in general world outlook and general education. In leadership, in understanding accurately the problems of the Jewish people, and in dealing with its true problems, and ability to discern what is truly important, in his personal example of self-sacrifice and loyalty to values and principles. The truth is that he is a "lamp unto our feet." When I see a man like this, I thank the Lord that such a leader is living in our generation, our pathetic generation.

[Katzman] And this leadership includes miracles, healings, and blessings given to businesses?

[Brod] I go according to the Talmudic maxim, "A Zadik ordains and the Holy One, Blessed Be He, fulfills." By the way, all Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) Judaism agrees on this, including the followers of Rav Schach. They also go to ask blessings from the Rav.

[Katzman] What do you think of the Baba Sali cult in Netivot?

[Brod] I do not have to answer that question. I have an opinion, but I see no reason to go into that here.

[Katzman] Where do you see the differences between you and them?

[Brod] That is really the same question. Baba Sali was a truly great man. I believe that a Jew who was a servant of the Torah—his word, his blessing, has power and meaning, and for someone who believes in it, this can be a help. What bothers me there, is that that is all it is.

[Katzman] But in its essence, you see no exaggeration?

[Brod] Perhaps I do.

[Katzman] In what way?

[Brod] I would explain that in an article, not in an interview.

YESHA Council Leader Criticizes Security Gaps

92AE0236B 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew Jan 92 pp 22-24

[Article by Eli'ezer Melamed: "The End of the Period of Restraint"]

[Text] The basis for our control of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza depends doubtlessly on the expansion of settlement, additional construction, the creation of jobs, and the establishment of a more spiritual and idealistic society. But at the same time, it is impossible not to refer to the continuing security failure in the handling of the intifadah.

At the beginning of the intifadah, we were told that a wise policy would lead to the waning away and disappearance of the violence, and that quiet would return to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Even when there were fatal attacks, we knew how to control our feelings and to focus on the main thing, the absorption of additional families and construction. The lack of national consensus regarding severe punitive measures towards the Arab population, we were told, keeps the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from using a firmer hand, and we restrained ourselves and waited for the wise policy to achieve the desired result at its own pace.

Today it is clear that the present security policy has failed. The "smart" methods were perceived by the enemy as an expression of weakness, and the deterrent power of the IDF is evaporating. The rules for opening fire are indeed changing in the right direction, and punishment is taking on a more vigorous and deterrent form, but always too late. Had they acted four years ago as they are now acting, the intifadah would have been cut short.

The present security policy does not provide any solution for the problem of the stonethrowers. The minister of defense, Moshe Arens, pats himself on the back because the number of stonethrowers has decreased, but he does not bother to mention that this fact is due to the

bypass roads and the fact that they are including in the statistics all the numerous vehicles that are travelling from the settlements that are near the Green Line, which hardly pass through an Arab population. The reality is that there is no decline in the quantity of stonethrowing on the roads that pass through Arab villages. It is true that there is a decline in the number of reports of attacks, but that is because in any event, even when it is reported, nothing is done. At best, a diligent patrol will go out to the area in its jeep and will shine a light between the trees. And it is not the fault of the frustrated soldiers, of course, but of the "wise" security policy.

On the subject of deterrence, the IDF thus did not take even one new objective. On the contrary, the stonethrowers are becoming more and more arrogant. They are not even trying to flee. So the minister of defense must not take credit for the bypass roads. It is his duty to increase the deterrent force against the stonethrowers and the organizers of the uprising. It must be understood that if we do not succeed in deterring the stonethrower, not too long from now he will become a thrower of incendiary bottles and afterwards he will participate in a terror gang that uses firearms. As long as the policy of the minister of defense makes it possible to throw stones, it also allows the organization of terror gangs that use incendiary bottles and firearms. It is not true that "this is a matter of intelligence," and "[we] are doing the maximum." The anarchy that reigns on the roads that pass through Arab villages and the greater anarchy that reigns in those many villages through which no one passes, are what is creating hothouses for wild upgrowths of terror bands, and it is they that allow the residents of the area to cooperate with the terrorists. Another reason for the "decline" in the amount of stonethrowing is that instead of going every two weeks to the police and wasting days of work, the residents prefer to combine their complaints and to report one time about several incidents. And there are cases where, due to lack of time, they gave up on fixing their car and there are even those who forego compensation for the damage.

The assertion always was that as long as firearms were not used, the army would relate to the intifadah with a certain measure of leniency, but that when the rioters go over to the use of firearms, the IDF would use every means against them. And behold, not a day goes by now without shooting at residents or at soldiers, and nothing in the fundamental approach of the security policy has changed. And we, who are only coming to demand what was promised to us and what is coming to us, are suddenly accused of some fanatic extremism. And the minister of defense, instead of coping with the problem and answering to the point, spends his time preaching morality to the settlers, that they should not violate the law.

It is precisely the lack of consideration on the part of security factors and the lack of understanding for our demands that show us concretely and clearly the severity of the situation. It is so much agreed upon and accepted that stones are thrown in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza,

that someone who tries to speak about changing the situation sounds like someone whose sole intent is nothing else but to hurt the minister of defense and the senior officers. We have arrived at a time when we do not have the legitimate right to demand security. And if that is the situation today, who knows what will be tomorrow (for they are talking about autonomy). We have given up enough, forsaken our honor and our rights. Today we must straighten up and insist that peace be returned to the roads, that the deterrent power be returned and that not even one stone be thrown.

If we want to live, and if we believe that Jews in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza also have the right to live with honor, we must demonstrate with all of our strength against the security failure in the handling of the intifadah, to bring out everything that we had been sweeping under the rug for years and to tell everyone about the many failures to which we have been witnesses up to now. How does it happen that in the same place, every day and at the same time, they throw stones and there is no reaction? How is it that armed bands are going about and the IDF does not succeed in getting its hands on them? How is it that you hear shots by terrorists who are training with firearms, and there is no response? In the past, almost every shooter was captured, sooner or later. Today, most of the shooters are not captured. And even when some rioter is captured and sentenced to prison, there, as well, we have no deterrence against him? The guards are afraid to go among the prisoners, and the prisoners divide themselves up into camps, those of the Hamas and those of the Fatah, and those [who] belong to the devil knows who. And there they train and prepare for the following attacks that they will carry out after they leave prison (perhaps early, in a prisoner exchange deal).

Part of deterrent power is that the enemy knows what awaits him if he is captured. And the proof is the case of the terrorist, who before he went out to run over soldiers, built a new wall in his room so that, if he were captured, they would destroy only part of the room. And indeed, when soldiers arrived to destroy his room and found a new wall there, they were compelled to destroy only part of the room, for even the fresh color of the cement, which indicated like a hundred witnesses that the wall had been built a few days before, did not help, and the prosecution insisted that the room be destroyed only up to the new wall.

We demand not only our security as settlers, but also the security of the entire state of Israel. (For we, personally, are willing to endanger our lives for the sake of the settlement of the country and this is not the place to expand on that. Also, the public that continues to stream to the settlements will not stop coming.) For if in the heart of Samaria, due to anarchy, terror bands will form, it will not take long for those rioters also to reach beyond the Green Line. A majority of the people already decided in the elections that were held about 15 years ago that we must hold on to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, at least for security reasons, for if we do not, the rioters will attack

us in the suburbs of Petah Tiqva and Natanya. Therefore, as representative of the public who have gone to the settlements at the head of the camp, it is our duty to warn about the present failure that is liable to spread on a large scale deeply beyond the Green Line. What is more, the majority of the people is of the opinion, as was expressed in the elections to the Knesset, that we must hold on to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, for if we do not, the rioters will attack us near K'dumim and Ari'el, which today, thank God, are relatively quiet, and afterwards also near Petah Tiqva and Netanya.

Even though it is very difficult to criticize the IDF, we must clarify that there is a failure, and that its results are liable to be even more severe than the results of the failure before the Yom Kippur War. It appears that the IDF has despaired of trying to overcome the intifadah, and the initial agreement with the failure is liable to create a situation where armed terror bands will spring up in all the Arab villages in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. The failure has already brought about the autonomy talks, and we are in a very weak opening position. And who knows if an army that has grown accustomed to suffering stones and bottles, which has inflicted no small damage to morale, can stand strongly in the face of a war. Precisely because the IDF is so dear to us, we must demonstrate and demand a complete change in the whole system, a change that can return to the IDF its honor and its deterrent power. Then we can again be proud of the army, of the chief of staff, and of our area commander. For, even given the harshest criticism, we do not forget their many past achievements, and how they endangered their lives in heroic feats.

By the way, until the war of the intifadah, the military men complained that it was the politicians who caused them to lose their military achievements. Today, it seems that the failures of the generals are those that cause the loss of political assets and settlement achievements.

It is evident that the criticism is not directed personally towards the commanders in the field. They are working night and day and are devoting the best years of their lives for the sake of maintaining our security, and we shall certainly not be ungrateful to them. But only after a full recognition of the failure will it begin to be possible to relate to the intifadah in a new way. Our wise men of blessed memory taught us that there is no accident in the world, and if in the past two months four of our comrades were killed and many more were miraculously saved, the significance is that we must learn that something has changed, that the time has come to protest and to demonstrate.

It must be understood that our struggle is not for a comfortable life, but for the degraded honor of Israel. We are struggling against the helplessness and the despair that has spread among us, which is clearly visible in the hallway conversations in Washington. If we do not use our right to expel or to punish the rioters severely, it shows that the military government is not absolute, and

that something has weakened in the link with the areas of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. It is a sign that we are not sure that we have the right to live in the country in security. There is no doubt that we will succeed if we all unite for a wise and common struggle. The subject of security unites around us the great majority of the people. Even those who support a certain withdrawal admit that meanwhile the IDF must maintain its deterrent power. Everyone knows that if terror bands develop in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Green Line will not stop them. If we all organize for protests and demonstrations within the framework of the law, something must certainly change for the better (during the first two weeks of the wave of protest, the number of attacks fell by half, according to the data of "Uvda"), and if the change that is demanded still does not occur, we will all mobilize for a broad informational effort throughout the country, especially among members of the Likud central committee. While the intentions and the position of the minister of defense are good, his deeds are not desirable. And it must be clear that whoever is responsible for the present anarchy must pay for it.

There were those who understood the meeting of the rabbis of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza and their communiques as some kind of expression of lack of faith in the Council of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. This is certainly not the case. It is inconceivable that any rabbi would take upon himself the organizational roles of promoting construction and broadening settlement, for the members of the Council of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza have been doing this for years with great success, and there is no challenge to them (When these lines were written, it became known that the Council of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza has undertaken to organize the protest activities against the security failure, and there is no doubt that this must be so. The leaders of the public, who always bear the organization burden, are those who are called to lead the protest.) Our wise men of blessed memory have already said (Pesahim 111, B) that one must not live in a city whose leaders are all rabbis, for there is the fear that their desire to be involved in Torah and in spiritual matters will lead them to neglect public needs. The role of the rabbis is to engage in that part of life that involves principles, in the determination of the basic direction. Therefore, when we come to the point where a decision of principle must be made, it is the duty and the role of the rabbis to take a position.

Settlement in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza stemmed from the school of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Hacohen Kook, a righteous one of blessed memory. He was not involved, of course, in the actual establishment [of settlements], but he educated and guided and encouraged. In all the early settlements, his pupils stood at the center of spiritual and practical action. That is the way it was in Gush 'Etyon with Hanan Porat, and that is what happened in Hebron with Rabbi Levinger and Rabbi Waldman. And that is the way it was in Kedumim and Alon Moreh, and in 'Ofra and Bet El. And when the subject is more daring settlement, whose strengthening and reinforcement

require values and dedication, the role of the rabbis is more prominent. Men of the spirit have the strength to turn the first wheel, the spiritual one, the one of principle, and afterwards the other wheels will turn, until the last, the practical, one.

Today, as well, it seems that we have arrived at the point where we must determine our attitude to the new situation. Many things have changed, settlement has expanded, problems of the intifadah, [and] the autonomy talks, and here resumes the role of the rabbis in expressing a position of principle. We have arrived at a situation in which we must decide in principle that we cannot go on like this any longer, and to determine that the present security policy has failed; that this failure is causing a weakening of the link of the people to the areas of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and is engendering doubt in our ability to impose order and to punish the rioters in the land of our inheritance; and that the impotence of the senior command is reflected in the lack of faith in the justice of the cause. The implication is that we must protest against the failure, until there is a complete change in the entire attitude to the intifadah. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the protests must be carried out in a legal manner and without any confrontation with the IDF soldiers in the field.

All energies must now be concentrated around the demand for security and the return of complete control to the IDF throughout Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, including the Arab villages. Only after that will we be able to engage more efficiently in the other subjects also.

[boxed item]

A Public Appeal from the Meeting of the Rabbis of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza

The rabbis of the settlements of the headquarters of Binyamin and Samaria and representatives of rabbis from Judaea and the Gaza region met to discuss the security situation. The following is the text of the joint appeal made by the rabbis:

To the residents of Judaea, Binyamin, Samaria, and the Gaza region, may God protect them!

A. We hereby call for strengthening within us the faith and trust in God the Lord of Israel and for the repudiation of all spirit of weakness and desperation. The spirit of faith and trust of the settlements is what brought about the accelerated expansion of settlement during the intifadah, we shall preserve it and intensify it!

Let us not slip into weaknesses nor speak in a desperate style! We trust in God the Lord of Israel who gave us this land for an eternal inheritance. Blessed is the man who trusts in God and God will be his refuge, and he who trusts in God will be surrounded by righteousness and everything that the Merciful One does is for the best,

from this situation, as well, we will come out strengthened with the help of God, In distress I called on the Lord; the Lord answered me and brought me relief. [Psalm 118, 5]

B. Along with the faith and the trust, we will not pass over in silence the criminal acts of terror and murder. The residents of the settlements are called on to organize for vigorous action of demonstrations and protests that will clarify to the government of Israel and the security forces that it is their duty to take every measure in order to overcome the terrorism and repel it.

The leaders in every settlement are called on to organize demonstrations and protests against attacks of any kind, against stonethrowing and a fortiori against the throwing of bottles and shooting! The demonstrations and protests will be carried out within the framework of the law in the area of the attack and in no way is there to be a confrontation with the IDF soldiers in the field.

The demonstrations must continue until practical results are obtained.

C. We demand that the government and the security forces make a proper response to Arab terror, both in the military sphere and in the sphere of morale.

The morale response to terror should be emphasized by establishing settlements each time that Jewish blood is shed and also by expropriating houses and appropriate punishment. These responses are demanded due to the decline of the deterrent power of the IDF. The soldiers of the IDF need this and the entire people of Israel needs it.

D. In this period, we are demanding the strengthening of the link with the soldiers of the IDF, who are patrolling the roads and are at the roadblocks and the positions, for visiting with them, for serving them refreshments and treating them warmly during these cold days and especially at night.

E. The meeting of the rabbis will address the prime minister and the minister of defense and will inform them of the severity of the situation by a demand that it be changed immediately.

"Be strong and we will be strengthened for the sake of our people and the cities of our Lord."

The meeting of the rabbis of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza
[end boxed item]

Details of Rabbi Shach's Attack on Habad

92AE0260D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Mar 92
p 4

[Article by S. Eylan: "Rabbi Shach, When He Bitterly Weeps: Habad Men are Heretics; and the Secular Newspapers—Non-Kosher"]

[Text] Rabbi Eli'ezer Menahem Shach again sharply attacked Habad and defined the Hassidic men as atheistic and ignoramuses. Shach, who spoke at a meeting of religious teachers and students of the Degel Hatorah cultural organization, Toda'ah, at the Binyaney Ha'umah complex in Jerusalem, burst into tears in the course of his talk, and at other times appeared on the verge of collapse from lack of strength.

Shach prefaced the Habad matter, so he claims, with the saying that everything depends of the study of the Torah, and then said: In Habad, I have never heard that they preach and call for reinforcement of the Torah. They have no connection with Torah study. They denounce the Torah and are ignoramuses."

Do Not Be Persuaded by Prayers

There were two discoveries in his talk. One of them was the cry not to be persuaded by the election promises, which was interpreted as a warning not to be persuaded by the prayers of the Habad men. "When election day comes," said Shach, "vote only for orthodox parties, and listen only to what the great rabbis say. Do not be persuaded by the promises that they are spreading." Sources in Degel Hatorah interpreted the words the day before yesterday as a warning not to vote for the Ge'ulat Yisra'el slate, which intends to install Deputy Minister Eli'ezer Mizrahi.

According to these sources, this slate will run under the slogan that whoever wants to bring the Messiah must vote for them. The head of advertising in Habad, Rabbi Menahem Barud, said in response, that he did not know if the Lebovitcher Rabbi said something to Mizrahi that could be understood as a blessing for the establishment of a party.

The second discovery came when he said that all of his words, including those against Habad, were spoken with the previous knowledge of all the rabbis who were present. Present were two of the greatest arbiters, Rabbis Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, and the fact that they, too, were attacking Habad has great significance in the orthodox community.

"What do you think, that I am not normal? Ask all of the rabbis present," Shach said.

Because the two conditions [as published] were met, they could conclude the evening in Degel with the satisfaction of a great success. The attendance of Elyashiv, who is considered to be the number two man in Degel Hatorah, was the final act in the process of his return to the party. Auerbach remains neutral between Degel Hatorah and Agudat Yisra'el, but, nevertheless, his attendance was considered a Degel achievement. In Agudat Yisra'el, they claim that Auerbach came because it was said to be a theological meeting.

"Sepharadis in Their Institutions"

Rabbi Shach called for the registration of children only in orthodox education, and then added the Ashkenazis should be registered in Ashkenazi institutions and the Sepharadis in Sepharadi institutions. Each one according to his customs. Shach is the one who integrated the Sepharadis into the orthodox system, and many Sepharadis listen to his words. His call for separation between the communities is a harsh blow to the attempts of the Sepharadis to integrate themselves into the Ashkenazi educational institutions.

A large part of Shach's speech was dedicated to a harsh attack on the media, "MA'ARIV, YEDI'OT AHA-RONOT, HA'EREV SHABBAT, PANIM EL PANIM, every piece of dirt in the world, every bit of filth in the world. I am not afraid to say so," he said. "Even in Benay Beraq, the holy city, the city of yeshivas, go from house to house and what will you find there? YEDI'OT, MA'ARIV. It is forbidden to touch secular newspapers, it is forbidden to keep such newspapers in the home, it is nonkosher. It is forbidden to buy them, so that the secular newspapers will be abolished, because there will be no one to buy them. It is forbidden to sell them, and when you pass near a kiosk that sells secular newspapers, you must make a big detour."

Similarly, he called for not keeping a television, just as they do not eat pork, and if there is a television in the home, to get rid of it. Rabbi Shach was considerably behind the times in the field of communications. PANIM EL PANIM is an orthodox newspaper that was in business more than 30 years ago.

Bombs and Breaking Teeth

People who identified themselves as Habad youths threatened to hide a bomb in the hall or to bomb the event by other means. So it was announced by Deputy Minister Rabbi Avraham Ravitz yesterday. The police sent a terrorist unit to the event. During the event, the chairman announced that the police requested all present to check whether a bomb had been hidden under their chairs.

The head of Habad advertising, Rabbi Menahem Barud, in response, defined Ravitz's words as the cry of the robber pretending to be a victim and blamed the Degel Hatorah people, because they broke five teeth of an eight-year-old girl with the punch of a fist merely because she was distributing Habad leaflets in synagogues.

In the course of the event at Binyaney Ha'umah, Habad men [as published] distributed stickers with the slogan "Prepare for the false Messiah," a response to the Habad slogan "Prepare for the coming of the Messiah."

Peretz and SHAS Men Participated

At the event the minister of absorption, Rabbi Yitzhaq Perez, as well as SHAS men participated, which tells us of the possibility for cooperation in the future. "We can

learn from this that SHAS [Sephardi Torah Guardians] men are subject to the greatest of men, Rabbis Shach and Yosef, and I, too, am subject to the greatest of men," Peretz said.

Paper Urges Stricter Gun License Measures

TA2203171992 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
22 Mar 92

[Text] Although there is a certain logic to arguments which favor allowing private citizens to obtain personal weapons with which to defend themselves, it is doubtful that granting such permission would greatly reduce the number of terror casualties—it is most difficult to fire a sidearm accurately, if at all, once an attacker has managed to wedge an axe in your back, the paper surmises. Moreover, recent tensions have increased the chances of innocent people being victimized. The paper concludes that the criteria for weapons licences should not be relaxed; if anything, the establishment should endeavor to limit the number of guns in the public domain even further.

Factional Tensions at Qetziyot Prison

TA1103155792 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 11 Mar 92
p 5

[Text] This week, as a gesture in honor of the month of Ramadan, about 300 prisoners are being released from Qetziyot Prison, in addition to the 30 prisoners who were released last weekend. This decision was communicated yesterday by prison warden Lt. Col. Ze'ev She'alti'el, in a meeting with journalists in Beersheba.

According to him, the number of prisoners has recently decreased from 7,000 to 5,000, in accordance with the policy of Southern Commander Matan Vilna'i. "The objective is to reduce, by as much as possible, the number of prisoners in the facility and, to that end, we are releasing prisoners who have two months left until the end of their sentence. This comes in addition to the bolstering of the legal system in Gaza, in order to shorten

the legal proceedings. The result is that, today, there are only about 600 prisoners in Qetziyot awaiting trial, in contrast to the approximately 1,500 there were just recently.

"At the same time, the trend is to use the procedure called 'administrative detainee' in as low a dosage as possible and, as a result of this, the number of administrative detainees in the prison has dropped from 3,000—in the not too distant past—to the 250 today. The intention is to bring calm to the Gaza Strip and the population imprisoned here is an integral part of the territory."

She'alti'el noted that it was decided to release youths and the chronically ill, even if they have two months remaining in their prison terms.

He said that, since the time of the establishment of the prison in March 1988, 28 prisoners were murdered, the majority of them by strangulation. The last instance occurred on 19 July 1991. He emphasized that none of the murdered prisoners cooperated with the authorities, despite the suspicions of their prisonmates. According to She'alti'el, there has been, in the last half year, a worsening sensed in the relations between imprisoned Fatah members, which represent about 70 percent of the Qetziyot population, and HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement] activists (11 percent)—who formed a coalition against Fatah, together with the prisoners belonging to the Democratic Front (10 percent), the Popular Front (8 percent), Islamic Jihad (3 percent), and the Communists (2 percent).

Owing to the direct confrontations and the severe tensions between the different factions, the authorities have had to use force—more than once—in order to separate between the rivals.

She'alti'el further stated that, two days ago—at the conclusion of a routine meeting held with prison monitors—one of them rose and, in their name, expressed their sincere feelings of participation in the grief over the death of Menahem Begin.

Civd Administrator on Economics in Territories

92AE0241A Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 5 Feb 92
p 10

[Interview of Brigadier General Freddy Zakh, deputy coordinator of activities in the territories by Yanqi Galanti and Avi Garfinkel; place and date not given; first paragraph is BAMAHAHE introduction]

[Text] The Palestinians' interest in the peace talks is waning, as indicated by the low-key receptions being given to Palestinian participants in the talks upon their return to the country. The EEC will inject \$97 million into the territories this year. Brigadier General Freddy Zakh, the deputy coordinator of activities in the territories: "This provides the Europeans with a door through which to enter into the peace process."

[Zakh] The worldwide political uproar created by the deportation [of Palestinians] will not deter us from taking similar measures in the future. On the contrary, the uproar proved to us that deportation is the most effective, deterrent measure. This assumption is strengthened by conversations which we held with residents in the territories. These conversations made it clear to us that deportation is an effective deterrent at the top of the punishment scale. Because of the severity of this punishment, we use it only against people who are proven to be central activists in terror organizations and who continue their activities from the prison facilities in which they are detained. Candidates for deportation are detainees who manage to obtain a certain degree of control in the field even when imprisoned. The prisons have now become a place from which people entering as stone throwers are liable to leave with the ability to carry out more serious activity.

[BAMAHAHE] How much interest are residents of the territories currently showing in the peace process?

[Zakh] The population of the territories is showing declining interest in both the multilateral track of the discussions and in the entire process. One indication of this trend is that the receptions given to participants in the discussions when they return to the country have become quieter with time. After the euphoria which characterized the start of the process, residents of the territories have come to understand that this is a protracted process. Therefore, their interest has declined. Evidence of this decline is provided by the fact that the strike which opponents of the peace process declared on the opening day of the multilateral conference in Moscow was not enforced completely and actually failed.

In general, the Palestinians do not speak with a single voice. This is a problem with which the state of Israel must contend. If and when we reach an agreement, the territories will undoubtedly not be quiet, and violence in them will increase.

[BAMAHAHE] One of the five conferences that will be held following the multilateral discussions will deal with

the rehabilitation of refugees. Does the Civil Administration have plans in this regard?

[Zakh] A refugee rehabilitation plan is under way in the Gaza Strip. We have plans on file to rehabilitate all of the refugees living in the camps. The state of Israel is interested in their rehabilitation as part of the peace plan.

[BAMAHAHE] A number of months ago, it was reported that residents of Gaza attempted to create a city council headed by Fayiz Abu-Rahmah. Where do matters stand now?

[Zakh] For our part, we have brought the horse to the trough, but we cannot force it to drink. We encouraged local residents to create a city council, and we agreed that Fayiz Abu-Rahmah would head it. The process is now stuck. However, we are certain that the idea is good and positive. About two weeks ago, Defense Minister Moshe Arens met with the heads of the Chamber of Commerce and stated his willingness to consider free elections in Gaza City leading to the establishment of a local city council.

[BAMAHAHE] Recently, we received the good news that the coordinator of activities in the territories, Major General Danny Rothschild, met with EEC leaders to mobilize \$80 million to develop the territories. What was the outcome?

[Zakh] In June 1992, \$80 million is expected to start arriving in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza as special assistance. This is in addition to the regular funding provided by the EEC, which totals \$17 million per annum. This money facilitates development and provides the Europeans with a door through which to enter into the peace process.

The Japanese are also seeking to participate in the process and are now investing in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza through UN organizations. Every allocation granted to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza undergoes our approval to prevent excessive investments that might turn out to be "white elephants."

The Civil Administration's budget, which is financed mainly by taxes collected from the local population, was at its highest level in 1987. The intifadah has since damaged the production capacity of the population in the territories, causing a drop in tax revenues. The main damage is in the area of development. Investments in infrastructure dropped by 50 percent. The situation is still much better compared to 1967, and it is good relative to an Arab state. However, our criterion is that of the state of Israel, relative to which there is still room for improvement.

Deepening Recession, Gloomy Economic Forecast

92P40159A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
27 Mar 92 p 1

[Text] The Bank of Israel confirmed yesterday that the economy is now in a real recession. All economic indicators for the first three months of the year point to a retreat, a decline, and a freeze.

At the beginning of 1992 investments declined, building decreased, exports diminished, the request for workers declined, industrial production did not increase, agriculture suffered, and trade diminished—a gloomy picture and harsh reality.

What happened? The main reason for the drop in the economy is fading immigration from the former Soviet Union. The massive immigration from there was the steam that drove economic activity, the great expectation for the State of Israel. Now that the rate of immigration has slowed to almost 5,000 a month, growth has been blocked. Without massive numbers of immigrants, the economy will return and march in place as it did during the 1980's.

Additional reasons for the recession: First is the continuing drop in Israeli industrial exports. Our foreign markets are shriveling up and this will continue in the coming year. Second is the interest rate. It is still relatively high, but it is choking and there are scandals.

What is the government doing against the recession? It will not be believed, but just the opposite of what is required. Budget policies are not stimulating the economy, but depressing it. The treasury is absorbing money from the public and saving it as a stimulus for export. Investments are shrinking and aid for employment is being curtailed. Interest rates are still relatively high.

What will happen? Bank Hapo'alim determined in its last survey, published yesterday, that unemployment will continue to rise. Real wages will be eroded. The buying power of the wage earner will decrease, and the recession will grow stronger. This is the expected course of the Israeli economy—a dangerous deterioration.

A year ago an uncoordinated, short-sighted, unimaginative economic policy "succeeded" in fracturing immigration. A similar economic policy this year is likely to fracture the whole economy.

Photo Satellites, Collection Methods for IDF

92AE0241B Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 5 Feb 92
pp 22-25

[Interview of Chief Intelligence Officer Brigadier General 'Oren Shahor by Yo'av Kaspi; place and date not given]

[Text] Outgoing Chief Intelligence Officer Brigadier General 'Oren Shahor, in a special interview with BAMAHAANE: "The satellite is the most important need in intelligence at present.... We warned in advance that the Iraqis would launch missiles against us.... With the outbreak of the war we appointed a special team to examine the restructuring of the [intelligence] corps.... In the coming decade, it will be necessary to pay attention to states such as Iran, and to develop sensitivity and vigilance regarding the rear.... In the short term, we see no chance of a broad Arab coalition developing against us."

Ten days before completing his tour of duty, outgoing Chief Intelligence Officer Brig. Gen. 'Oren Shahor decided to conduct a surprise inspection of a number of units in the Intelligence Corps. The timing chosen for the inspection was sensitive and problematic from the outset. It was feared that commanders would view the inspection a kind of final "leadership exercise." Brig. Gen. Shahor claims that the inspection's true aim is to broadcast that it is business as usual. He began his tour of duty three and a half years ago with a series of inspections, and he wishes to end it in the same way.

It was very difficult to convince him to allow us to join the in on the inspections. To put it mildly, he was not enthusiastic about the idea. Only intensive persuasion by his office chief, Shay, enabled us to make this story a reality. Even on the way to the surprise inspection in the helicopter, Brig. Gen. Shahor was still hesitant, fearing that the inspection would not achieve its true objective if there was press coverage. He asked us to stay on the sidelines and remain conspicuous.

The inspection was organized as an operation for all intents and purposes. It is well-known that soldiers often find out in advance about supposedly surprise inspections, which enables them to prepare accordingly. Therefore, this particular inspection was kept secret and was known only to a limited group of officers who accompanied the intelligence chief.

To avoid arousing attention at the bases to be inspected, the inspection team landed in deserted fields, kilometers from the bases. From there, we used civilian transportation means to reach the different bases.

Another way to "smell" an impending inspection is simply to look at the inspector's calendar. However, on this occasion, anyone who might have peeked at Shahor's schedule on that day would have seen that the evening hours were scheduled to be taken up with a visit to a swearing-in ceremony for new soldiers entering the

Intelligence Corps. This time, the ceremony, at which most of the corps' senior officers were present, was opened with an announcement by the commander of Training Base 15, in which he stated that, to his regret, he had been notified that the chief intelligence officer would be unable to attend. While most senior intelligence officers were in the center of the country, we were already somewhere in northern Israel at the base of a listening unit.

Even the helicopter which we used had been ordered earlier in the name of a corps department head, without any indication of who would be accompanying him. It was not even known in the control rooms of the different commands that the chief intelligence officer would be arriving. If all of this was not enough, a unit in the distant south was ordered to prepare for a planned inspection by the chief intelligence officer. As eyes turned southward, we were landing in the north.

The moment our vehicle approached the entrance to the base, Shahor's office chief, Shay, contacted the unit commander and informed him that the chief intelligence officer was on his way. The unit commander's response indicated that he was indeed completely surprised.

Brig. Gen. 'Oren Shahor is leaving an Intelligence Corps that is standing at a crossroads. The events of the Gulf war and the large information gaps that were uncovered regarding Iraq's unconventional capabilities forced intelligence to undergo a certain shake-up and to examine why so much was unknown. Suddenly, it emerged that the radius of threats is much greater, and that special emphasis must be placed on unconventional weapons. It is now desirable—or more correctly, necessary—to know not only what is happening within a radius of 100 km from the border, but also to look down on states on the distant periphery, such as Iran and Algeria.

A change in the radius of threats of course requires a change in the entire concept of the corps' operation.

The current organizational structure of the Intelligence Corps and AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence] is mainly the result of the events of the Yom Kippur War. The great surprise in 1973 required a new intelligence disposition. A second Yom Kippur is now unspeakable. However, the structure formed in response to the lessons of the Yom Kippur War is clearly no longer suited to current needs. Additional resources and a different organizational deployment are needed to furnish good answers about what is being done in distant countries.

In the Intelligence Corps, a committee is currently working to recommend a new organizational structure more suited to current needs. For many months, the committee has been interviewing a series of officers throughout the corps. The recommendations are supposed to be formulated shortly. According to Shahor, the reorganization process will be completed during the current operational year.

[Kaspi] Brig. Gen. Shahor, do we have the tools to contend with the new threat?

[Shahor] We are preparing. However, such preparation takes more than two days. Since the Gulf war ended, we have changed our resources and emphases considerably. It is important to remember that it is still necessary to know about Syria and terrorist organizations. Syria, despite the peace process and our hopes, is still a confrontation state. At the same time, a much larger circle [of threats] has developed. This requires resources and a completely different deployment.

[Kaspi] As is the case throughout the Army, intelligence is forced to cut its budget. You did not receive additional resources.

[Shahor] We received a portion. You never get what you want. There is no end to this. The more we receive, the more we will do. It should be remembered that the state in general and the Army in particular has a limited basket of resources. I understand this. Therefore, taking into account the circumstances, I can say that we received not a little. We received a large budgetary slice both from the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] pie and the supplement given to the defense budget. We are getting ready for new areas, such as a photo satellite, which is already in the national basket of resources.

In my opinion, we have received the critical resources that we need to implement our operational program and to be able to provide a warning response for new missions as well.

[Kaspi] Can these new missions be fulfilled without a photo satellite?

[Shahor] Intelligence has neither a single answer nor a single information source. However, I think that it is very important that we have a strategic tool of the photo satellite type. It will provide us with solid, high-quality information on what is being done on the periphery.

[Kaspi] Can one thus conclude that intelligence cannot provide a satisfactory response without a satellite?

[Shahor] I think that it is important that we have such a satellite in this decade. That is a very clear answer.

[Kaspi] There is discussion of a number of expensive systems, including a satellite, the Hetz [Arrow anti-missile missile], and "smart weapons." Of all of these systems, which is more important?

[Shahor] We are experiencing considerable financial straits. We also have clearly defined priorities. Regarding intelligence at least, a photo satellite is the most important [need] at present. I estimate that the current basket of resources will enable us to see a satellite become a reality.

[Kaspi] As part of the examination of the organizational structure of intelligence, a question is being raised again about whether the post of chief intelligence officer is needed.

[Shahor] We have been engaged in streamlining all fields of life, including the merging of small units. We are seeking new missions and ways to improve. This seems natural to me. It is good for every organization to reevaluate its structure once every several years. We are currently engaged in this task. A very devoted team has been meeting with very many people, inspecting units, and trying to formulate a comprehensive restructuring for AMAN, for the Intelligence Corps.

[Kaspi] You frequently say that intelligence is not omnipotent. What can we, and what should we, expect from intelligence?

[Shahor] Strictly defined, an ideal is something that is unachievable. The "superman" mentality is very dangerous. We must not become filled with excessive self-confidence or a feeling of omnipotence. We must be conscious of our ability. However, we must also understand the limitations. We are all human.

[Kaspi] What level of information should we expect? When is information good information?

[Shahor] One should expect that intelligence is engaged in warning of war and hostile terrorist activity, and in providing information on different areas, from military to political areas.

We have a good level of information in very many fields, especially those related to warning of, and readiness for, war. I should emphasize that intelligence is a science that deals with human beings. A person can make a decision and change his mind completely overnight. Therefore, the question is: At what point in time do you manage to intercept information? You can come across a certain decision, but not the extreme change [regarding that decision] that occurs immediately after it.

Despite all of the technology, we are still talking about totalitarian regimes with leaders who consult with a very, very limited, intimate group. This is inherently a problematic matter.

[Kaspi] Let us take Iraq as an example. When can you say with confidence that you have good information about what is happening there?

[Shahor] When we have information on unconventional weapons, the leaders' decisions, and military capabilities, you can estimate, for example, whether the Iraqis will fire ground-to-ground missiles at us as soon as the American attack starts. Incidentally, we said that they would.

[Kaspi] Would it be enough to estimate that missiles were likely to be fired without also knowing whether the missiles were armed with chemical warheads?

[Shahor] No, we would need to know more.

[Kaspi] The Yom Kippur War, the intifadah, and unconventional weapons in Iraq are all examples of events that surprised us. Is intelligence incapable of providing answers to the most critical questions?

[Shahor] The surprise in the Yom Kippur War is a well-known problem. It has been rehashed almost endlessly. That war changed the concept, resources, and hierarchical structure of the entire intelligence disposition, including, for example, the post which I fill. The problem of surprise is connected to the fact that there is no limit to [the need for] information, and there will always be a substantial dim area resulting from a lack of knowledge. A complete mosaic must be built. Regarding some subjects, precise information exists. Regarding others, one can only predict or estimate. This gap must be covered by military force. What I am unable to give as intelligence must be covered by the military order of forces.

We are not dealing with one issue. You want to know not only what is happening in Iraq, but also what is happening in Syria and Jordan, the effect of the political process, and very many other developments. In the Intelligence Corps, there is an old story about a chief of general staff who asked the chief of AMAN: "Tell me, what do you think such and such a leader will do regarding such and such a question?" The officer's answer was: "I do not know, because I am not sure the leader himself knows."

Sometimes, we need to know what a leader will decide regarding a question which he himself has yet to consider.

[Kaspi] However, the perception that has arisen is that intelligence is surprised over and over. For example, the intifadah suddenly confronted us with a situation which we had not predicted.

[Shahor] Without entering into the question of whether we were indeed surprised, or who is to blame for the surprise—insofar as we do well to understand the nature of the mission, we will understand what can and cannot be anticipated.

[Kaspi] Could the Intelligence Corps which you are leaving today be surprised by the next war too?

[Shahor] We are making every effort to avoid being surprised. However, we always sense that everything is not in our hands. We are aware of the sensitivity and measure of responsibility linked to the possibility of an error. We are also aware that, on the whole, we are a militia army, and that intelligence must provide a warning sufficiently in advance to enable the mobilization of reserve personnel. Because of the criticalness of this matter, we make every effort to prevent a surprise. However, it is forbidden and very dangerous to speak with full confidence of our ability to prevent a surprise.

[Background] Brig. Gen. 'Oren Shahor was born in 1946 in Tel Aviv. He had a classic northern Tel Aviv childhood, living in the Habima area and going to Municipal High School Five. Contrary to traditional stigmas attached to members of the Army, he was not attracted to spy and detective movies. He says that he preferred to occupy himself with painting, music, and writing.

[Shahor] One who takes up these pursuits can sometimes succeed better in the Army and enjoy his work. If you ask me whether I thought in my youth that I would be a military person, the answer is no—not even when I was inducted into the Army. I used to expect that those who seemed soldierly in their youth—those who excelled in scouts and in tying knots, or who demonstrated exceptional long-jump abilities—would be the ones to remain in the Army. I think that I and my friends were surprised when I ultimately found myself in the Army for a long time. In general, I thought about becoming a lawyer. Here we are talking about intelligence predictions and estimates. You can see that the things with which I occupied myself personally and what I estimated differ substantially from what happened in reality.

[Background] Despite his excessive caution and exposure difficulties, it should be remembered that Brig. Gen. Shahor was the first to open intelligence to the media. During his tenure, a branch for information (known colloquially as "public relations") was created in the corps for the first time in its history. Shahor himself even granted a number of press interviews last year.

[Kaspi] How do you contend with the lack of praise and compulsory silence in intelligence work? Does it bother you that you cannot boast about your successes as do other senior officers?

[Shahor] When you perform an action and know its results, the fact that you know that the matter was accomplished widens your knowledge. This is not a minor reward for tedious work performed away from the limelight. It is enough to feel and know that you contributed to the security of the people of Israel.

[Kaspi] Were there moments when you felt remorse, when you thought that you had missed out on something outside [of the military]?

[Shahor] There are pros and cons regarding every position in the Army. To speak of a crisis would be melodramatic. Given that this is a press interview, I would not want to color this matter in such a way. However, there was more than one crisis. It should be remembered that we are dealing here with human beings who have feelings.

I recall that there were debates over whether soldiers are permitted to cry. You cannot speak of courage unless you overcome fear. You cannot succeed unless you are human. You cannot command people successfully unless you understand their feelings and know that not only is there courage and heroism, but also disappointment, fear, and anxiety. All humans have these traits. There are

moments of happiness, but there are also moments of trenchant questions. One must be aware of this.

[Kaspi] Can you point to a particularly interesting post which you held?

[Shahor] There were several. An intelligence officer in the southern command has a fascinating job, as does an eastern theater chief in AMAN (Shahor was once responsible for operations in AMAN).

[Kaspi] Does the silence surrounding intelligence personnel and the fact that you sometimes cannot even relate matters to your closest relatives affect your personal development, personality, and relations with those around you?

[Shahor] Not necessarily. I would not link matters. In personal life, matters appear differently. However, it seems very wise to carefully weigh each word and to understand its meaning, not only in talking with the media, but also in life in general. I know how to assess the value of a word.

[Kaspi] Would you say that intelligence personnel have a more closed personality?

[Shahor] When one speaks of an intelligence person, I do not imagine a man with a hat that conceals part of his face, a trench coat, and a gait intended to camouflage his real stature. This seems more than ridiculous to me.

[Background] Brig. Gen. Shahor was inducted in 1964. He was injured in the Golan Heights in the war of attrition in 1970. In May 1986, he was appointed to command a foreign forces liaison unit. In that post, he served as an assistant to the defense minister in negotiations over Taba's future. In August 1988, he was appointed chief intelligence officer.

He uses long, foreign words in his speech. However, he is authoritative and sharp. He will listen to you patiently and attentively. However, as soon as he forms his opinion, it is doubtful whether you could persuade him to change it. In conversations with senior officers as well, he will always first listen to what others have to say, but he will be the one to make the final decision. This is also the case in a friendly conversation about nonmilitary matters. Military camaraderie does not suit him. The atmosphere around him is business-like. A certain measure of distance is always maintained between him and his subordinates.

[Kaspi] You have said repeatedly that you view yourself as a candidate for another position. Where do matters stand today?

[Shahor] At the moment, I cannot clarify my future beyond what is known. As soon as I know, everyone will know, which I reckon will be soon.

[Kaspi] How does one put together an intelligence puzzle to obtain a complete picture?

[Shahor] In intelligence, there are no miracle diagrams. There is no formula that says that you add information X to collection technique Y, and multiply by the number of researchers to obtain a situation picture with such and such a resolution. Matters are much more complex.

Intelligence is produced by advanced technology and high-quality, highly motivated manpower. The mosaic is created by the interaction between the collection systems and the systems that process the information and construct the situation picture. You collect information and identify the missing parts. You then order more information. This happens over and over, around the clock.

This is lousy, tedious work, without glory. You are tied up in very many details which you glean from many sources. Nevertheless, you sometimes identify information that is more central. Information definitely has quality.

[Kaspi] Does the simple soldier carrying out eavesdropping have real influence, or does he simply listen until he hears something important?

[Shahor] First of all, he sits and listens. This is what he must do. If he creates information and constructs something with his own concepts, we will obtain nothing. He collects the information using a simple technique. However, he exercises a decisive influence. Great importance is attached to his skill, [ability to interpret] voice intonation, keenness of hearing, and familiarity with the secrets of the language. Sometimes a single grammatical particle negating or affirming a predicate could be the difference between "a war will not break out," and "a war will break out." The same simple soldier could pass over or confuse this distinction.

Frequently, the scope of our information depends on the listener. The listener can read between the lines, or, conversely, miss important information, because his senses are dull.

[Kaspi] In this era of sophisticated intelligence devices, is there still a need for human spies, like Eli Kohen, who operated in Syria?

[Shahor] In the high-tech intelligence of today, with all of its perfected signals intelligence (eavesdropping) systems, human intelligence still carries weight. Intelligence has been and will be based on the quality and motivation of human resources.

Human beings must develop and run forward with technology. Technology does not run by itself. It has a critical need for humans.

[Kaspi] In recent years, intelligence has been turning into an "arm." What is the significance of this decision?

[Shahor] The significance is more independence as far as having control over resources and the slotting of manpower. We can decide that we want more means at the expense of manpower or vice versa.

I would like to see intelligence becoming a separate arm, a completely independent arm, like the Air Force and the Navy. I reckon that we are more than halfway there, and that it is now only a matter of time before the process is complete.

[Kaspi] How would you describe the link between Army intelligence and Air Force and Navy intelligence?

[Shahor] Each intelligence has its uniqueness. However, they are well integrated. The intelligence presence in operational events is joint. We are constantly striving to tighten the connections further. Good people from the Air Force intelligence group find their way to AMAN.

[Kaspi] Would you say that there is a bottleneck in intelligence regarding promotions from the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel to the rank of brigadier general?

[Shahor] There are excellent people. Competition is therefore fierce. Brigadier general positions are very limited in AMAN and the Intelligence Corps. A promotion to colonel is also difficult and not a given. I would not like to make comparisons with other corps. I would say that the possibilities are very limited in intelligence.

[Kaspi] And now to a required question in an interview of this type, one that causes distress for everyone in the state of Israel: Can we sleep in peace?

[Shahor] I think that it is possible to trust in intelligence, and to believe that it is assiduously engaged in providing early warning, with not a few resources. As far as I know, we have good answers, such that it is possible to be calm.

[Kaspi] Even given what happened in Iraq and the reports on nuclear developments in the Arab countries? Any mistake or surprise is now liable to be fateful.

[Shahor] We are aware of the sensitivities and the seriousness of matters. When we performed our examination and derived our lessons regarding Iraq, we did so very incisively, with a critical knife. However, the balance of what we knew and what we estimated is definitely positive.

[Kaspi] Is it possible to succeed in your post?

[Shahor] Success is always momentary. You can do your job faithfully. However, you contend daily with questions that do not have absolute answers.

[Kaspi] When the Air Force bombed the reactor in Iraq, it was said to have succeeded.

[Shahor] And when intelligence provides excellent information that enables the bombing?

[Kaspi] It is said that this is its duty.

[Shahor] I do not see any frustration or lack of appreciation for our activity. I think that intelligence has merited a great deal of attention.

[Kaspi] It has also absorbed a great deal of criticism in recent years.

[Shahor] That is part of the desire to provide answers when the answers cannot always be absolute. The task of intelligence in Israel is, to my knowledge, broader than that of all the armies of the world. Naturally, very many expectations develop.

[Kaspi] Brig. Gen. Shahor, where will the next war come from?

[Shahor] We need to examine strategic weapons, from missiles to unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons. We must be vigilant and sensitive regarding our rear area. We must be highly sensitive to the countries on the periphery, such as Iran, which is certainly a developing threat.

That these are the most salient threats of the coming decade does not diminish the conventional threat, which is posed mainly by the nearby confrontation states. However, at least in the near term, we do not see a substantial chance of a broad, Arab, military coalition developing against us.

New 'Merkava' Tank Excludes U.S. Components

TA2503164792 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
25 Mar 92 p 1

[Text] The futuristic "Merkava" tank, now being developed in Israel—and which will enter into operational service toward the end of the decade—will have no components made in the United States. The decision regarding the components for the tank—now undergoing preliminary field experiments—is part of the general trend emanating from the Defense Ministry, aimed at reducing the amount of procurements of military components from the United States by as much as possible, and to find alternative supply sources—so as to reduce the dependence on the United States, in the sale of the tank to a third country by as much as possible.

As it is known, the United States is demanding that Israel obtain prior approval for any sale of defense items containing American components. It should be noted that the Israeli "Merkava" tank that has been developed and produced until now does include a number of U.S.-made parts.

The fact that the futuristic tank will not include such components was disclosed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens, in a speech he gave at a reception for United States Secretary of the Army Michael Stone.

Analysis of 'Gray Areas' in Arms Trade

TA1503164092 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
15 Mar 92 p 4

[Text] Last Thursday, American officials accused Israel—via the WASHINGTON TIMES—of an act equivalent to insanity and a suicide attempt. Israel was

accused of selling Patriot, anti-aircraft missile technology to China. From the perspective of the Americans, a serious offense is involved; from the standpoint of Israel, theirs is a signature on the death warrant of its aerial defense—which makes the whole story dubious from the outset.

Aerial defense systems are more sensitive than any other electronic warfare system. The transfer of data, including elementary data, in the field of aerial defense enables the development of countermeasures which will allow the unchallenged penetration—by missiles and aircraft—of the domain of a state. A state which sells technology related to aerial defense systems to a country like China takes into account that this technology will fall into the hands of the Arab countries that are recognized customers of Chinese military technology.

Selling Patriot technology to China means selling the skies of the country. It was published in one of the recent air force journals that the Patriot missile radar systems were integrated with the radar systems of the Hawk missile. Breaking through these systems leaves one exposed.

Absurdly, the WASHINGTON TIMES publicity was only the blowing of the trumpet, introducing the opening of a mass administration offensive against Israel. The objective of the offensive is political and its method is hitting below the belt at the sensitive belly of defense cooperation between Israel and the United States. This is an old and well-known method in the network of Israel-United States relations, which repeats itself in accordance with the needs of the administration and depends upon political developments in the Middle East.

Over the years, Israel has enjoyed a special network of relations with the American defense establishment, and this domain serves as a whip in the hands of the administration every time they have differences with us. The timing of attacks of this sort generally falls close to visits of Israeli figures in the United States. Now, for example, Defense Minister Moshe Arens is visiting there.

If American officials could not exactly point to which technologies Israel supposedly transferred to China with respect to the Patriot, the WALL STREET JOURNAL and the WASHINGTON POST—on Saturday—moved the offensive to a more comfortable playing field. This time, Israel was accused of selling American components—in missiles of Israeli origin—to countries like China and South Africa. The indictment of the Israeli transgression has two parts: The first is a deviation from a commitment Israel signed not to export missile technology or finished missiles. Involved is an international commitment which relates to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The second part is a deviation from agreements between Israel and the United States which prohibit the sale of Israeli weapons which contain American components without the approval of the U.S. administration. The two newspapers brought—in the name of American

officials—examples for Israeli missile systems which were sold illegally: "Python," "Mapatz," and the technologies of the "Arrow" missile. The "Python" is an air-to-air missile, the "Mapatz" is an anti-aircraft missile, and neither is included in the international commitment. They appear in the trade catalogues of Israel Military Industries and REFA'EL [Combat Means Development Authority], and are offered for sale at international exhibitions.

Just as the Israelis know it, the Americans also know that there are no components to American weapons systems that cannot be obtained from the weapons industry of Western Europe. This is a gray area in the arms trade, and Israel has been using this fog for many long years, to the displeasure of American arms industries that see it as a competitor for the market share in certain products.

In the recent case, the publicity in the American press is based upon constant follow-up work by the American State Department. The WASHINGTON POST admits that the American State Department has had the facts for a long time and that it was political timing which determined the date of their release and their strength. And, indeed, Israeli officials in New York describe the media atmosphere against Israel today as reminiscent of the Pollard era.

It seems that the Americans are less troubled by the damage Israel is causing with the sale of one kind of arms or another. What interests them more is the political dispute against the background of the guarantees, the peace process, and the presidential election campaign. The solution to the storm, therefore, is political dialogue.

IDF Budgetary Planning, Constraints

92AE0241C Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 5 Feb 92
pp 16-20

[Article by Le'a Eshet and Yo'av Kaspi]

[Text] Small and smart. That is how the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] must appear at the end of the five-year plan. When he began his tour of duty, the chief of general staff declared that "anything that does not shoot will be cut." Indeed, the entire IDF, including the combat disposition, has undergone a drastic cut. However, at the same time, the volume of missions has not diminished, and the big challenge now is to perform the same missions with less people. In plain language, this can be called streamlining. During the post-Gulf War respite [created by the reduced probability of an eastern front developing against Israel in the next several years], the defense system is seeking to develop and equip itself with a series of smart weapons systems. The main fear [among senior IDF officers] is that the current plan will collapse like its predecessors if approval is not given to the full budgetary supplement which the IDF is seeking.

About six months ago, the IDF Planning Branch finished forming the principles of a multiyear plan that is supposed to chart the course of the Army's development

over the next five years. Recent weeks have seen the transformation of these general principles into precise, detailed plans. The multiyear plan, especially the cuts and organizational changes contained in it, sent a shudder through the Army. More than 3,000 career-Army personnel and 1,000 civilian employees of the IDF will be forced to leave the IDF by 1995. A significant number of the personnel to be dismissed are in any case about to complete their IDF service. Most of the commands will undergo a 15-percent manpower cut. A number of bodies have already undergone particularly drastic cuts (such as the Education Corps) and have been halved in size. The training and safety branch was eliminated, and its purviews were distributed throughout the Ground Forces Command. [Other changes include] the merging of the military colleges [the National Security College and the Staff and Command College] and the creation of a training and doctrine division in the general staff. A rear command will also be established in the coming year. The various operational corps also absorbed a substantial blow. Aircraft and ships will be removed from the order of forces, and many field units will receive less training as part of the reorganization of the Ground Forces Command. The goal of the drastic cuts is to save an average of 300 million shekels in each of the next four years.

Parallel to the cuts, the IDF asked the Israeli Government for a budgetary supplement of 5 billion shekels until 1995. After difficult struggles with the Finance Ministry, the government approved a supplement of .5 billion shekels for the current budgetary year, instead of the 1.1 billion that had been requested by the defense system. This budgetary supplement dwindled even further, because a cut of 150 million shekels was imposed on the defense budget, as it was on other ministerial budgets, and the IDF did not receive full compensation to cover its expenditures arising from its handling of the intifadah.

The multiyear budget is based on the assumption that, following the Gulf War, the chance of an eastern front developing against Israel will diminish in the coming years. The general staff is seeking to exploit this respite to develop modern combat means and gain strength. Most of the sums that will be saved, and the budgetary supplement, will be allocated to the defense industries to develop and produce advanced weapons. The crowning achievements are supposed to be a series of smart and precision weapons systems, advanced systems such as the Hetz [Arrow antimissile missile], and a photo satellite.

The development of these systems is supposed to continue for a number of years. According to the [IDF] Planning [Branch], the development and equipping processes will come to fruition when the respite evaporates; they will enable the IDF to arrive prepared at the next war and to decide it while sustaining low abrasion rates and a smaller number of casualties.

However, the hitch is that the budgetary supplement approved for defense is much smaller than the supplement assumed by plan. It is now clear that it will not be possible to implement portions the plan, or that the development and equipment replenishment provided for by the plan will have to be spread over a greater number of years. This, despite the fact that recent months have seen the re-emergence, with greater intensity, of the unconventional threat and accelerated nuclear development in a large number of Arab countries, which requires the IDF to deploy itself appropriately and to seek suitable responses.

Since 1980, the IDF has made three attempts to prepare a multiyear plan, all of which failed, due—among other things—to the Lebanon war and the intifadah, which no one foresaw. The current plan is actually the first successful attempt in IDF history to implement a multiyear plan. The plan has indeed gotten under way. However, many senior IDF officers harbor the fear that a significant portion of the plan will not be implemented if the full budgetary supplement that is required is not approved, in which case the IDF would arrive at the next war clearly less prepared.

In 1990, 850 career-Army personnel [were] retired from IDF service. In 1991, this figure increased by 10 percent to about 1,050. In 1992, 1993, and 1994, 1,500 are expected to leave each year, which is a 40-percent increase compared to 1991.

The multiyear plan specifies a 15-percent cut in career-Army personnel. About 55 percent of the expected discharges are noncommissioned officers and 45 percent are officers.

According to data from 1990, 60 percent and 55 percent of the discharges found civilian jobs at the end of their discharge leaves from the IDF in 1991 and 1992 respectively (in 1992, more found civilian jobs, but there were more discharges). In 1992, even more personnel are expected to be discharged. Those discharged from service are supposed to compete in the labor market, which is currently made difficult by the economic situation and competition for jobs posed by new immigrants.

The multiyear plan is based on the assumption that 200,000 immigrants will arrive each year until 1995. According to Brigadier General Yisra'el Einhorn, the chief of the manpower planning department in the Manpower Branch, the plan contains checks and balances to contend with significant deviations from the projected immigration figure. The induction of new immigrants, and the simultaneous natural expansion of induction classes, will be exploited to increase the number of regular IDF personnel and to reduce the number of days served by reserve personnel. In 1991, 1,200 immigrants were inducted. In 1992 and 1993, 3,000 and 4,800 immigrants respectively are expected to be inducted. According to data examined at the induction bureaus, about 70 percent of the immigrants are

classified in the officers' cadre quality group [as determined by testing] (compared to only 50 percent among IDF soldiers). About 60 percent of them have postsecondary education, and about 78 percent of them have a combat profile.

In the next four years, the number of men in compulsory service will increase. Consequently, the number of reserve days will decrease substantially, and hundreds of millions of shekels will be saved. Relative to 1990, 1991 saw a drop of thousands of personnel serving in the reserves each day. We should nonetheless note that the bulk of the drop was not in the frontline, combat echelon. An attempt is being made to reduce frontline reserve service by creating many new regular companies, in cooperation with the Border Police. These companies will be able to replace operational reserve companies. As of next year, reserve personnel in combat units will be discharged at age 45, rather than age 48. It should be remembered that, until this year, the discharge age was 51, and the Defense Service Law permitted the summoning of a soldier to reserve service until age 54. The plan will not be implemented all at once. A substantial portion of the manpower potential, aged 45 and over, in battalions will be discharged from the reserve disposition in 1992. The rest will be discharged by 1995. The discharge age in the rear disposition will continue to be 51. The duration of reserve service will not change in the coming year. It will continue to be 48 days for commanders and 42 days for soldiers. According to Brig. Gen. Einhorn, the main problem is to lighten the load on combat companies: "A significant lightening of the load on reserve personnel will be felt only in 1994-95. To my regret, it will not be possible at this stage to make things easier for combat forces in a number of critical dispositions." In the coming years, the Civil Defense disposition will be reorganized. The disposition was reduced by 50 percent last year, and, in the coming year, it will be reduced by another 30 percent.

According to Brig. Gen. Einhorn, the Manpower Branch and the Planning Branch examined the effect on the economy of the shortening of compulsory service: "The conclusion is that, particularly in a period of growing unemployment, the shortening of service will have negative effects on gross national product. The shortening service would not enable us to reduce reserve days, each one of which damages the civilian economy's production capability. Also, from a qualitative standpoint, it is preferable for regular soldiers to carry out protection operations and operations related to handling the intifadah. As explained, the 'Weave [Mirqam]' plan is based on a three-year service duration for men. From both a quantitative and a qualitative standpoint, a decrease in the duration of service would make it necessary to prepare a new plan."

It is said in the Manpower Branch's planning department that the IDF succeeded in advancing the retirement of career-Army personnel and IDF civilian workers. Thus, most of the discharges scheduled for 1992 were effected in 1991. In the past nine months, the IDF underwent a

net decrease of about 1,700 career-Army personnel and civilian workers. "The implementation of the plan did not cause any disturbances, because the plan is based on early discharges, accelerated retirement, and the discharge of lower quality people and personnel for whom we see no future in the service."

In the coming year, 13,000 immigrants will be inducted into the reserves. Most of them will undergo brief training (stage-B basic training) lasting four months. More than 50 percent of the immigrants have served in a foreign army. Immigrants up to the age of 39 who have been in the country for at least two years will be inducted into reserve service, taking into account absorption and employment problems. Those 29 or younger will undergo 100-120 days of training, and half of them will be assigned to ground dispositions. Those not entering the combat disposition will undergo basic training lasting only two weeks. All immigrants aged 18-23, who have been in the country for at least one year will be inducted into the regular Army, depending on their family situation. Most of them will receive prebasic training and Hebrew lessons. In 1991, 300 new female immigrants were also inducted into the IDF. In the next two years, another 2,000 will be inducted. The quality of the female recruits is very high. Eighty percent of them have been classified in the officers' cadre quality group. However, language barriers are making it difficult to integrate them into many duties.

The multiyear plan has generated a wave of rumors to the effect that the service requirement for women will be shortened considerably, and that entire induction classes will even be eliminated. Brig. Gen. Einhorn stated that the rumors are groundless. "The service requirement for women will be shortened by one month at most. Regarding critical positions [filled by women], the service requirement will be shortened by several days. Service will not be shortened for female soldiers and officers who sign up for SHSN [expansion not given]." In the coming year, basic training for women will be shortened from four to three weeks. The number of women in the IDF is expected to increase by 7 percent. This increase will be assigned to help achieve national objectives, such as immigration absorption.

[Einhorn] We have already greatly extended assignments outside of the order of forces. In any case, we will continue to mobilize the entire potential. However, we will probably decide on an additional shortening. One solution on the agenda is to encourage national service having a security dimension for men and women. In this way, we will employ our manpower surplus to help solve social and economic problems.

As a result of the increase in the size of induction classes, significantly more service candidates fail to pass the induction threshold due to a low quality group [classification] or adjustment problems. "Indeed, based on a vision of national goals, we are investing in frameworks, such as the MAQ'AM [radar] project. However, at the same time, we are discharging a large number of soldiers

from service due to adjustment difficulties, psychological problems, or a high number of desertions or absences. In this regard, we are tending more to discharge problematic soldiers who fail to adapt to the military. However, we discharge them after giving them an opportunity, instead of precluding their induction from the outset. One result of this process is that the military prisons are not as full now as they were in the past."

Under the multiyear plan, the threshold for consideration for the officers' corps will be raised significantly for males starting in 1992. Thus, 20 percent of those who have so far competed to join the officers' corps (who obtained a quality group rating of 51-56) will not take examinations for admission into the officers' corps. The IDF will also continue to assign surplus academic reserves [whose regular service is deferred for purposes of university study] to field units. In the coming year, dozens of academic reserves will be assigned to field units. In 1993, the number is expected to reach 100. To prevent assignment problems in the future, the quota of personnel studying in the academic reserve was reduced in 1992 by about 30 percent. In addition, the classification of MALSHAVIM [specialized occupation candidates] will change significantly. The name of the game is to streamline and deepen early classification to reduce the number of days spent waiting at the absorption and classification base. The main goal will be to classify personnel and form units, especially elite units, before induction as much as possible. In November 1991, 175 MALSHAVIM participated in an experimental unit formation for a pilot's course. In the coming years, all units for pilot courses will be formed before induction.

The desire to strengthen the IDF by developing new, more sophisticated combat means and integrating them into the future battlefield increased the number of development missions carried out in the Army by about 30 percent. For the most part, the Ordnance Corps develops ground combat means. However, the Ordnance Corps must contend with the 15-percent cut that has been imposed on all of the corps even while absorbing the increase in development missions.

According to Chief Ordnance Officer Brigadier General 'Ami Sagis, the combination of the cut and the increase in demands has created a difficult problem in every area of development and performance. "In a substantial number of cases, we will need to rely on external elements, such as industries and planning offices. We will also use support means, such as computerized systems, to help us in the development process. We will probably be forced to abandon, or develop over a longer period, a number of less important development missions that do not directly strengthen the IDF."

He stated that the cuts are intended to free resources for the development of combat means that can provide a response to the threats of the battlefield of the future. This includes "advanced, technology-intensive weapons

systems in the areas of electronics, optics, the improvement of mobility, tank armor, fire control, etc."

To contend with development missions, the Ordnance Corps will receive manpower supplements from the regular Army beginning in 1993. However, according to the chief ordnance officer, it will not be possible to replace career-Army personnel [who are cut], most of whom are professionals: "The Engineering Corps contains personnel who have accumulated knowledge and experience. We are being forced to discharge them precisely when they enter their career-Army years, when they can yield the most. Regular soldiers cannot replace them, because their professional knowledge and experience cannot come to fruition during their shorter period of service. We are also encountering a problem regarding academic reserves. We cannot keep many of them in the service after they complete three years in the regular Army, because there are not enough career-Army positions. They simply go home after accumulating engineering knowledge, which we are then unable to exploit."

Because of the complicated nature of maintaining smart systems, maintenance specialists will use computerized systems to identify and repair malfunctions in the field. "We will invest in development that will reduce the cost of maintaining existing combat means and increase their reliability and life. In this way, we will be able to reduce the man hours and spare parts invested in each weapon. Due to the reduction of the service days of reserve personnel, the frequency and character of professional refreshing will change. Combat means are advancing, and there is a constant need to chase after technology."

The different combat corps have suffered a series of cuts, including the elimination of regular and reserve combat units.

Some of the cuts were made possible by the plan to reorganize the Ground Forces Command. That plan provides for the transfer of responsibilities for communications, maintenance, and ordnance from various corps to the Ground Forces Command. The transfer of the commands of the Armored, Artillery, Engineering, and Infantry Corps to the Ground Forces Command yielded a substantial savings of cooks, battalion police, camp commanders, etc.

The amount of training received by reserve personnel in the ground forces will also change in the coming years.

According to Chief Armored Officer Brigadier General Yitzhaq Rabin, as part of the plan, the IDF is moving toward equipping and strengthening instead of training. "We are working with the given sums of money. In this situation, it would be a mistake to move toward more intensive training and neglect equipping. Therefore, reserve personnel will train less. To close some of this gap and maintain fitness, we have reinforced the one-day training facilities, adding one-day training for commanders alone. We employ many things in the Bareqet

facilities, where trainees do not actually encounter combat means, but train using computers and written material."

"However, it should be stressed that when a crew member does not train on his tank with live fire, when the driver does not drive, and when the loader does not load shells, it is certain that fitness is damaged and rustiness worsens."

According to Brig. Gen. Rabin, they are overcoming some of this damage by developing and equipping themselves with combat means of a different type, which are force complementers or substitutes. "In the armored corps, this involves fire-control systems, the improvement of armor, and the introduction of the Mark-III Merkava tank. All of these measures are supposed to provide a response to the threats."

The disposition of reserve personnel in infantry and paratroop brigades is also currently undergoing a transition to a different training model. According to Chief Infantry and Paratroop Officer Brigadier General Doron Elmog, "in the immediate term, the multiyear plan will strongly hurt those personnel who were dismissed or forced to transfer to other posts. The command is also hurt, because it is required to continue carrying out the same missions, or even additional missions, using fewer personnel. Regarding certain subjects, we will probably have to set shorter [training] periods and change our priorities.

"The top priority will be to strengthen our deterrent and killing capability through better combat means and optical systems. We want smarter, more accurate combat systems—optical sights, machinegun sights, a new sniper's rifle, upgraded infantry mortars. Currently, we are discussing cutting everything that does not fire in favor of strengthening firing means. The process of development and equipping ourselves with these means is protracted and will come to fruition only in another three to four years, perhaps even later.

"The decrease in training for reserve personnel could certainly damage professional capability in the short term until we adapt to new, more efficient training systems. However, in my estimation, the damage is marginal, because the bulk of the cut was made at the systemic level, and it is not manifested at the level of the individual corps. It should also be remembered that manpower strength in reserve brigades is over 100 percent. Thus, combat manpower has suffered no damage to speak of.

"The Artillery Corps also paid a heavy price. Its order of forces and amount of training were reduced. According to Chief Artillery Officer Brigadier General Doron Qadmi'el, most of the cut has already been implemented, and the balance will be effected within three months. He stated, "Parallel to the cut, a significant slice of the budget has been invested in replacing old equipment with new equipment. A decision has yet to be made regarding the main weapon with which the Artillery

Corps will be equipped. Reserve personnel will undergo training once per year. Sometimes, this will be training with live fire. Otherwise, it will be 'dry' training in the one-day facility. We are maintaining a training level that sustains the combatant's fitness for a number of years. I do not believe that we have crossed the red line in our training cut. Obviously, cuts entail risks. However, they permit a return to fitness within a short time. Training for the regular disposition, by contrast, will not be damaged at all and will even receive more means this year."

In the Engineering Corps, the commanders will train every year at the engineering center at B'LYSH [expansion not given]. Soldiers of the quality disposition will undergo full training for four to five days once every several years. All reserve soldiers have trained at least twice a year at a one-day installation, at the Fording School. The facility was enlarged last year, and it can train a number of companies simultaneously. According to Chief Engineering Officer Brigadier General Yishay Dotan, training at the one-day facility is some compensation for soldiers who do not [otherwise] receive training in the same year.

"In my opinion, the approach is very correct. According to this approach, it is possible to identify periods in which the threats are relatively lower in order to train somewhat less and to invest more money in the development of equipment and new means. This process would be difficult to undergo during periods when the probability of war is higher. We are paying a certain price regarding training. In exchange, we will obtain many more means with greater capabilities. The Engineering Corps is planning to be equipped with new means. We will be able to do things faster and safer. The multiyear plan is very good for the Engineering Corps."

[box on p 18, by Or Qashti]

**The Chief of the Air Force Allocations Department:
Without a Budget Supplement, a Large Part of the Plan
Will Not be Effected**

Colonel G, the head of the Air Force Allocations Department: "The most troubling point in the multiyear plan is funding sources. This is the biggest threat to the plan. If we do not receive the supplement, a significant portion of the plan will not be effected. We are entering the first year of the multiyear plan. Manpower cuts are continuing. Cutbacks among career-Army personnel began in 1991 and are supposed to be completed in 1994. Over a four-year period, hundreds of career-Army personnel will be discharged from the Air Force. The plan for last year was implemented fully, and we are progressing well in implementing manpower cuts scheduled for 1992. The key question today concerns the size of the combat aircraft disposition."

The current multiyear plan is structured differently from previous plans. Col. G calls this a "metamorphosing multiyear plan." Each year, the plan is updated based on new situation estimates or the availability of budgetary

resources. One reason for dismembering of the previous plan was a change in the situation estimate and the funding sources at the IDF's disposal at the time. The plan is always fashioned for the next five years. Should a component of the multiyear plan change, the plan is updated accordingly, although the first multiyear plan of 1991 is the basis for all subsequent plans [in the five-year period].

"The plan is conditioned by several fundamental assumptions. One assumption on which the plan was based is that the budget supplement given this year (500 million shekels) is a multiyear supplement. If that assumption does not hold, a large portion of the multiyear plan will collapse and projects covered by the plan will not be carried out. In that case, we would lose a considerable amount of money invested in the projects which would have to be eliminated. An alternate solution would be to dig into current expenditures even more deeply to finance the development of projects. In this case, funding would flow from a single source that has already been reduced to a minimum, and the additional damage incurred by that source would not be sustainable."

[box on p 19, by Adi Polk]

The Commander of Mahave Elon [a Remedial Education and Adjustment Base]: Every Additional Cut Will Result in the Suspension of More Activities

Due to the cuts stipulated in the multiyear plan, the manpower strength, budget, and facilities of the Education Corps and the Youth Battalions [pre-induction training for high-school students] were cut by 30 percent. In addition, the Education Corps and the Youth Battalions were merged into a single corps.

Another result of the cuts is that training to give experience to members of the Youth Brigades was reduced to accommodate only about 10,000 trainees per year. Bases at Tzalmom, Beersheba, and at Bet-Lid were closed.

Lieutenant Colonel Menashe, the assistant chief infantry officer for organization: "A reduction in training to give experience [to members of the Youth Brigades] damages preparation for military service. This training has provided an especially strong experiential dimension in preparation for military service." In the Education Corps, many efforts were made to find funding sources outside of the Army.

Lt. Col. Menashe: "Education in the IDF is intended to complement the work of commanders by preparing soldiers to carry out their missions. Our goal is to convey messages to the soldier. In this way, he will not view the Army as a foreign body that demands and pulverizes. Rather, he will come to understand the importance of his service. The cuts no doubt reduce our ability to carry out this mission. This situation is certainly liable to damage the preparation of soldiers and their functioning with respect to values."

The education and information section in the Infantry Corps Command has seen many cuts and changes as a result of the plan. Many departments were merged or attached to the section: The combat heritage department and the department concerned with knowledge of the country were merged; the information department became an information cell; SQIRA HODSHIT [officers' publication] was eliminated; and other departments were either attached or closed. Lieutenant Colonel Natan, the chief of the section: "The bottom line is that the section now handles many areas with a very limited staff. A broad cut was made among career and regular personnel, but without a significant drop in the demands. In precisely this difficult period of the peace process, the intifadah, and elections, we need more information. Under the current circumstances, our ability to facilitate the IDF's performance of its missions is compromised."

Another section which absorbed painful cuts is the Culture Section. According to Section Chief Lieutenant Colonel Dorit Novak, because of the cuts, the number of performing troops in the military was reduced. "My entertainment teams are more mobile and work in all types of frameworks, both small and large. The number of appearances of the troops is growing, and troops now appear almost daily. The number of artists ordered from outside is smaller due to their high cost, and the troops are taking their place."

Lt. Col. Menashe: "The merging of the education system and the Youth Brigades permitted the more important areas of the education system to survive and remain well-established within the system. Any cuts understandably damage programs and test their importance. The process has made clear to us that the education system and the Youth Brigades must submit the frequency and results of their activities to IDF commanders. In this way, the defense system will give the correct weight to education."

The Commander of Mahave Elon, Colonel Hazi Harpaz: "Today, any additional cut, even a small cut, will result in a large-scale cessation of activities. To allow all activities to continue normally, we have greatly reduced living and study conditions." The most substantial, draconian measure was a 40-percent cut in permanent facilities.

Mahave Elon Base was established five and a half years ago to treat weak populations in the IDF regarding the completion of education, Hebrew instruction, adjustment to service, etc. About six months ago, an educational training base located at the base adjacent to the Masmiya junction, which was closed, was added to Mahave Elon. The latter, which has always been full, absorbed more soldiers in addition to those already there, who include new immigrants participating in various courses.

Col. Harpaz: "Due to the cuts, three frameworks at the base—the basic training section, the start of service

section, and the end of service section—were combined into two.” Because of the importance of treating the weak populations, which Col. Harpaz defines as a “national mission,” a decision was made at the base to refrain completely from reducing the amount of training. However, due to the cuts, an organizational change is needed, and the remaining staff must work twice as hard.

The cut was manifested in other areas: “In the past, we had civilian pedagogic experts at our disposal. We are now feeling a shortage of the means needed to perform our basic function.” Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhaq Reicher, the chief of the Ze’ev section, which is responsible for completing the basic education of soldiers to the eighth- and tenth-grade levels: “As a veteran IDF officer, I believe that we must compare the conditions and means at our disposal to those of units that provide training for combat specialties, inasmuch as we are at the educational front. If we were to give the appropriate technological tools to our female soldier teachers, we would no doubt achieve higher outputs and even save training time. In that way, the soldiers would be able to contribute more in the framework of their service.”

The cut is even felt among soldiers in the field.

Yuval, the commander of a HAVAYA [expansion not given] course: “At the previous educational training base, Sha’are Avraham, the conditions were almost like those of a resort—comfortable beds, nearby showers, a weekly change of sheets. Today, even most of the rooms lack heating.”

Major Yaron, the chief of the beginning of service section: “The commanders feel the cuts more sharply than the soldiers. We have to perform twice as many missions with fewer means, and we are forced to improvise. The results are just as good, but the wear and tear on the staff is greater. I hope that budget cuts will not affect the continuation of activities carried out here in the future.”

[box on p 20]

The Merging of the Military Colleges: Studies at the National Security College Will Be a Direct Continuation of Studies in the Staff and Command College in the Future

Eleven senior career-Army cadres, including a brigadier general and two colonels, were cut from the manpower strength of the two military colleges, the National Security College and the Staff and Command College, between April 1991, when the chief of general staff ordered the merging of the two colleges, and 27 August, when the merger was actually carried out. Unlike elsewhere in IDF, where the cut in cadres will be effected over the course of the next four years, 15 percent of career-Army cadres at different ranks have been cut in the military colleges already. The new body will thus begin to operate with a new structure and will not be compelled to undergo additional changes. The deputy commander of the colleges and the commander of the

interarm Staff and Command College, Brigadier General Mano Hart, indicates that, in the year before the chief of general staff’s decision, the Staff and Command College underwent internal streamlining involving the elimination of eight to 10 cadres, most of them colonels and lieutenant colonels.

Before that decision, the National Security College was an independent body headed by a major general. The Staff and Command College, which was headed by a brigadier general, was previously subordinate to the training department in the general staff. As a result of the change, the commander of the National Security College became the commander of the military colleges, and the commander of the Staff and Command College was appointed his deputy. The position of deputy commander of the National Security College (a brigadier general) was eliminated. As part of the merger, a joint staff combining previously separate functions was created for the two colleges, and the budgets of the two colleges were unified. Matters related to construction and infrastructure were also unified. According to Brig. Gen. [Hart], there was no cut in allocations, because the salaries which the colleges have to pay to universities and lecturers are fixed and cannot be elasticized.

“Goals and substance were not changed by the merger. However, regarding the outlook for the future, the creation of a combined body no doubt indicates a trend toward the unification and coordination of the many elements engaged in training officers. This will create a broad vision of officer training, as well as continuity throughout a substantial portion of the IDF officers training track. Studies at the National Security College will in the future be a direct continuation of studies at the Staff and Command College.”

IDF, ‘Black Panthers’ Contend for Power

92AE0260B Tel Aviv HA’ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Mar 92
p B3

[Article by E. Rabin: “Their Pictures Are Posted in Every Room”]

[Text] The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has stood powerless in the past two years in the face of the accelerated activity of the Black Panther band, which has been operating during those years in the West Bank, primarily in the Jenin region, and which has enjoyed much success in confrontations with the IDF, security forces, and the settlers.

Last Monday, one of its members killed Leor Serliker, a fuel tank escort who arrived with the driver of the Pedesco company tank truck at the gasoline station in Jenin. A masked man from the Black Panther band surprised the two, shot the escort dead, left his weapon, and fled.

The murder of Serliker joins a long list of harsh attacks executed by masked men in the Jenin area. In the last six

months, a soldier and two Israeli civilians were murdered there in a similar manner. Even the attack on the training camp adjacent to Kibbutz Gil'ad was apparently carried out by the Black Panther band, which left the weapons of the army trainees and disappeared.

The large rise in the number of attacks with firearms that were carried out in the Jenin region confirms that the terrorist bands are getting more and more daring. They study the movements of the IDF forces, carry out attacks, and succeed in evading those who seek them.

IDF officers state that actions of this type are operations that are planned in advance, as soldiers in select units of the IDF usually do. In many cases soldiers earn special mention in dispatches over such an operation. The Black Panther men receive the praise of the Jenin residents for their daring and bravery.

For about the past two years, the IDF has used special means to locate and destroy the band, but has been unsuccessful up to now. From time to time, the IDF's special forces operating in the territories manage to capture one of the masked members of the band, but a senior military source says that immediately upon the termination of a Panther, a new qualified and trained member joins up.

Only a few months ago, the security forces succeeded in killing two masked members of the Black Panther band, but the band's leader, Ahmad Kamal, to whom the murder of the soldier Yoram Cohen six months earlier at the railroad crossing in Jenin has been attributed, has not been captured.

In the opinion of security sources, "Black Panther" is a general name for the bands of Fatah members operating in the Jenin region. The group has dozens of members who are divided into bands, undergo training, and become qualified in the use of weapons. Each band has 45 men armed with weapons and are ordered to kill collaborators and to carry out attacks against IDF forces and the security forces. According to a senior IDF officer, these are men with nothing to lose and who know that the IDF and the Shin Bet are on their trail.

These bands operate primarily at night, under cover of darkness, with the aid of some of the residents of Jenin who do this—according to the same officer—not out of admiration for the men in the band, but for fear of losing their lives. "We have been on their trail for months now, but I must acknowledge that it is very difficult to catch them," says the officer.

The chief of staff, Major-General Ehud Baraq, whose assistance was also needed to capture the band, yielded to the request of the chief of the central command, Brigadier Dani Yatom, to send out special forces into the West Bank and expand the procedures for opening fire to confront those being sought, who are armed with weapons.

The principal mission of the arabized units is to go after the bands, primarily the Black Panther band, but none of their measures has resulted in the elimination of the bands.

Similarly, the Shin Bet has been active in the collection of intelligence information. Last week, immediately after the murder of the Israeli escort, officers said that only the Shin Bet can inform the soldiers of the band's place of origin.

Among the IDF, the members of the band are perceived as the most dangerous type of terrorists, who must be captured. The senior officer adds: "We are talking about guerrilla warfare, in which the enemy recognizes us, and we recognize him. These bands have a slight advantage, since they receive assistance and intelligence information from the residents, in addition to provisions and equipment. It is very difficult to locate such a band that hides in the Jenin region, in which one-fifth of the West Bank's population lives, 220,000 residents, 40,000 of whom reside in the city of Jenin, itself, and in the adjacent refugee camp."

Defense Minister Moshe Arens instructed Brigadier Yatom to locate the band. The names and pictures of the men in the band are posted in every room in the central command, and every piece of intelligence that arrives is checked out. This is not an intifadah of stones and of empty bottles thrown at the IDF forces, but war with firearms, where members of the band have an advantage, because they are well informed of the IDF operations.

Indeed, the security sources say that it is only a matter of time before the band is caught. But the IDF is already anticipating the next attack, and the more time that passes and the band is not caught, the more the army's prestige is damaged. In addition to the chief of staff's instructions to capture this band, it is the soldiers' personal goal to accomplish it. This band is making a mockery of the IDF with its long series of attacks.

IDF Plans To Establish New Brigade in Gaza

*92P40162A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew
25 Mar 92 p 9*

[Editorial Report] According to a report in Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew of 25 March, on page 9, a new IDF [Israel Defense Forces] brigade is being planned for the Rafah area of the Gaza Strip. The military magazine says this is in response to lessons learned after four years of the intifadah in Gaza. According to Southern Commander Matan Vilna'i, "Army representation in Rafah is weak, so the Southern Command is determined to establish a regular brigade in the Rafah region."

BAMAHAANE reports that the Rafah area has unique characteristics distinguishing it from other areas. Its beach can be used by smugglers. It can be used also as a point of penetration by terrorists. The magazine adds that two terrorists were caught recently in a fishing net as they were swimming toward the beach. They were

heavily armed, and intelligence officials said they intended to set up an infrastructure for attacks in the Gaza Strip.

The magazine also points out that Rafah borders Egypt and can be used by smugglers and terrorists. Most of the area's residents are involved with refugees from the nearby camp, making the area "one large refugee camp, with 100,000 residents." According to BAMAHAANE, the Southern Command hopes that, with the establishment of a new brigade, the Rafah area will be easier to control.

IDF Addresses Increased Hamas, Fatah Tensions

92P40160A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Mar 92
p 2

[Text] The government coordinator for activities in the territories, Colonel Dani Rothschild, held a closed discussion, classified confidential, in coordination with Civil Administration leaders in the territories on the subject of increasing tension between Hamas and Fatah; it is causing worry in the defense establishment.

The question raised in the discussion was whether the defense establishment should be involved in the conflict or if it should change its policy. The participants agreed with Col. Rothschild that Civil Administration leaders do not need to become directly involved in a historic conflict between the groups, but they should follow the process closely. This is the first time the defense establishment has discussed the subject.

It was claimed in the meeting that involvement by the defense establishment should not significantly influence the situation. Sources that participated in the discussion said that in case violence between these groups continues to grow, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] will become involved and impose a curfew.

The participants surveyed the rising tension between Hamas and Fatah after Hamas supporters recently won Chamber of Commerce elections in Ramallah, taking 10 of the 11 seats. This clicked on a red light in the PLO, which organized a special committee to look into the matter.

Another reason for tension between the groups, which are concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the areas of Hebron, Nabulus, and Tulkarm, are the peace talks which Hamas strongly opposes. Last month there were several fierce confrontations between Hamas and Fatah, and in one case a Fatah supporter was killed in the West Bank.

West Bank Civil Administration Coordinator Colonel Gadi Zohar told HA'ARETZ that this was an internal matter whose details were classified. A senior source in the defense establishment said that for a long time they had been following, with concern, the increasing power of Hamas and, if necessary, steps such as curfews would be taken.

Analysis of Defense Industry Sales

90AE0239B Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew
12 Feb 92 pp 14-17

[Article by Dubi 'Alboim: "The Situation is Very Bad"; sidebars by 'Ur Qashti]

[Text] The defense industries in Israel are at an all-time low. The "new world order" has reduced the world's demand for weapons. The economic difficulties at home have greatly reduced the orders from the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. The military industry is converting to prefabricated housing. The aviation industry is moving along with the "Arrow." The Weapons Development Authority [REFAEL] is subcontracting out. A lot of employees will go to the Employment Ministry.

This is a sad story, not yet over, it seems, about increasing decline and despair in the State of Israel's defense industry plants. They say this is a kind of prelude to what is going to happen in just a short time, a threat to thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of workers who will take to the streets and try desperately to shake up the government.

The Israeli defense industries were never so bad off. Over the last few years the number of employees has dropped from 60,000 in 1985 to about 40,000 this year. In the current reality, with the lack of a cold war and two superpowers, there is less need for equipment and defense weaponry. All the world's defense industries, and not just those in Israel, are already feeling the tendency toward continuing decline in demand for military products. Even in the Middle East, where consumption has, perhaps, not lessened, there have been sharp cuts in defense budgets. At the same time, the local military industry has begun to lose its former prestige position in defense establishment orders, to the American industries.

Even the Gulf War, on which many hung their hopes, did not improve the situation much. In the present situation the possibilities available are simple: either move to massive production for the civilian market, or prepare for a long and painful demise leading to closure.

The situation of the military industry, headed by former Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, is perhaps the most serious. Only a year ago the Defense Ministry decided to transfer the military industry from the status of a support unit to an independent government corporation. Despite the fact that the decision was made a long time ago, the implementation was delayed because of long arguments with the Treasury Ministry about whether the military industry had to pay for all of the infrastructure established from public coffers, and if so, how much. Now the military industry has to get used to being a corporation with all that implies, without being budgeted by the Defense Ministry, and has to deal, as well, with the transition to production for the civilian market. The traditional market orders, the IDF, have shrunk by \$150

million and other markets, like South Africa and the countries of Eastern Europe, have closed.

The transition to the civilian market has not gone well for the military industry. Apart from the Bazaq public telephones and a number of small projects, they have been unsuccessful in penetrating the civilian market. The prefab housing project has also failed, and is now in the headlines because of the refusal of the Housing Ministry to buy them and its decision to import other prefab housing from abroad instead. Thus it turns out that the company's enormous potential in the areas of metals and chemistry is not being realized. It is also clear now that the company's budget cannot be included in the implementation of the plan to transfer the military industry to Ramat Beqa' in the Negev.

Shalom Habashush, chairman of the military industry workers, said: "During the eighties, even when the defense budget in Israel was drastically cut, the military industry found alternate orders from markets outside Israel and remained on its feet to the point that we accounted for 75 percent of exports abroad. What has happened is that, with the end of the cold war and the worldwide reduction in equipping, our share of the production has been greatly reduced, to the point that last year we lost orders in excess of \$150 million, which explains the magnitude of the disaster we are now facing. We have no alternatives to those orders and to move in one day to the civilian market is impossible. That is a long process involving a change in marketing mentality. We are now passing through a terrible crisis. Since 1985 about 6,000 employees have been fired from the military industry, and the administration is inclined to fire an additional thousand workers from among the 9,000 that we have today."

Is that not the condition of weapons industries worldwide?

"What annoys me is this, that the stock owners, i.e., the Israeli Government, does not care that our system is crumbling. For example, look at the case of the prefab housing units. This, after all, is a defense system for which there is no alternative in time of emergency, and the IDF and the Ministry of Defense know full well that they cannot always count on the countries of Europe or on the United States. Besides, even today they impose an embargo against us on certain products.

"Obviously, we are also critical of the military industry administration. They indeed are trying to get the company out of its dire straits, but that may not be enough. In any case, the principal responsibility is the government's, which did not allow the military industry to move to the civilian market until the end of 1990, when they finally converted us to an independent corporation."

So what do you plan to do about it?

"We are now working on setting up a battle staff and will also take to the streets to shake up the government and

the public. I already told the prime minister that he can set up the next investigating committee to deal with the defense oversight in abandoning the military industry. I cannot describe the enormous potential that is going to waste, the strategic production lines that have been shut down, and knowledgeable people who are going home and will never want to come back. This is irreversible damage."

However, it is not only the government that is at fault, as Shalom Habashush fiercely asserts, but it is also the problem of the military industry that cannot adjust quickly enough, perhaps through no fault of its own, to the civilian market condition. Dr. Manu'el Trakhtenberg, lecturer on industrial organization at the University of Tel Aviv, explains the problem as follows—that over the years most of the defense production became high-tech, and in such a complicated arena it is very hard to convert products intended for defense consumers to civilian use.

The transition process in Israel has run into two main obstacles: the emphases on products in the civilian market are entirely different from those of the military. For example, military systems have to function in any situation, and large resources are dedicated to ruggedizing the products for very harsh conditions, a requirement that does not exist in the civilian sphere. The second problem, he says, is that not all military developments have a civilian application, and quite often, on the road to civilian use, all acquired knowledge has to be tossed out the window, except, for the most basic, perhaps.

The plants most ready for civilian conversion are small plants or plants which always had a civilian department alongside the military. In any case, he says, the transition from military to civilian is more difficult than it seems and involves a heavy investment of resources.

But if they talk about hard times over at the military industries and about the fact that they ended last year with a deficit of \$90 million, they may, perhaps, take fool's comfort in the comparison with the Weapons Development Authority. That organization, which is, in actuality, a support unit of the Ministry of Defense (and not an incorporated company) and was, over the years, the State of Israel's research and development house, is dying before our very eyes.

The Weapons Development Authority is dragging along deficits of hundreds of millions of dollars. If there were those who took comfort from the fact that a prestige project such as the Arrow may be saved, well, the work has been transferred to the aviation industry. Not to mention the sharp Defense Ministry budget sword that was wielded at them, too.

It is difficult for the defense system to withstand the company's unending drain on the state budget. The Weapons Development Authority, they say, has become bloated way beyond its natural proportions. From a

small and flexible unit, it has turned into a giant company of 6,000 employees. Here, too, there was no choice but to dismiss significant numbers. Except that the Authority, in order not to make too many waves, offered especially good terms to those who agreed to leave voluntarily. Eight hundred employees did so, but those 800 were, apparently, not the right ones. Sources in the Authority's management admit that the cuts in manpower are still not sufficient, and it seems that many more workers are yet to be let go. An organization that over the years was entirely budgeted and never thought in terms of profitability, nor about marketing and export, is now forced to think in terms of profit and loss. Likewise, the experts say, it is difficult for the Authority to reconcile itself to being a subcontractor on American projects.

Only the aviation industry is still somehow managing to keep its head above water. Indeed, they have not yet fully recovered from the cancellation of the Lavi' project and here and there little incidents explode on them like the Dov Raviv case, or lethal criticism like that of departing Air Force commander 'Avihu ben-Nun. Despite the fact that they only made \$10 million this year within an overall cycle of more than \$1 billion, at least they did not finish with losses.

Its great advantage, they say, is that, back in 1966, the aviation industry had already turned into a government company and not just a unit of the Ministry of Defense. Thus it was able to develop a marketing system and civilian production lines like, for example, inspection of planes, to the tune of \$250 million. Apart from that, in the aviation area, unlike other areas, civilian production has to be no less good and no less safe than military production.

The Gulf War, in contrast to the forecasts, did not revive them because the budget cut problem remained, and used weapons marketers from Eastern Europe continue to sell everything possible at half price. The Gulf War resulted in additional orders only in a few areas such as smart command, control, and intelligence systems.

The plan at the aviation industry is to direct 50 percent of the company's entire production to the civilian market within as early as five years, but they are all aware that this is an unrealistic dream. According to seniors in the aviation industry, the more moderate forecast, which is also quite doubtful, is for an increase of from 20 percent civilian production today to 30 percent civilian production out of the total aviation industry production. In order to sell a dollar, they say, you have to invest at least a dollar, and today aviation industry investment is only 5 percent of what they need to invest in order to reach those goals.

The same sources say the entire process is too slow. This year the aviation industry will start selling civilian products at the paltry tune of \$3 million. They are now looking for civilian partners to help the aviation industry market those products in an area where it does not sell to

them at all. But there is a trap here: If you want to get people to invest in you, in order to show that your intentions are serious, you have to invest the same sum yourself, and they are not doing so much of that.

Still, even in the best situation, the process is too slow, and in the aviation industry they talk about at least 10 years going by at the present rate before the process will be complete. "You have to get an entirely different receiver in your head in order to convert from a military head to a civilian one," they will tell you there. The question is still how many more of today's 17,000 employees will have to be let go along the way. The answer from spokesperson Sylvia bet Halahmi is laconic: "The aviation industry will adjust its manpower to the scope of its employment."

The Weapons Development Authority's Main Projects

The Popeye: Air-to-ground missile already in operational service for a number of years in the Israeli and American Air Forces. In the Gulf War, for example, the B-52 bombers carried the missiles but did not launch them for a variety of reasons, some of them, perhaps, political. The Popeye is launched long-range and can hit point targets with great precision. It is particularly effective in attacking quality targets such as airport installations or command and control posts. The missile can be launched from low, medium, or high altitude and along a variety of flight paths. The long launch range prevents exposure of the attacking planes to enemy anti-aircraft missiles.

The Python 3: The Python 3 is the third generation of the Authority's air-to-air missiles. The missile is adapted to the needs of close air combat—it can be launched against targets at a distance of 500 meters as well as for the interception of enemy planes at a distance of 15 km from the launching plane. The Python 3 is characterized by especially high maneuverability and the ability to work in all sectors. An 11-kg warhead is installed in the missile. At the Authority they claim that the missile is considered reliable and very easy to maintain. The Python 3 can be carried by such planes as the Kfir, the Phantom, the F-5, the F-15, and the F-16.

Adams: The Adams is the system that is still under joint development with General Dynamics. It is a system that will defend quality point targets or mobile forces. At the Authority it is hoped that the system will defend against planes, missiles, cruise missiles, precision guided weapons, small pilotless drones, and helicopters. The Adams is based on the "Baraq" antimissile missile. In contrast to many other anti-aircraft systems, the missiles in the system are carried and launched vertically. In the basic configuration the system is installed on a truck, and the number of missiles is limited only by the load capability of the vehicle. At the last air show in Le Bourges, the Weapons Development Authority and General Dynamics presented the integrated version of the

Phalanx mobile anti-aircraft gun and the Adams anti-aircraft missile, a version that attracted a lot of interest. The system, according to Authority people, can defend an area of 200 square km.

Baraq: The Baraq, a naval antimissile missile, is produced in cooperation with the aviation industry. It is, in fact, the world's first missile designed from the start to meet the threat of naval missiles launched from enemy ships. The vertical launch, the advanced warhead, the radar system and the special proximity fuse are the Baraq's salient advantages. In addition to the ability to intercept naval missiles, the Baraq can defend a territory of 200 square km. The missile's warhead weighs 22 kg, a quarter of the missile's overall weight. The Baraq can deal with very close targets such as those only 500 m from the boat, but also with targets at a range of 12 km. The speed of the missile is 2 Mach.

The Aviation Industry's Main Projects

The Arrow: The aviation industry's antimissile missile. Thus far there have been three test flights that were only partially successful. In all three of the tests it was decided to blow up the missile before the end of the test. In the last test, held 30 October, the Arrow was set to intercept another missile that simulated an enemy ballistic missile.... Because of a mishap, the missile deviated from its course and was blown up. The Arrow is said to provide defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the various types of Scud or the SS-12, now operational in Syria. The aviation industry hopes that the Arrow will be operational in another 3-4 years.

The small pilotless drones: The Pioneer drones, produced by the aviation industry, are one of the great successes of the Gulf War. U.S. forces used lots of Pioneers to direct artillery and attacking planes. Army and marine forces used 40 Pioneer drones, which passed intelligence information in real time. The Hunter, now fighting for the right to a U.S. army bid, is the most advanced development of the Pioneer. The first flight of the Hunter was held in Israel in September 1990. The pilotless drone is set to serve U.S. forces as an auxiliary tool in passing intelligence information in real time, on both day and night missions.

Midair refueling systems: One of the striking lessons of the Gulf War is the importance of midair refueling. The aviation industry is installing such systems on planes

such as the Boeing 707 and the Hercules. At the air show held at Le Bourges last June, a number of organizations showed interest in this area. The aviation industry is offering two refueling systems—the boom system and a system of refueling points within the airplane itself—in Boeing airplanes.

Lavi' D.T: This is, in fact, the third prototype of the Lavi'. Several dozen test flights have checked all the plane's systems and, according to the aviation industry, "they were found to be operating satisfactorily." A few months ago, test pilots from two flight weeklies FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL and AVIATION WEEK flew in the plane and praised its accomplishments. One of them even claimed that this was the plane that was missing in the Gulf War. The aviation industry has used the plane in the past, and will use it over the coming months, to test new developments.

Tadiran Develops Antimissile Simulator

92P40169A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Apr 92 p 5

[Editorial Report] Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ carried in its 2 April 1992 issue in Hebrew on page 5 a short article on an antimissile training simulator developed by Tadiran. According to the article, there are three rooms used for the training: the "red room," which is the enemy; the "blue room," which is Israel; and the "white room," which is the administrative team. The antimissile defense simulator is located deep underground where theater defense exercises can be conducted; it is the only one of its kind in the world.

According to the Israeli newspaper, Tadiran Systems Administrator Mandi 'Irada and Project Manager Shlomo Azar believe that, in order to develop an antimissile order of battle, simulation is necessary, but apart from the Gulf War Scud missile attacks, practical experience is unavailable. The article says that the goal is to simulate attacks and to develop a doctrine to combat them. The system is named ITB and it is, in fact, a ground-to-ground warfare game with real-time command and control properties, tactical display, and direct battle administration involvement.

HA'ARETZ adds that, according to Tadiran Director-General Guri Meltzar, the simulator is based on advanced software systems, and the project was completed in only 32 months.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.